The Druze ‘National Guard’ in Southern Syria

As the Assad regime’s grip on northern Syria collapsed at the end of 2024, Druze armed groups in Suwayda decided to end the uneasy status quo that had prevailed for years: a light regime security footprint alongside continued state administration. Factions that once carried the Syrian regime’s flag as a gesture of nominal loyalty to Damascus switched to the green-white-black opposition banner and signalled readiness to join a new, unified Syria. Ashraf Jamul, spokesman for a coalition of Suwayda factions known as the Joint Operations Room, captured the early mood when he told Syria in Transition in December: “Once Suwayda, Daraa and the southern region stood hand-in-hand, Damascus fell. We were the first factions to arrive in Damascus before any other faction arrived.”

Nine months later, identification with the Syrian state is at its lowest point. Calls for outright separatism and even alliance with Israel have grown. Ashraf himself, speaking after government and Sunni tribal forces stormed Suwayda in July and committed grave violations, argued: “There is no solution to this issue except to join the state of Israel.” Protests in the following weeks echoed rage and anger, with demonstrators declaring Suwayda’s right to independence and denouncing Damascus and its forces — or, as Ashraf described them: “the criminal gang that has brought destruction, kidnapping and killing.”

With this rise of rejection of the new Syrian state under President Ahmad al-Sharaa has come the consolidation of over 35 Druze armed factions into a ‘National Guard’, announced on 23 August and endorsed by Hikmat al-Hajari, one of the community’s three most senior spiritual leaders in Syria (mashaykh al-‘aql). Meanwhile, the ‘Supreme Legal Committee’, announced on 6 August and also endorsed by Hajari, now functions as the civilian wing of a de facto Druze autonomous zone across central, southern and eastern Suwayda. The northern and western countryside remain under control of pro-government forces.

Government supporters have cast Hajari as the villain — a criminal, “traitor,” and collaborator with Israel bent on carving out his own fiefdom. Yet his harder line was not dominant before the government’s July attempt to impose control over the province by force, in which at least 2,000 Druze were killed. Until then, Damascus had found pragmatists within mainstream Druze factions willing to negotiate. Liwa al-Jabal, a powerful Druze group that coordinated with the Ministry of Defence, had previously seen Hajari as obstructionist in his insistence on constitutional decentralisation and secularism as preconditions for talks with the government. A spokesman told Syria in Transition that only 20 percent of factions stood with him. After the July violence, however, Liwa al-Jabal swung behind Hajari and joined the National Guard.

Even earlier atrocities, including the coastal massacres in March and violations against Druze in Damascus suburbs in April and May, had not ended engagement with Damascus. The July campaign, however, marked by massacres, kidnappings, and desecration of Druze shrines, shifted perceptions. Hajari’s scepticism toward the government suddenly seemed vindicated. Those still sympathetic to Damascus — notably Layth al-Balous and Sulayman Abd al-Baqi, whose support the government had counted on — are now publicly reviled by many Druze as traitors and live outside Suwayda. Others, such as former Rijal al-Karama leader Yahya al-Hajjar, have faced sharp internal criticism for initially welcoming government forces. One source in the Rijal al-Karama militia described a “strong incitement campaign” that had forced Yahya’s replacement with Mazid Khadaj, who now backs Hajari’s National Guard. The sense of existential threat has pushed the Druze toward closing and cleaning their ranks.

Some pro-government voices claim the National Guard is a “regime remnant” project that exposes Hajari’s malice. In reality, matters are more complex. Some former regime officers have indeed joined, among them Jihad al-Ghoutani, a Fourth Division brigadier general who was promoted to the rank in 2019. But their rallying to Hajari does not reflect Assadist influence so much as personal adaptation to a post-Assad reality. They have decided that their own interests and that of their community are best served by supporting Hajari — who has attracted support from Druze across political backgrounds.

Their inclusion nonetheless raises questions about accountability and the nature of the Hajari coalition, such as whether allegations of past war crimes should be ignored simply because these men bring military expertise to now defend “their community.” Supporters of Hajari’s coalition argue that Damascus itself works with figures accused of war crimes. In Syria, consistent and principled accountability remains elusive. Continuity runs through every camp, and none is morally untainted. Years of war and a predatory war economy have brutalised society and shaped its leaders. The only key difference between the government and the Druze are their respective narratives. When the Sharaa government integrates regime remnants, they are portrayed as serving the “greater good” of the state — regardless of how inclusive or just that state may be. When Druze factions do the same, albeit on a smaller scale, they are denounced as traitors. As long as there is no serious transitional justice process — which only the government can credibly initiate — selectively invoking accountability should be read for what it is: a rhetorical device to suppress unwelcome voices.

The National Guard and its civilian wing were born out of crisis and, like other de facto security forces and autonomous administrations that have emerged during the Syrian war, are interim entities: placeholders until the conflict over the state’s future is resolved. A truly independent Druze polity could not survive on its own, as many Druze are well aware. The earlier mentioned source in Rijal al-Karama cautioned that calls for an Israel-backed Druze state would be a “great mistake”, adding that “there is no place for us except within the Syrian and Arab embrace.”

If Israel secures Washington’s backing to expand its presence in the south while Damascus fails to chart a credible path toward reconciliation, the Druze are likely to continue to choose options, including ad hoc and interim measures, that best guarantee their immediate survival. In Syria, interim solutions have a way of becoming entrenched.

Published originally in the September 2025 issue of Syria in Transition under the title “The (Sub) National Guard: The Druze of Syria Now Have an Army.”