Iranian Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi is, without doubt, Iran’s most recognizable opposition figure. Unlike the Mujahidin al-Khalq’s Maryam Rajavi, who imposes strict veiling and once sided with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, he is an Iranian patriot. While some Iranians try to pin the excesses of his late father upon the son, this is unfair for two reasons. First, sons do not automatically repeat the mistakes of their fathers. Dictatorship is not genetic. Moroccan King Mohammed VI is generally liberal; he acknowledged the human rights abuses of his father, King Hassan II, and presided over as truth and reconciliation commission. Likewise, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has singlehandedly reversed the social conservativism of his father. Second, Reza Pahlavi is a student of history. He understands the excesses of his father and bends over backwards not to repeat them. Rather than impose his own views, he does the opposite. Her listens but does not lecture. He envisions himself as a coalition builder who can unify disparate threads of Iranian politics around two principles: the unity of the Iranian nation and democracy. He seeks a big tent, one in which liberals, republicans, and monarchists can all co-exist.
[Pahlavi] envisions himself as a coalition builder who can unify disparate threads of Iranian politics around two principles: the unity of the Iranian nation and democracy.
While many Iranian activists—pro-Islamic Republic activists who populate the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and the Quincy Institute—denigrate the crown prince based on the experiences of parents who suffered under the monarchy, ordinary Iranians trapped within the Islamic Republic have a different perspective. A full 10 percent of Iranians participated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution; in comparison, historians estimate only 1 percent of American colonists actively took part in the U.S. Revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini cultivated such crowds by rallying Iranians against the shah, rather than in favor of any specific program. Khomeini repeatedly denied personal ambition or a desire for power and instead promised “Islamic democracy.” By the time Iranians discovered he had lied, it was too late: He had consolidated control. War, corruption, mismanagement, and isolation took their toll on Iranian standards of living.
Under the shah, the Iranian economy was growing quickly; the rapid urbanization that followed contributed to popular discord as villagers with more traditional mentalities flooded into cities and either grew disillusioned with Iran’s pro-Western turn or felt left behind by the progress they saw. After suffering under the clerical regime, many Iranians soon lamented what they lost. The grass is always greener on the other side.
I have seen Iranians who came from the Islamic Republic to attend a wedding see the crown prince, whom they did not know would be in attendance. None were monarchists; all crowded him. Some bowed. Some sought to kiss his hands. Whether monarchists or not, Reza Pahlavi is a symbol of better times for Iranians.
With such potential, what then is the problem with Reza Pahlavi?
Ironically, one major problem is his obsession with not repeating his father’s mistakes. Organizing the Iranian diaspora and internal opposition can be like herding cats. Reza Pahlavi, however, chooses not to wrangle them for fear of the dictator label. At times, such passivity can be valuable; at other times, however, it appears cowardly, if not negligent. The Islamic Republic fears unity of purpose among anti-regime Iranians; unfortunately, Pahlavi has given them little about which to worry… yet.
If [Pahlavi] makes a move and Iranians do not rally to him, his power and relevance dissipate immediate and permanently.
There is an unfortunate parallel developing between Reza Pahlavi and former Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan, a brilliant if verbose intellectual whom King Hussein passed over in favor of his own less qualified and more corrupt son, Abdullah II, in 1999. In the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war, many Iraqis hoped that Hassan might serve in some capacity, at least to chair a constitutional convention. The Hashemite family is remembered well among many Iraqis for the same reason the Pahlavis are by Iranians: They represented the golden age. As one Iraqi quipped to me in 2000, “Saddam was God’s curse because the communists killed the [Hashemite] king.” Hassan himself spent his boyhood summers in Iraq and was familiar with the country. He certainly had more legitimacy among Iraqis than ambitious but either hapless or attention-seeking U.S. officials like Jay Garner, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Paul Bremer, whom President George Bush sent to Iraq but who chafed ordinary Iraqis. Hassan’s problem was cowardice. He feared taking the plunge, perhaps even returning to Iraq. Abdullah II, himself lacking self-confidence, feared his uncle gaining prominence and sought to coerce his uncle into silence. Hassan, meanwhile, feared defying Abdullah II for fear that the king or his allies among the Persian Gulf oil emirates would cut off Hassan’s allowance. Ultimately, Hassan was afraid to take the risk.
Reza Pahlavi’s risk is different. He does not receive foreign subsidies and he is not as wealthy as many Iranians assume. His fear may be that he is essentially Schrödinger’s cat. Now, he can have it both ways by claiming great authority. If he makes a move and Iranians do not rally to him, his power and relevance dissipate immediate and permanently. Conversely, if they do rally around him, then even his American detractors no longer could question his stature or role. The question then becomes whether Reza is too fearful to take the risk. He needs to visit the region, and perhaps even set up a temporary residence in Najaf, where Khomeini spent years of exile and where Iranian pilgrims might meet and perhaps even rally around him. The Iraqi government might not like it, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s thugs would try to assassinate him, but at some point, he will need to cast worry aside and make a bold move.
Even if Reza Pahlavi does this, though, he must still address other problems that for too long have held him back. His own organization reflects his hands-off political style. To describe it as chaotic would be an understatement. Multiple associates all claim to speak on his behalf. This creates a problem when aides use his authority to engage in polemics, targeting other Iranian activists and even non-Iranian Americans. The crown prince is ultimately responsible for those speaking in his name, unless he slaps down or fires those who do so without authorization. The monarchists are not a cult like the Mujahedin al-Khalq, but a small minority of Reza Pahlavi’s supporters forget that.
If [Pahlavi] is unable to manage his own organization effectively, he gives credence to critics who say he cannot manage a constitutional convention, let alone a country.
Within Pahlavi’s organization, as well, there is a problem of follow-up. Many imagine themselves as de facto ministers; they want the glory but do not display the competence. Communications go unanswered. His team will request meetings but then not respond to proposed dates or times. Pahlavi probably fears that cracking down to impose discipline, even firing those who add little or detract from his movement, would lead to backbiting and unnecessary distractions. His organization is also penetrated by Iranian intelligence. Certainly, Reza Pahlavi realizes this. Inability or unwillingness to root out these infiltrators is problematic. With the Islamic Republic teetering, however, he can no longer delay. If he is unable to manage his own organization effectively, he gives credence to critics who say he cannot manage a constitutional convention, let alone a country.
Make no mistake, Pahlavi’s alone among exiled groups has potential to contribute to a peaceful transfer of power in Iran, even if the end result is not a monarchy. While Iranians despise the Mujahedin al-Khalq for supporting Khomeini, betraying Iran to Saddam, and then supporting terrorism, they view Reza Pahlavi as a symbol of their golden age. Pahlavi means well, but unless he imposes discipline on his movement, and until he spends as much time managing as he does virtue signaling about the potential for a better future, he will ensure that he will never fulfill his true ambition. Not only would that be a personal tragedy, but it would represent a tragedy for the Iranian people who deserve far better and a real shot at parliamentary democracy.
