On June 22, President Donald Trump all but endorsed regime change in Iran in a social media post. This is wise. Regime change is different than regime collapse. Iran should not become a failed state, but rather a country that realigns with the free world. Ideally, Iran would become a liberal democratic state. Any talk of regime change in Iran necessarily must consider Reza Pahlavi, the crown prince, as a candidate for at least the transition period.
The problem with Pahlavi is that Iranians can neither do with nor without him. Long-time Iranian studies academic Michael Rubin wrote a sympathetic piece that nonetheless criticized disorganization surrounding Pahlavi’s organization. There is something to this. While Pahlavi has maintained his position as the leading opposition figure by fending off rivals over the past decade, he has failed to leverage his popularity into an action plan.
One view of Pahlavi is that the people surrounding him poorly serve him. This is understandable. For decades, Iranians surrounding him have treated him not as an opposition figure but as the king. This bias has impeded even friendly criticism from his own advisors.
Pahlavi’s supporters inside Iran are largely not enlightened liberals; he is more popular both among conservative Iranians from the working class ... as well as an older generation.
Another view is that Pahlavi plays a duplicitous game. His message has been that Iranians should decide whether their country’s future should be a monarchy or a republic, but he has previously also said his preference is a republic. “I will never agree to having a master,” he said in one interview, “let alone becoming someone else’s master.” His second daughter recently married a Jewish American, and a shrewd observer pointed out that this is another piece of evidence that Pahlavi has not raised his children to be Iranian princesses.
But the people closest to him have a completely different message. They treat criticism nearly as heresy. His closest confidant, Amir Etemadi, in a language akin to the Turkish state, calls any journalist critical of Pahlavi a “terrorist,” including employees of Iran International, a generally sympathetic outlet. A popular slogan among his supporters is, “Death to three corrupt actors: mullahs, lefties, and Mojahedin.” In this context, lefty refers to republicans, whom the Pahlavists accuse of secessionist sympathies, an unpatriotic slander akin to treason but a powerful bogeyman for many Iranians. These undermine the promises of liberalism preached by Pahlavi.
Pahlavi has failed to expand his support base because his followers do not listen to his message of unity and liberalism. They attack rather than convince. Perhaps he is insincere, though this is unlikely. The alternative, though, is that he is too inept to enforce discipline on his supporters, even though this should be an easier task than running a country.
Pahlavi’s supporters inside Iran are largely not enlightened liberals; he is more popular both among conservative Iranians from the working class and the bazaar who respect strong central authority, as well as an older generation who have fond memories of the monarchy in contrast to the Islamic Republic. Secular and educated youth, though, are deeply skeptical of Pahlavi. This is a problem because that demographic constitutes the largest faction of the protest movement.
Certain missteps also damaged his credibility. During the 2022 protests, a coalition of former rivals gathered at Georgetown University to form a united opposition bloc. The initiative was a failure and collapsed. In the aftermath, other members pointed to Pahlavi as the divisive actor. Allegedly, many perceived his attempt to add Etemadi and Shahin Najafi, a vulgar singer and fervent Pahlavist, to the coalition as a power-grab. Pahlavi continues not to give his account of the events, despite being blamed by other members, adding to the sense that his divisiveness was deliberate. The conduct of his supporters and associates reinforces that view.
This could be Pahlavi’s moment. The previous U.S. administration met with most opposition figures, but it refused to meet with Pahlavi. The administration worried that the Islamic Republic would view such a meeting as an implicit endorsement of regime change and ruin their hopes for diplomacy. The current administration has no such fears. Quite the opposite, Pahlavi has spoken at conferences with members of the current administration, including Vice President J.D. Vance when he was a U.S. senator and Stephen Miller, an advisor to the White House.
This is also the weakest the regime has ever been. The administration is moving toward making regime change the declared policy, and Israel is paving the way for it. Finally, the president himself is biased toward monarchies with whom he can work in the Middle East, while the Israelis have formed a good partnership with Pahlavi.
The only other candidate current decision-makers might find attractive is the Mojahedin-e Khalq. The Saudis might even favor them. The problem with the group is that it is popular only among former American and European officials, rather than Iranians. Iranians have not forgiven it for fighting with Iraq and against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. Despite the vocabulary of democracy that the group uses when interacting with Western officials, its core identity remains a fusion of Islamism and Marxism, both ideologies that Iranians reject.
If Pahlavi fails to rise to the occasion, he should abdicate his position as an opposition leader.
If Pahlavi fails to rise to the occasion, he should abdicate his position as an opposition leader. To meet the moment, he must move to the region. Rubin has suggested Najaf, but Dubai would be a better destination. Najaf has religious symbolism, but the religious Iranians who are anti-regime already support him. Dubai resembles the future the secular youth wish to see: cosmopolitan, modern, and wealthy.
Pahlavi should reconsider his organization, too. He has managed to impose some discipline on the members of his office over the past two years, but that is too recent to forget. He needs a staff who are in sync with his liberal message. More importantly, he needs a staff who both treat him as a leader and challenge him, not aides who see him as the heir to Cyrus and someone who is beyond criticism.
Lastly, he must take risks. Understandably, Pahlavi has been cautious to ask Iranians to come to the streets. If such a pronouncement goes unanswered, it will discredit him. If Iranians respond, the regime will crack down. Some will blame him for the innocent blood spilled.
If the Trump administration is serious about regime change, Pahlavi can mitigate the second problem by working with the U.S. and Israeli governments to impede the Islamic Republic’s efforts at cracking down on popular uprisings.
Pahlavi, no young man, has been waiting for this moment his whole adult life, but it is unclear whether he has prepared himself for it. Iranians deserve a capable opposition leader. This is Pahlavi’s chance to prove that he is that man. If not, it is time to disappear from politics and allow someone else to emerge.
