At the height of the Second World War, in the jungles of northeastern India and northern Burma, the Allied forces worked to build a road from India to China to support the forces fighting the Japanese. It started at Ledo, the last railhead in India, with small fuel pipelines laid alongside it. The Ledo Road was later renamed the Stilwell Road in honor of American General Joseph Stilwell, who conceptualized it.
There are lessons to be learned from that war effort. Despite the treacherous terrain of the Patkai mountain ranges, dense forests, and significant loss of human life, the Ledo Road succeeded. If such a mammoth infrastructure project could take shape between 1942 and 1945, there is no reason why a similar effort—of building oil pipelines—could not occur today to address the Strait of Hormuz crisis. Compared with the 1940s, advanced construction technologies, substantial financial resources, and well-trained human resources are more easily available today.
For Washington to retain its position in the Middle East, and for the long-term health of the global economy, addressing the Hormuz vulnerabilities is critical.
The 2026 Iran War has hindered the movement of goods and energy resources across the Strait of Hormuz and harmed the regional and global economy. Unlike the Strait of Hormuz, other important sea lanes such as the Strait of Malacca have alternative routes, such as the Sunda and Lombok straits, through which international trade could traverse. When Houthi rebels targeted ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, many commercial vessels took a long route via the Cape of Good Hope to reach the European and Asian markets. By contrast, for the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz constitutes the only entry and exit point.
Through its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran not only inflicts pain on the global economy, but also undermines the perception that the United States is the net security provider in the Persian Gulf. For Washington to retain its position in the Middle East, and for the long-term health of the global economy, addressing the Hormuz vulnerabilities is critical.
In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia constructed East-West oil and gas pipelines, approximately 750 miles long to transport energy resources from the Abqaiq oil processing center in eastern Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. On one hand, the East-West pipeline has a capacity to transport seven million barrels per day. On the other hand, prior to the Iran War, the Strait of Hormuz saw the passage of almost 20 million barrels per day. Houthi drone attacks have hampered plans to expand the capacity of these pipelines.
The United Arab Emirates inaugurated an oil pipeline from Habshan to the Gulf of Oman port of Fujairah, in 2012. Now, the United Arab Emirates seeks to bring a new pipeline to Fujairah online by 2027, though Iran has targeted Fujairah oil facilities during recent hostilities.
Geopolitical concerns, such as overreliance on the Suez Canal, prompted the construction of a 1,069-mile Trans-Arabian pipeline in 1950 from Al-Dammam, Saudi Arabia, to the Lebanese port of Sidon. That pipeline fell into disuse due both to civil war in Lebanon and the relatively low cost of transporting energy resources by sea. New pipelines along the same route must also consider political instability in Lebanon and Syria.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz also demonstrates that overdependence on a single transit route can incentivize aggressive military tactics.
Similar concerns about Suez prompted the construction of a 158-mile Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, or the Trans-Israel pipeline, in the 1960s. Interestingly, it was a collaborative venture between Israel and Iran, who sought to ship Iranian oil to Europe. Following the Islamic revolution, Israel took full control of the pipeline. News reports in 2020 suggested the pipeline might carry Emirati oil. Some oil that exported from Yanbu could enter the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, though this might require restructuring Saudi-Israeli relations. While the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline may reduce dependence on Suez, it does not reduce the vulnerability associated with the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb.
In the 1970s, there was a Saudi proposal to develop a 37-mile corridor through Oman’s Dhofar region to construct an oil pipeline to a new port on the Arabian Sea. Oman balked, fearing impact on its sovereignty. However, the idea to link the oilfields of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to an Omani port persisted. Hindsight is 20/20, but if such a scheme existed, Tehran would not have the leverage it now exploits.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz also demonstrates that overdependence on a single transit route can incentivize aggressive military tactics. In contrast, diversified networks, such as pipelines, can modulate the behavior of the sovereign states.
As President Donald Trump looks for an exit strategy from the Iran crisis, he might collaborate with regional countries to build a 21st century Stilwell Road, a web of pipelines to send oil from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea. Doing so will deliver substantial benefits for the U.S. and global economies.
