Iran is facing its most severe wave of anti-regime unrest since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. A collapsing economy has driven the rial toward 1.4 million per dollar, pushed inflation above 40 percent, and sent food prices soaring more than 70 percent year-on-year. What began as protests over living costs has escalated into nationwide calls for regime change. Chants of “Death to the dictator!” echo across all thirty-one provinces as bazaar strikes disrupt commerce, ethnic minorities mobilize, and security forces respond with live fire. More than 2,400 protesters reportedly have been killed and over 16,700 arrested, amid a near-total internet blackout, with credible estimates placing the death toll above 10,000.
For Turkey, which shares a 331-mile border with Iran, the unrest poses a direct strategic threat. Yet Ankara refuses to back the protesters. Instead, it pursues strategic restraint: denouncing “foreign interference,” especially by the United States and Israel, while deepening engagement with Tehran. This stance reflects calculation, not neutrality.
Ankara has issued no evacuation advisories for Turkish citizens in Iran, signaling confidence in regime survival.
Ankara views escalation as the worst possible outcome. President Donald Trump’s threats of “strong action” alarm Turkish policymakers who fear a refugee surge far exceeding previous inflows. Turkey already hosts roughly 3.6 million Syrians and faces mounting domestic backlash against migrants. Another regional collapse would strain state capacity and inflame social tensions. Escalation would also risk proxy conflict in Iraq and Syria, where Turkish forces confront Kurdish groups and Iranian-backed militias. A wider war could entangle NATO’s second-largest military while Turkey struggles with inflation nearing 50 percent. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has therefore warned Washington and Jerusalem to stay out.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has reinforced this line by framing the protests as rooted in “genuine grievances” but driven by external manipulation. In a January 2026 interview, he accused the Mossad of exploiting social media to inflame unrest, arguing that interference would backfire. This narrative serves two purposes. Externally, it signals to Tehran that Ankara will not support regime change. Domestically, it reinforces Erdoğan’s long-standing message that mass protests invite chaos, foreign plots, and state collapse. Justice and Development Party (AKP) spokesperson Ömer Çelik echoed this view, insisting Iran’s problems must be resolved through “internal dynamics,” not external pressure.
Despite its rhetoric, Turkey has intensified diplomacy. Fidan has held multiple calls with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, emphasizing dialogue and de-escalation. Ankara has issued no evacuation advisories for Turkish citizens in Iran, signaling confidence in regime survival. At the same time, Turkey has coordinated with Persian Gulf states, including the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, to manage energy risks and contain sectarian spillover. As a NATO member, Turkey has pressed Western partners to avoid actions that could trigger state collapse. This multi-vector diplomacy reflects Turkey’s doctrine of “strategic autonomy,” which in practice means hedging against every outcome while committing to none.
Security concerns anchor this caution. Turkish officials fear that prolonged unrest or regime collapse in Iran would turn the border into a corridor for smuggling, armed movement, and uncontrolled migration. Turkey has already fortified its frontier, including constructing a 150-mile border wall. Opposition lawmakers have questioned the government’s preparedness for a new migration wave, warning that additional refugees would strain public services, worsen inflation, and intensify anti-immigrant sentiment. Turkey currently hosts more than 74,000 Iranian residents alongside thousands of asylum seekers, and any sudden influx would further complicate Ankara’s migration arrangements with the European Union. Authorities have also restricted protests near the Iranian consulate in Istanbul to prevent spillover activism among the diasporas.
Turkish officials fear that prolonged unrest or regime collapse in Iran would turn the border into a corridor for smuggling, armed movement, and uncontrolled migration.
The Kurdish dimension heightens Ankara’s anxiety. Iranian Kurds have played a leading role in the protests and have faced disproportionate repression. Groups such as Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdistan Freedom Party, and Kurdistan Free Life Party have called for regime change, strikes, and minority rights. For Turkey, this remains a red line. Although the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announced its dissolution in 2025, Ankara fears unrest among Iranian Kurds could revive cross-border networks and reintroduce separatist narratives inside Turkey.
Economic dependence further sharpens Turkey’s caution. Iran supplies 13.5-20 percent of Turkey’s natural gas under a contract expiring in 2026, making any disruption, especially in winter, costly through higher prices and inflation. Strategically, Ankara fears a power vacuum more than authoritarian continuity, warning that a weakened Iran could invite jihadists, expanded U.S. or Israeli military action, and proxy warfare that would erode Turkey’s position in Iraq and Syria. By hedging, Ankara preserves leverage whether the regime survives or weakens.
Turkey avoids openly endorsing Tehran’s repression, allows limited solidarity rallies, and tightly polices escalation. This calibrated ambiguity shields Ankara from Western pressure but exposes Erdoğan’s core logic: Mass uprisings threaten state authority. Turkey, therefore, defends the status quo, judging authoritarian stability next door to be safer than revolutionary uncertainty.
