The Red Sea is no longer a secure trade corridor. The Houthis, an Iran-backed movement operating from Yemen, have escalated attacks on vessels transiting this waterway. While Houthi rhetoric focuses on solidarity with Palestinians and hostility toward the West, their choice of targets tells a more nuanced story: Greek-owned ships have emerged as a frequent and deliberate focus.
Recent attacks are not random. The Houthis struck the Magic Seas and Eternity C within hours in the Red Sea. The Eco Wizard suffered sabotage in the Baltic. An external explosive hobbled the Vilamoura on June 27, 2025, as it departed a Libyan port. Four ships, three separate maritime zones, all Greek-owned. These incidents, spread across geography and time, form a pattern that highlights the strategic role of Greek shipping in the global economy, and efforts by terrorists and their sponsors to undercut Greece.
Greece controls more than 21 percent of the world’s cargo-carrying capacity.
Greece controls more than 21 percent of the world’s cargo-carrying capacity. Greek shipowners operate thousands of vessels that transit strategic chokepoints like the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These ships may fly various national flags, but their ownership is visible; the Houthis and other terrorists are sophisticated and precise in whom they target.
The Houthis and other terrorists target Greek-owned ships for three reasons. First, these vessels are ubiquitous—Greek firms operate one of the largest merchant fleets in the world. Second, they are strategically important, responsible for a large share of global energy and goods transport. Third, they are lightly defended. Unlike U.S. or Israeli naval assets, most Greek commercial ships transit contested zones without military escort.
For the Houthis and their backers, attacking Greek ships serves a dual purpose—damaging Western-linked trade while avoiding actions that might provoke full-scale military retaliation. Greek shipping finds itself at the intersection of commercial infrastructure and geopolitical signaling. This makes them ideal targets: high in economic impact, low in political risk. The result is a new kind of warfare: disruption without escalation.
The effects are now felt. Shipowners reroute vessels to avoid the Red Sea, incurring longer transit times and higher fuel costs. Insurance premiums are rising. Delays ripple through supply chains. The Houthis have demonstrated that a regional group with the right tools and protection can have a global economic footprint.
This is not just a commercial issue; it is a signal that non-state actors can manipulate critical global infrastructure without facing significant response. Within the industry, alarm is rising. Melina Travlos, president of the Union of Greek Shipowners, issued a statement expressing grave concern over maritime security. Greek Minister for Shipping Vassilis Kikilias met with Israel’s Minister of Transport to discuss growing threats and cooperation. These developments underscore that the threat is no longer a technical problem for insurers or risk managers—it is a strategic problem for governments. At the heart of this evolution is a larger geopolitical question: Who controls the arteries of global trade?
Disrupting maritime corridors like the Suez Canal opens the door to shift trade across land routes, energy pipelines, and logistics hubs under tighter state control.
Disrupting maritime corridors like the Suez Canal opens the door to shift trade across land routes, energy pipelines, and logistics hubs under tighter state control. What looks like regional chaos may serve a longer-term ambition: to reroute commerce away from liberal maritime norms and toward systems influenced or dominated by rival powers. Indian officials have voiced similar theories, noting that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stands to benefit if Houthi disruption of shipping forces Indian companies to ship freight across the so-called “Northern Corridor” in Iran, whose logistics companies the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls.
Greek shipping, in this context, is not just economically important; it represents Western integration, commercial independence, and logistical dominance. The risk now grows. As attacks go unanswered, terrorists absorb a dangerous lesson: Targeting commercial vessels, especially Greek-owned ones, can yield gains without triggering consequences.
This emerging vulnerability cannot be addressed by rerouting ships alone. It requires coordinated political response—and that begins with the United States. The United States long has been the guarantor of freedom of navigation and a key partner of Greece. But its recent redeployment of naval assets away from Red Sea patrols creates a vacuum. European forces have not filled the gap. With no deterrent in place, adversaries exploit the opportunity.
