The third round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran took place in Oman at the end of April. More rounds are expected, with both sides pushing hard to get what they want out of the deal. But what exactly has changed since the U.S. pulled out of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)? Why are some U.S. officials still holding out, talking about “very good progress” like this time will somehow be different? That is where a more foundational question becomes relevant: Can there ever be a reliable, enforceable nuclear and missile non-proliferation agreement with Iran—and one that Iran would actually honour? Answering that requires understanding the regime at its core.
Since the signing of the JCPOA in July 2015, the U.S. has cycled through two Republican and two Democratic administrations. Iran, however, has remained the same. Its leadership structure and its ideological base have not budged. It does not matter whether a so-called “reformist” like Rouhani or Pezeshkian or a “hardliner” like Raisi is in office—the fundamental nature of the regime does not change. It is not a state that responds to international norms, but an ideological theocracy rooted in Perso-Shia supremacy and anti-Western resistance. Western analysts and policymakers in mainstream media too often ignore this fact. Instead of confronting the regime’s deeply held beliefs and intentions, they try to explain Iran’s actions as rational, strategic responses to outside pressures or search for the rational justifications of its behaviours. But that analysis falls short. This is not just a question of carrots and sticks—it is about identity.
Iran’s leaders see their survival as dependent on resisting the liberal international order. To them, the Islamic Republic is not just a government but also a mission. Abandoning its anti-American, anti-Israel, and anti-liberal stance would not just be a political shift; it would effectively commit ideological suicide. That is why previous deals have failed. Trump justified his withdrawal in May 2018 by arguing that the agreement, as “a windfall of cash,” did not curb Iran’s destabilizing regional activities. Instead, it provided financial resources that “enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior.” Iran’s compliance is always temporary, tactical, and reversible; as John Bolton, former National Security Advisor, rightly pointed out, “there is no 100% way to verify compliance.”
At some point, U.S. policymakers will have to face the truth: this regime is not interested in real compromise, and deterrence does not work on a fanatically religious system.
Yes, there has been a major shift in U.S. policy over time. Obama and Biden have leaned toward diplomacy and engagement through imposing soft and easily evaded restrictions set to expired before 2030, while Trump pursued maximum pressure. But the other side has remained fundamentally static. What has changed is Iran’s current position of weakness. Years of sanctions and a series of blows to its regional proxy network—dealt by Israel—have put the regime on the back foot. That is not a sign of transformation. It is just a moment of vulnerability that Iran will try to manage.
As Ambassador John Bolton often says, “Trump has his own philosophy,” but that should not stop him and Congress from understanding what Taqiyya means—the deeply held belief and the common practice of deception Iran uses in the service of survival. Iran changes its tone and appearance depending on circumstances, but never its core values. It may dial down its “Death to America” slogans or quietly pull the U.S. flag from under university doorsteps during talks, but its hostility toward the U.S., Israel, and liberalism as a whole remains.
Iran’s leadership sees Israel not just as a geopolitical rival, but as the embodiment of colonialism and an extension of “colonizers” or American and Western influence. Its preoccupation with anti-Zionism is not strategic—it is theological. This is not a regime that can be dissuaded from its goals through mutual interest and diplomacy alone. Internally, Iran’s oppressed national and ethnic and minorities—Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and others—have tried peaceful resistance and civil disobedience, resulting in brutal crackdowns and ongoing repression.
At some point, U.S. policymakers will have to face the truth: this regime is not interested in real compromise, and deterrence does not work on a fanatically religious system. If the Trump administration had fully understood this, it might have prepared to “move on”—as it may with peace talks between Ukraine and Russia—and let Israel take decisive action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. That may still be on the table as a viable path to stopping Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
In the end, what the U.S. is asking of Iran is not just to change behaviour but to abandon its ideological foundation. That is not something the regime can do without collapsing. And its supporters and proxies, from Iraq to Lebanon to Yemen, know that too.
