Most analyses of succession in Iran focus on formal institutions. Nevertheless, there is another structure that provides authority through local processes: khums. Believers provide khums, a donation, to a living marja’, whom they believe is the most knowledgeable about laws and jurisprudence. The amount of khums received amplifies into influence, as a marja’ can use the cash to sponsor more seminary students, mosques, and charities.
The Shi’i clerical system long has remained independent from the state institutions and centers in Najaf and Qom.
Khums verify authority, as Shi’a choose the recipients. Khums functions not simply as a religious obligation but as a system of continuous legitimacy production. Khums also operates as a system of decentralized clerical sovereignty that predates the Islamic Republic. The Shi’i clerical system long has remained independent from the state institutions and centers in Najaf and Qom. The authority that a marja’ holds ends at death, forcing believers to consider their allegiance. This is not cut and dried, though. The contrast between Grand Ayatollahs Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah and Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei illustrates this. Fadlallah’s network preserved institutions and collected khums with approval from living maraji’, while Khoei’s network redirected allegiance toward Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
In Iran, the state has tolerated both methods. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini sought to direct his followers to Ali Khamenei, his choice as successor, after Khomeini’s 1989 death. While the regime coerced Iranians to accept this politically, not all continued to direct their khums to Khamenei’s office. This reflects a system that guarantees institutional continuity but not legitimacy. If Khamenei’s succession was only partially successful in tying religious and institutional succession, this will not likely remain the case going forward. Shi’i doctrine does not permit hereditary succession, hampering the regime’s attempt to elevate Khamenei’s son Mojtaba as supreme leader.
Scholars say the government utilizes religious foundations, or bonyads, coercion, and patronage to collect khums, but this downplays the importance of voluntary emulation of the authority and leadership of a marja’.
If Mojtaba Khamenei fails to secure the title of a marja’, khums payments will shift away from him to those residing in Najaf, or to alternative clerics in Qom.
This dynamic creates a paradox. The Islamic Republic is strong where it has institutional power but weak where it depends on legitimacy. The regime depends on decisions it cannot control as it concentrates its institutions. Khums reflects this vulnerability, as each payment reflects a private judgment about authority. Combined across the millions of individuals who make these decisions, they affect the flow of funds and transform clerical authority. Analysts can treat khums as revealed preferences for religious authority.
Every khums payment is essentially a plebiscite on clerical authority. Naming a marja’ is not enough; that authority must be sustained. If Mojtaba Khamenei fails to secure the title of a marja’, khums payments will shift away from him to those residing in Najaf, or to alternative clerics in Qom, potentially dividing the allegiance of Iranians across more than a dozen clerics. This process unfolds quietly through routine financial practice. As the state decides who rules, believers choose who is authoritative.
This reveals a form of political order in which authority emerges through participation rather than enforcement. Khums operates across Iraq, Iran, and the wider Shi’i world. The dynamics of money flows in khums indicate the balance of power between Qom and Najaf. Analysts who neglect khums are bound to be wrong about the structure of authority in Iran. The state can organize religion, but it cannot command belief. Succession theory helps predict which individual would take the leadership of Iran, but it fails to address the issue of the legitimacy of the marja’ who will legitimize the state after succession takes place.
