In 2007, Robert Gates recalled his time in government when, in 1979, the new revolutionary regime took fifty-two American diplomats hostage for 444 days and mocked the U.S. government’s response to it: “Thus began my now 28-year-long quest for the elusive Iranian moderate.” Nineteen years later, the search continues with additional irony: Iranians no longer accept a moderate Islamic Republic, while the regime’s “reformers” are yesterday’s hardliners. Yet this futile idea has united an unlikely coalition of believers that spans from President Donald Trump to the mainstream press to the progressive left.
On March 5, 2026, Trump said that he was looking for “someone from within” the regime to elevate to the top. Some Iran observers and mainstream media refer to figures like Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of the parliament, as pragmatists. This might be part of a deliberate campaign by the Islamic Republic. Arash Azizi, a humanities fellow at Yale University and a member of the Iranian diaspora, wrote for The Atlantic, “Larijani and Qalibaf have made plenty of harsh statements of their own about Israel and America, but they both incline toward pragmatism.” He added, “They know full well how little ammunition (real and metaphorical) Iran has for fighting a prolonged war.” The problem with little ammunition is that the regime can make more if it wants to, and the pragmatists in Iran often do.
Khamenei ruled Iran for nearly two generations and allocated power to those aligned with his vision.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei ruled Iran for nearly two generations. Stanford University historian Abbas Milani writes that the focus of Khamenei’s politics was anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism. Unlike his predecessor, Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei was not a religious scholar but a political activist cleric. He translated four of Muslim Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb’s books, all of which denounce Jews and Israel. He was one of the founders of the Combatant Clergy Society. On his watch, the clergy’s primary role became legitimizing the regime’s foreign policy. Seminary leader Ayatollah Alireza Arafi even bemoaned how security forces can now veto the clergy. Khamenei ruled Iran for nearly two generations and allocated power to those aligned with his vision.
Khamenei’s repeated purges of dissenting clerics mean that those who have risen through the ranks of the regime have “applied faith” in the late supreme leader and his vision, especially Larijani and Ghalibaf, both retired Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps generals.
Khamenei liked a rotating cast of characters in the regime. Presidents, prime ministers (before the office was dissolved), and speakers of the parliament usually retired into obscurity if they were obedient; he had the regime security apparatus persecute them if they were not. Nineteen men have held these positions. Beyond Khamenei himself, only two Larijani and Ghalibaf still hold political power—not because they are pragmatic, but because Khamenei trusted their loyalty and competence.
Larijani had been in the background for five years, despite his close relationship with and support from Khamenei. He returned to prominence after the June 2025 Twelve-Day War, giving a television interview in which he denounced “the enemy” in the fullest sense and praised regime resilience. Khamenei rewarded him by appointing him to lead the Supreme National Security Council. In that capacity, Larijani oversaw the January 2026 massacre.
President Masoud Pezeshkian may lead the three-man interim Supreme Leadership Council, in accordance with the constitution, yet he is powerless in practice. On March 7, 2026, he said that, moving forward, Iran would only target neighbors if their soil had been used for attacks by the United States. Hardline backlash began before he finished the speech, with one parliamentarian saying it would be best if Pezeshkian never spoke until the war was over. Immediately after the speech, hardline Telegram channels reported strikes on the Dubai Airport.
The guys with guns have an internal rival: the clergy, whose power peaked under Khomeini before eroding in the face of the Revolutionary Guard’s rise.
Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Eje’i, also a member of the council, “clarified” that “the enemy controls neighboring countries’ geography and heavy attacks against them will continue.” The commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ economic wing “thanked” Pezeshkian for his remarks and asked him to go fly a kite. “I reiterate that we have not attacked the public and government infrastructure of neighbors so far and will continue to only attack U.S. and Zionist targets,” he said. Ghalibaf doubled down on Khamenei, declaring, “Our policies continue to be in accord with our martyred supreme leader, and as long as there are American bases in the region, countries will not find peace—all decision makers [in Iran] are united about this.” Larijani pushed back, too: “Arab countries should either stop the Americans from using their territories to attack us themselves, or we will do it.”
The guys with guns have an internal rival: the clergy, whose power peaked under Khomeini before eroding in the face of the Revolutionary Guard’s rise. While the clergy may not have superior power, they do enjoy some immunity, simply because of the clerical nature of the regime.
Arafi and Larijani have been at odds before. Arafi even went so far as to use his Guardian Council position to disqualify Larijani from running for president twice. While Arafi justified his veto on Larijani’s daughter’s residence in the United States, the real reason was likely Arafi’s fear that Larijani would give the security forces even more power than they already have. Such tensions represent an ongoing debate within the regime about whether to prioritize Islamism at home or export revolution abroad.
Pragmatists within the regime are tactically flexible. During the recent negotiations with the United States, overseen by Larijani, Iran offered to freeze uranium enrichment for three years, just in time for the Trump administration to expire. Ideologically, however, Larijani remains an ideologue. “You have hurt us emotionally in a way that we will never leave you alone,” Larijani reportedly declared on March 7, 2026.
New figures may emerge and claim the mantle of moderation, but among regime officials, ideology will always triumph.
