On September 26, 2026, Somali Defense Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi announced that al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu had fallen by nearly 87 percent since 2023. His government is using that record to suggest Somalia’s partnership with Turkey is paying dividends. A closer look at Somalia’s security situation, though, suggests Turkey is more interested in using President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s regime more to solidify its foothold in the Horn of Africa and its lucrative partnership with Mohamud, and less to bring actual security to the country. As a result, Somalia’s stability seems increasingly precarious. Turkey has invested billions of dollars in Somalia. The situation soon may force President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to determine just how much he is willing to defend that investment militarily.
While Turkey reportedly has trained nearly 35,000 Somali soldiers, the Turkey-backed forces hardly bring security.
Fiqi’s statement came just a week after Uganda’s army suspended military cooperation with Turkey. The public trigger was Ankara’s refusal to extradite a blogger critical of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, but the real motive might be Mohamud’s request that Uganda end its deployment in Somalia, arguing that Turkish-trained Somali brigades can hold the capital. The crisis is just one more example of Somalia allowing itself to be drawn into Erdoğan’s bullying and pissing matches across Africa.
While Turkey reportedly has trained nearly 35,000 Somali soldiers, the Turkey-backed forces hardly bring security. Basra, about 18 miles from Mogadishu, has changed hands more than a dozen times since 2011. In August 2026, the army and Haramcad, a Turkish-trained police unit, fought there for over a week, but by September 9, local sources told the Somali broadcaster Kaab that government troops had withdrawn toward Dayniile, a district of the capital, leaving al-Shabaab to take ground along the Afgooye road without a fight.
Somalia is a federal republic in which member-states constitutionally have broad autonomy. With Turkish cooperation and perhaps prodding, Mohamud, however, tries to centralize the country under Mogadishu’s rule. This has led to disputes with not only Puntland in the north, but also the South West State and Jubaland.
On September 28, fighters loyal to South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen, himself ousted on March 30, 2026, after a dispute with Mohamud, entered Baidoa, in the third round of fighting there since August 17, 2026. Somalia’s Defense Ministry claimed that al-Shabaab and Laftagareen’s militia had merged, but this appears less real than part of a pattern in which Mohamud links his political opponents to al-Shabaab to justify military force. Turkey, meanwhile, appears willing to play his game, so long as Mohamud gives Ankara lucrative contracts and a military footprint.
Turkey has been reluctant to put its own soldiers on the front line, though, for two reasons. The first is simple: It does not want to get drawn into clan warfare. As important, it wants to avoid conflict with Ethiopia, which has forces in the region as part of the African Union Mission. Instead, Turkey apparently uses drones and jetfighters based in Mogadishu. This most recently came into play with a mysterious September 3, 2026, airstrike in Doolow. Somalis do not view Turkey’s denials of its responsibility as credible.
On September 29, Mohamud flew to Addis Ababa to speak with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed about regional security. Rashid Abdi, a well-connected, Nairobi-based analyst, wrote that Mogadishu is losing control of Baidoa and wants Ethiopian troops to join the fight.
Ethiopia is unlikely to agree. Just two years ago, Mohamud threatened to expel every Ethiopian soldier from Somalia, and so Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is cynical about Mohamud’s request, especially after Mohamud’s antics led to the departure of the Ugandans. Nor could Mohamud’s request have come at a worse time for Ethiopia. War has re-erupted in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and along the Eritrean border. Declining African Union funding has already pulled Ethiopian troops out of Qansaxdheere. A wider war in northern Ethiopia could lead to an Ethiopian withdrawal en masse, leaving a vacuum that al-Shabaab could fill.
It appears Mohamud realizes he will get not a life raft from the Ethiopians. On October 2, 2026, the Somali president visited Cairo for a summit with the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea and Sudan, all of whom have antagonistic relations with Ethiopia.
Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has acknowledged that former al-Shabaab members now serve in government, some in senior posts.
What happens in Somalia should matter in Washington. Since February 2025, the Trump administration has launched nearly four times as many air and drone strikes in Somalia as the Biden administration did over four years, but U.S. patience is limited. Washington has told the African Union it will stop funding the United Nations support office for the mission by year’s end, for lack of a ground force able to hold what airpower clears. Mohamud may sing Turkey’s praises, but U.S. analysts do not have the same confidence in the Turkish-trained Somali forces.
While the United States is unlikely to accept cynical Somali or Turkish branding of Mohamud’s local rivals as al-Shabaab, the fear of an al-Shabaab insurgence is real. Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre has acknowledged that former al-Shabaab members now serve in government, some in senior posts. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has estimated that al-Shabaab raises about $100 million a year through extortion and that up to 30 percent of Mogadishu’s police may be compromised. Traders report paying taxes to both the state and the insurgents. A falling attack rate may just as likely reflect accommodation as a successful security plan. Anecdotally, however, it is hard to claim military success when al-Shabaab gains ground just over a dozen miles from Mogadishu.
Turkey now has a choice: If Ethiopia follows Uganda in suspending its anti-al-Shabaab operations, Turkey must either recognize that airpower and training will not be enough to secure its investment. It may need to either enter combat more directly or to co-opt al-Shabaab. Either way, the cost of Turkey’s Somalia investment appears to be on the verge of skyrocketing, in terms of both blood and treasure.
