Officially, Kuwait insists that it is not a party to the U.S. war with Iran. Yet, its territory, airspace, and strategic infrastructure have drawn Kuwait into the conflict. Therefore, the question is not Kuwait’s declared neutrality but whether the small state can remain neutral, when both the U.S. and Iran have factored its security architecture into their calculations. Kuwait finds itself absorbing the consequences of decisions made by larger powers, while exercising limited influence over the exposure of its land and people to the war.
Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has constructed its foreign policy around power balancing, non-interference, engagement, and respect for international law. Its diplomatic outreach through humanitarian assistance and developmental support, so-called “dinar diplomacy,” gave Kuwait influence disproportionate to its size.
Kuwait has constructed its foreign policy around power balancing, non-interference, engagement, and respect for international law.
Kuwait has also relied on external security guarantors to protect its territorial integrity. In 1961, when Iraq challenged its sovereignty, Kuwait turned to Great Britain for protection. During the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait sought Western naval protection, to protect its shipping. The Iraqi invasion of 1990 exposed the limits of diplomacy without credible security guarantors. The U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991 established a partnership with the United States that has remained central to Kuwait’s defense and regional security, further institutionalized through long-term defense cooperation and the presence of U.S. military forces. Kuwait stays away from ideological confrontation while relying on the United States to deter any existential threats arising from its neighbors.
The present conflict has exposed the paradox of this model. The military infrastructure that strengthens Kuwait’s security also increases its vulnerability when the United States is a party to the conflict.
Kuwait has refused to join the war politically, yet it cannot overlook its significance to the conflict. Kuwait hosts critical U.S. military infrastructure at the Ali Al Salem Air Base, a hub for regional air operations and tactical airlift; Camp Arifjan, the forward headquarters of U.S. Army Central command; and Camp Buehring, a staging and training facility for U.S. forces. From the Iranian point of view, Kuwait’s statement of neutrality is inconsistent with the reality of hosting U.S. forces and providing logistical support to its enemy. Therefore, Kuwait’s security dilemma is not the presence of its ally, but its limited agency on how that alliance is operationalized during conflict. Kuwait finds itself managing the consequences of strategic exposure in a great power regional confrontation, without any real strategic control. While the American presence has strengthened Kuwait’s security, it creates a contradiction when the security guarantor enhances the security risk.
Kuwait cannot eliminate this dilemma by asking for the removal of the U.S. military presence. It can, however, redefine the terms of its strategic dependence by moving towards multi-alignment. Kuwait’s defense and security partnership with Britain reinforces British commitment to its security and territorial integrity; its defense cooperation agreement with France provides another institutionalized security relationship; and its participation in NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (2004) offers a broader framework for defense planning, civil preparedness and security cooperation.
Kuwait might deepen these relationships while expanding defense cooperation with Pakistan, India, Turkey and China, building on recent military and security engagement—not to replace the U.S. security umbrella but to reduce the risks of overdependence on any single security provider. This should be accompanied by clearly defined national red lines, before military decisions taken by a partner could expose Kuwait to retaliation. Kuwait cannot determine U.S. strategy, but no sovereign state should be left to manage the consequences of decisions taken elsewhere.
Kuwait’s traditional diplomatic strategy of aid, mediation, and defense partnerships still has relevance, provided regional coordination reinforces them.
Simultaneously, Kuwait must build its own defense capability, focusing on national resilience, air and naval defense, cybersecurity, protection of civilian infrastructure, food security, and safeguarding energy and water infrastructure. Kuwait can intercept a large proportion of incoming missile and drone threats with U.S. support, but it must build strategic resilience by planning its own survival and strategy against any conflict escalation. Kuwait’s traditional diplomatic strategy of aid, mediation, and defense partnerships still has relevance, provided regional coordination reinforces them.
The Gulf Cooperation Council formed in 1981 as a regional framework for dialogue and cooperation but has largely remained a spectator in regional conflicts, reflecting the divergent ambitions, aspirations, and threat perceptions of its six member states. The current conflict demonstrates that in modern warfare, missiles cross national airspace, drones threaten civilian infrastructure, and maritime disruptions affect entire economies, as evident in Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, no single Gulf Cooperation Council state is immune to the impacts of regional escalation.
Kuwait’s neutrality has not necessarily failed, but neutrality without strategic agency offers limited protection. For Kuwait, the challenge is not to stay out of the war, but to manage, balance, and reduce its vulnerability as it seeks to stay on the sidelines.
