MEGHRI, ARMENIA—The last train left the old, abandoned Soviet station in this dusty, mountainous outpost just a few dozen yards from the Iranian border in 1989.
It was bound for Baku, Azerbaijan, just over 300 miles away.
Meghri is a small town, with just about 4,500 residents, but it could become a geopolitical flashpoint.
Soon after, as the Soviet Union collapsed, Azerbaijan severed its rail link with Armenia. Today, the old Meghri train station is strewn with trash. Soviet train cars rust in its yard. You can see it in the photo above.
The paint and plaster on the once elegant building is peeling. The train yard abuts the Iranian border and the Aras River. Just 20 feet away in the opposite direction, cars speed on the highway between the Armenian cities of Meghri and Kapan, and Iranian, Armenian, and Georgian trucks lumber past on the way to or from the official border crossing with the Islamic Republic of Iran, just a couple miles away.
The Flashpoint History Can’t Skip Over Anymore
Meghri is a small town, with just about 4,500 residents, but it could become a geopolitical flashpoint. The long-frozen conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted in 2020 when the Azerbaijani military, backed by Turkish Special Forces and armed with Israeli weaponry, attacked Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh. After 45 days, Russian President Vladimir Putin imposed a ceasefire that called for Russian peacekeepers to separate Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the return by Armenia of Azerbaijani territory it occupied between Armenia and the Armenian statelet in Nagorno-Karabakh, a humanitarian corridor to feed Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians, and then transit corridors across Armenia so that Azerbaijan and its landlocked exclave could trade by land.
Azerbaijan never fulfilled its commitment; it blocked aid traversing the Lachin corridor and then attacked the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh to expel the region’s 1,700-year-old indigenous Christian community. To add insult to injury after such violations, Azerbaijan berated Armenia for allegedly violating the 2020 ceasefire by no creating a corridor across which Azerbaijan and Turkey could trade with each other.
While numerous proposals about the corridor leak to the press, even the most basic details are unresolved. It is unclear, for example, whether the corridor would be a sanitary corridor exclusive to Azerbaijan and Turkey, exclusively a road or railroad Azerbaijani trucks or trains would enter and be unable to exit, or whether Armenian vehicles could also use the corridor. If the former, politicians and diplomats have not decided how Armenian traffic would cross the corridor.
Both Azerbaijan and Turkey blockade Armenia, seeking to starve it into submission. As Georgia falls under Russian influence, Armenia’s ability to trade via its northern neighbor is also in question.
The route is also unclear. Azerbaijan and Turkey demand the corridor traverse southern Armenia, likely passing through Meghri, while Armenians favor a corridor further north in Syunik, perhaps near the provincial capital Kapan if not even further north.
Topography and existing infrastructure favor the Armenian argument. The Soviet-era rail no longer exists and decades of development have made real estate tight. Geopolitics, of course, comes into play. A major reason why Azerbaijan and Turkey favor the southern route is to cut Armenia off from Iran. Both Azerbaijan and Turkey blockade Armenia, seeking to starve it into submission. As Georgia falls under Russian influence, Armenia’s ability to trade via its northern neighbor is also in question.
If Turkey, Azerbaijan, or Russia can block Armenia’s southern border, they an essentially besiege and starve the country, much as they did Nagorno-Karabakh.
While diplomats debate routes, protocols, and even the possible involvement of American contractors, they miss the larger question: Do designated corridors bring peace or encourage war?
If the goal is peace, there is no need for a corridor: Turkey could lift its blockade of Armenia and open its borders to truck traffic. The same is true for Azerbaijan. Indeed, Armenians say they would welcome reciprocal trade. In contrast, if Azerbaijan and Turkey demand their corridor be a cordon sanitaire, that suggests an unwillingness to recognize and normalize ties with Armenia. Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia treated the November 2020 ceasefire with disdain; demanding now a single clause is illogical. Armenia should not let Azerbaijan define the debate.
If peace is the goal, end the blockade. If trade flows freely, then the whole discussion of corridors becomes moot.
