When India launched Operation Sindoor against Pakistan on May 7, 2025, to avenge a cross-border attack on the popular tourist region of Pahalgam, Jerusalem stood firmly behind New Delhi. Why, then, as Israel conducts operations against Iran, is India approaching the conflict with ambiguity? On June 13, 2025, for example, the Indian foreign ministry urged Israel and Iran to “de-escalate” and “resolve underlying issues.” At the same time, though, India did refrain from endorsing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s condemnation of Israel. Once again, New Delhi faces a dilemma akin to that it faced in the Russia-Ukraine situation.
Over the past three decades, but particularly under Narendra Modi’s government, Israel has become one of India’s most important strategic partners.
India’s so-called strategic autonomy may frustrate its allies, but it emanates from myriad sources. Over the past three decades, but particularly under Narendra Modi’s government, Israel has become one of India’s most important strategic partners. This partnership encompasses a spectrum of diplomatic, counterterrorism, intelligence, defense, technological, agricultural, business, and cultural ties, as well as Modi’s personal friendship with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his Israeli counterpart. India’s traditional support for Palestinians in multilateral organizations has declined significantly, and India now often abstains from voting against Israel in multilateral forums.
Also, Hamas’s growing ties with Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups and Indian Islamist groups alarm Indian intelligence.
However, at the same time, India values its ties with Iran. Today, energy security, connectivity, and security constitute the bedrock of India’s Iran policy. Iran is India’s second-largest oil supplier. India, with its aspirations to be a global economic powerhouse, places a premium on energy security. If starved of oil because of pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, India could face instability and unrest. Iran also provides India with the quintessential strategic connectivity to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe. The Chabahar project on the Gulf of Oman, an India-Iran joint venture, allows India a gateway into Central Asia and Afghanistan without needing to transit Pakistan. Wars and volatility in the Middle East dampen the prospects of the India-Middle East Economic Corridor, and Western sanctions against Russia, blocking the entry of Indian goods into Europe through Russia, have also made the dormant International North-South Transport Corridor across Iran critical to India’s interests. Finally, there is the Khamenei regime’s religious hold over India’s substantial Shi’ite population, constituting nearly 15 percent of India’s Muslims.
All these factors combined make New Delhi jittery about taking sides in the Israel-Iran conflict. Reportedly, the Shi’ite Muslims have a better disposition towards Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) than many Indian Sunnis. The BJP, at loggerheads with most Sunnis because of its Hindu-nationalist Hindutva ideology, does not wish to alienate the Shi’ites. Also, Indian agencies view the Shi’ites as a useful counterbalance to India’s worsening threat of Sunni extremism. New Delhi fears losing the Shi’i constituency if India outright supports Israel.
Lately, India’s ties with Iran have deteriorated. The Islamist regime has been critical of the Modi government on its treatment of Muslims, abrogation of Kashmir’s special status, and India’s strengthening ties with Israel. If the ongoing war leads to the ouster of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei’s regime, a major roadblock in India-Israel ties will cease to exist.
If the ongoing war leads to the ouster of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei’s regime, a major roadblock in India-Israel ties will cease to exist.
However, Delhi likely will be uncomfortable with chaos and instability following the regime change. For Pakistan to emerge as an influential player in that scenario would be a nightmare for India. But there is also opportunity if Pakistan’s entanglement in the Iran imbroglio can distract and weaken Pakistan. Massive internal schisms can result due to a fraught Shia-Sunni relationship within Pakistan, and it can accentuate internal protests and existing fissiparous forces, because Pakistan’s overly radicalized and religious society will perceive the backing of American causes as betrayal of Islam.
In the long run, if this conflict escalates, engulfing other major Middle Eastern stakeholders, resulting in instability and the defeat of states and forces promoting Islamist causes, it will deal a blow to India’s Islamist organizations and radical Muslims’ morale. It will be a great windfall for India, whose biggest internal security challenge today comes from radical Islam. In the interim, however, India will continue to walk the tightrope.
