U.S. and Gulf Arab diplomacy in Sudan is missing a key piece. Their chief goal today appears to focus on stopping the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. But Sudan’s war is no longer just an internal conflict. It is now part of a wider regional struggle involving the Gulf Arab states, Iran, Red Sea littoral states, and Ethiopia. Any serious peace effort that leaves out the latter simply will not hold.
Over the past year, as the Sudanese Armed Forces has looked for outside support to strengthen its position, it has renewed ties with Iran. Reports of Iranian drones and military cooperation suggest that Khartoum is again opening the door to Tehran. Iran, for its part, has long sought influence along the Red Sea, and Sudan offers a route back into that arena, alongside its existing footholds in Eritrea and among the Houthis.
In the Horn of Africa, the crisis in Sudan poses a direct national security threat to Ethiopia, a longstanding U.S. security partner.
This matters far beyond Sudan’s borders. Egypt is also increasingly engaged with the Sudanese Armed Forces as Cairo seeks to shape the outcome of the conflict. At the same time, the future of Islamist networks, particularly those linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, which have long been embedded within parts of Sudan’s military establishment, now hangs in the balance.For many external actors, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Israel, and European partners, this is a growing concern. In the Horn of Africa, the crisis in Sudan poses a direct national security threat to Ethiopia, a longstanding U.S. security partner in the region.
So far, the United States, as part of the Quad alliance, has worked with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf powers to push for ceasefires. These efforts are important, but too narrow. They treat Sudan as if it can be stabilized in isolation. In reality, the conflict is deeply tied both to the politics of the Horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia, and to Middle Eastern dynamics. Ethiopia shares a long and tense border with Sudan. If Sudan fragments or falls under the influence of one faction, whether the Sudanese Armed Forces or the Rapid Support Forces, backed by outside powers, Ethiopia will feel the impact. Armed groups, refugees, and instability will not remain confined within Sudan. Moreover, Sudan has long served as a buffer limiting the spread of instability from the Sahel into the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor. Its collapse would remove that barrier.
There is also the question of the Nile: Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remains one of the region’s most sensitive issues. Egypt has historically relied on Sudan as a partner in pushing back against Ethiopia. But Sudan’s current instability, and the possibility that it could align more closely with Iran or competing Gulf Arab actors, could shift that balance. A divided or externally influenced Sudan could intensify Nile tensions, undermining efforts, including those supported by the United States, to reach a negotiated solution.
A divided or externally influenced Sudan could intensify Nile tensions, undermining efforts … to reach a negotiated solution.
This is why leaving Ethiopia out of Sudan peace efforts is a serious mistake. No agreement between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces will hold if key neighboring states view it as a threat to their own security. Ethiopia has the capacity and the incentive to shape developments in Sudan, and it has clear stakes in how the conflict ends. Bringing Ethiopia into the diplomatic process would change the equation in several ways. It would help manage border tensions and reduce the risk of spillover. It would connect Sudan diplomacy to the broader issue of Nile stability. And it would introduce a more balanced regional perspective at a time when Gulf states themselves are not fully aligned. It also would push U.S. policy beyond short-term crisis management.
The current focus on temporary ceasefires does not address the underlying regional dynamics—Iran’s re-entry, Gulf Arab rivalry, and cross-border instability—that drive the conflict. Without addressing these factors, any ceasefire is unlikely to last. A broader framework is needed. The United States should continue working with Gulf Arab actors but also bring Ethiopia into a more formal role, alongside the multilateral efforts, making the Quad a Quintet. This would not replace existing efforts but strengthen them by aligning the interests of the countries most directly affected.
The alternative is clear. If Sudan’s future is shaped without Ethiopia, the result will reflect heightened external competition rather than regional stability. That could mean escalated competition and tension along the Red Sea corridor, deeper divisions among Gulf Arab states, and rising tensions over the Nile. None of these outcomes serves U.S. interests. Hence, any peace effort that ignores Ethiopia will distort the regional balance of power, struggle to move beyond paper agreements, and will have far less chance of succeeding.
