Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is expected to visit Washington in mid-July if he completes appointments to his cabinet. U.S. Envoy Tom Barrack wants a full government, a measurable track to disarm militias, and guarantees that neighboring states will not use Iraqi territory to launch attacks against Western interests and other regional states.
The real test, however, will be if Zaidi can move beyond the forces that enabled his rise. Zaidi cultivates an image in Washington and some regional capitals as a figure from outside Iraq’s traditional ruling environment. An Arab capital, political sources say, helped reassure the Americans about him. Yet his government emerged from the same forces that have run the Iraqi state for two decades, under the supervision of Iranian Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani. External reassurance gives Zaidi an opening, but it does not change Baghdad’s balance.
Zaidi cultivates an image in Washington and some regional capitals as a figure from outside Iraq’s traditional ruling environment.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reportedly has built covert cells inside Iraq, separate from known factional fronts. This lowers pressure on established factions and gives Tehran room to operate from Iraq without putting its known allies at risk. Established militias and groups now move on another track. Some are expanding inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, ministries, security bodies, and economic positions. Others keep the weapons like drone and missiles Tehran does not want to lose. Integration into the state is cosmetic, temporary, and tactical. It gives broader cover.
On June 19, 2026, Kata’ib Sayyid ul-Shuhada said it would not hand over its weapons even if U.S. forces leave Iraq, because Americans would remain in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The statement moved the debate from the U.S. presence in Iraq to the Persian Gulf, exposing the reality: The factions treat their arms as a regional pressure tool, not an Iraqi file.
Even the handover process risks becoming symbolic. Sources say some groups want weapons deposited in depots that remain close to them. The issue is not where the weapons are stored, but who then controls the depots.
Political sources say Zaidi had warned factions that attacks on neighboring states would lead to arrests and prosecutions. Strikes that hit Gulf Arabs exposed the limits of that warning. Beyond statements, Iraqi authorities took no public measures appeared against the accused parties.
Washington now seeks to present the new government as a fresh beginning outside militia control. Barrack’s first visit to Baghdad fit that message, and his thanks to Supreme Judicial Council head Faiq Zaidan for his role forming the government reinforced it. Baghdad’s reality points elsewhere.
Limited measures against corrupt figures or party-linked fronts may hurt some actors, but they will not dismantle the financial structure that funds the militias.
Filling the remaining ministerial posts may allow Zaidi to go to Washington, but it will not prove that the rules of the game have changed. Advanced weapons, political money, border crossings, banks, contracts, and front companies remain subjects of militia influence, if not control. Addressing these problems will reveal the size of Zaidi’s space within the state. The forces that facilitated his government can also block any action that threatens their core interests.
Limited measures against corrupt figures or party-linked fronts may hurt some actors, but they will not dismantle the financial structure that funds the militias. Money protects the weapons and gives the factions the ability to survive when security or U.S. pressure rises.
Washington knows the crisis is deeper than ministerial names. Barrack reportedly told Zaidi that he must dismantle banks and economic structures linked to armed groups. This moves the American demand beyond weapons storage and into the financial system that sustains the factions. But the pressure stops short of a clear cost for networks operating inside the state. Zaidi’s test will neither be his ability to complete the cabinet nor win public relations photos from within the Oval Office; rather, it will be whether he can expose who controls the drones, rockets, money, banks, and issues the orders.
