The Houthis have used Yemen’s mountains to support attacks on shipping for years. What has changed is where the fight is moving.
Mokha, an old fishing village along the Bab el-Mandeb, was until today the headquarters of Republican Guards under the commander of Tareq Saleh, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s nephew and the current commander of the National Resistance. Saleh worked in close coordination with Southern Forces under the command of Aidarous Zubaydi to counter the Houthis. Saudi Arabia’s forced ouster of Zubaydi, however, due to his closer ties to the United Arab Emirates and his sympathy for southern autonomy if not independence, left Saleh and Mokha more isolated. Today, the Saudis paid the price for their actions, which led to the cascade resulting in Mokha’s capture.
High ground near the water can provide direct visibility over coastal approaches, ports, and nearby maritime space.
Should the Houthis retain new high ground around Mokha, they can move their positions and firing zones from more distant inland highlands toward elevated positions closer to the maritime approaches to the strait.
For years, the Houthis have been able to launch missiles and drones from deep inside Yemen. But positions closer to the coast create a different military environment. High ground near the water can provide direct visibility over coastal approaches, ports, and nearby maritime space. It can give Houthi forces greater ability to observe movement along the coast to better protect military assets positioned near the shoreline.
This is particularly important at the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. The strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and lies beside the Tihama coastal plain. Any military force able to establish a sustained presence around its approaches can connect control of the land with pressure on maritime traffic.
On August 9, 2026, the Houthis launched a major attack on the Mokha port involving ballistic missiles, drones, and an explosive-laden boat. Two days later, a Houthi attack on the Egyptian-owned cargo ship Tihamah near Perim Island in the Bab el-Mandeb killed four crew members and two Yemeni rescuers. If the Arab coalition and the West delay and allow the Houthis to consolidate control, the Tihamah incident could become a daily occurrence.
Tehran has spent years building the Houthis into a capable regional partner without deploying an Iranian naval force to control the Bab el-Mandeb. Iran’s support for the Houthis has included weapons, training, and intelligence assistance. A stronger Houthi position near the strait would enhance Tehran’s leverage to shut another critical shipping route without the need for Iran to deploy its own forces there.
The United States has warned that the Houthi threat to commercial shipping remains active. The current U.S. Maritime Administration advisory records more than 100 Houthi attacks on commercial vessels between November 2023 and October 2025, affecting more than 60 nations. Shipping companies now should expect further disruption, perhaps on the scale of what has happened in the Strait of Hormuz.
Houthi control of elevated positions closer to the water could augment the Houthi challenge and bring shipping within range of shorter-range, line-of-sight drone swarms, as well as enable mining, essentially replicating Iran’s strategy along the Strait of Hormuz. Blocking the Houthis will take multilateral effort.
Riyadh must prioritize the effectiveness of Yemeni forces over its own concerns about diminishing Emirati influence.
The United States should establish a direct security partnership with Tihami forces and local communities along the Tihama coast, providing air support so that local forces can reclaim and defend their own territory. Training, professionalization, and intelligence support can follow.
Saudi Arabia should condition continued financial support to the Yemeni government on reforms, including the return of the Presidential Leadership Council and government institutions to Yemen, a reduction in unnecessary public-sector patronage appointments, and clear targets for institutional and economic reform. Riyadh must prioritize the effectiveness of Yemeni forces over its own concerns about diminishing Emirati influence.
Finally, Tareq Saleh should not limit his counterattack to Mokha. If he is serious about challenging Houthi control, he should shift greater political and military attention toward areas closer to Sana’a where he has tribal connections. These networks could help mobilize local support and undermine the Houthi recruitment base, which relies heavily on tribal and local communities for manpower.
Building pressure around areas such as Sirwah, close to Khawlan, would force the Houthis to divert resources away from the Tihama coast and confront a challenge closer to their core areas of control.
