Tripoli is burning again. Gunfire echoed through the capital in early May as Libya plunged into yet another power struggle. This time, the trigger was the death of one of the country’s most notorious militia leaders: Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, known locally as “Gheniwa.” But this wasn’t just another turf war. It was a calculated hit with implications that reach far beyond Libya’s borders. The fallout could reshape the US playbook in North Africa.
Al-Kikli led the Stability Support Apparatus, a militia infamous for human rights abuses. He ran Abu Salim like a fiefdom, complete with torture chambers and loyalty networks stretching deep into Tripoli’s government. His assassination, which occurred inside the 444th Brigade’s headquarters, wasn’t random. It was surgical. And it signals that Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah has decided it’s time to clean house or at least consolidate it.
Libya has long been a geopolitical minefield. Since Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, warlords, tribal factions, and foreign mercenaries have carved the nation into zones of influence.
The 444th Brigade and the 111th, both aligned with Dbeibah, moved quickly. Within hours, they dismantled SSA checkpoints, seized arms depots, and filled the power vacuum. The swiftness wasn’t improvisation. It was coordination. Perhaps it even came with international backing. Notably, Turkey — a key Dbeibah ally and NATO member — maintains a military footprint in western Libya. Where Turkey moves, US strategic interests are watching closely.
Libya has long been a geopolitical minefield. Since Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, warlords, tribal factions, and foreign mercenaries have carved the nation into zones of influence. The east remains under the grip of Khalifa Haftar, the Russian-backed strongman whose ambitions have consistently clashed with US goals in the region. The west, until now, was fractured between militias loosely tethered to the Tripoli government.
With al-Kikli gone, the scales are tipping. For once, they might be tipping in the right direction.
Dbeibah is no saint. But he’s pragmatic — and increasingly pro-West by default. His survival depends on international legitimacy and economic stability. Both of those require oil exports, dollar transactions, and reduced chaos. In Washington’s eyes, that makes him a partner worth watching, if not yet fully trusting.
The real question is whether the US is ready to lean in. Much of its Libya policy has remained passive, focused on UN-led processes and cautious diplomacy. But the situation on the ground is demanding more. The recent consolidation of power in Tripoli offers a rare opening: a central authority with the muscle to dismantle rogue militias and the motive to secure US support against eastern threats.
One clear lever is security cooperation. The 444th Brigade is not your average militia. It is disciplined, professionalized, and increasingly aligned with government interests. Targeted training, intelligence-sharing, and support — possibly channeled via Turkey — could create a reliable security apparatus in western Libya. This force could challenge both extremist cells and Russian proxies.
Another lever is economic. Libya’s oil wealth is both its curse and its cure. Ensuring that revenues benefit national institutions instead of local warlords must remain a top priority. Washington, with its influence over international financial systems, can help safeguard Libya’s oil earnings. It can also condition access to frozen assets on meaningful political reform.
The era of untouchable warlords is closing. What comes next depends on whether Washington watches from the sidelines or finally steps onto the field.
This isn’t about picking winners or taking sides in a civil war. It’s about recognizing when one faction is starting to look more like a government than a gang — and deciding whether to help shape it or leave the vacuum to others. Russia has already made its choice. It backed Haftar, built bases in the south, and flooded the region with Wagner operatives. Iran and extremist networks are circling too.
The Dbeibah government, flawed as it is, represents one of the few remaining buffers against total fragmentation. Supporting its recent moves — discreetly, conditionally, but decisively — could buy time and space for the political process to resume. This time, it might do so from a position of greater control.
There are, of course, risks. Dbeibah could overreach. The brigades could fracture. Haftar could counterstrike. But inaction is riskier. The longer Libya remains stateless, the more fertile the ground becomes for anti-American actors to grow roots.
What happened in Tripoli was not just an internal purge. It was a message. Someone — likely several actors — decided the old rules no longer applied. The era of untouchable warlords is closing. What comes next depends on whether Washington watches from the sidelines or finally steps onto the field.
If the US wants to prevent another failed state from becoming a playground for autocrats and terrorists, the time to engage is now.
Published originally on May 28, 2025.
