For more than two decades, the Islamic Republic has threatened repeatedly to close the Strait of Hormuz—relying on its proxy forces, exaggerating its military capabilities, and exploiting Arab states’ fear of its aggressive posture and international fears of oil market disruption. Tehran renewed such threats following Israel’s bombing campaign that began on June 13, 2025. On June 14, for example, Esmail Kowsari, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander and current member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security Committee, stated that “closing the Strait of Hormuz is under review.”
While such threats carried some weight in the past, the landscape has changed. Today, not only have Iran’s levers of pressure weakened, but it is Iran itself—and its Asian allies—that would suffer most from any disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait.
In recent years, the United States has become the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas and one of the world’s leading oil exporters.
In recent years, the United States has become the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas and one of the world’s leading oil exporters. Only a small fraction of Middle Eastern oil and gas flows to Europe. By contrast, last year 44 percent of China’s 11 million barrels per day oil imports came from Persian Gulf states—including 1.5 million barrels per day of Iranian crude. Additionally, Qatar provided a quarter of China’s imported liquefied natural gas in 2024, all passing through the Strait of Hormuz. India is even more dependent on Middle Eastern energy than China.
For comparison, last year, Saudi Arabia was the only Persian Gulf state among the European Union’s top seven oil suppliers, but it accounted for just 7 percent of the European Union’s imports. Qatar was the only liquefied natural gas source from the region among the European Union’s top suppliers but still had only a modest 10 percent share.
Whether Iran even has the capability to close the Strait of Hormuz for any sustained period is questionable. But even a temporary closure would inflict serious damage—not only on China and India but also on Iraq, Iran’s largest non-oil export market.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, have pipeline capacity to export four million barrels per day without relying on the Strait. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, global oil inventories rose in the first five months of 2025 and are expected to continue rising throughout the year, with global inventory increasing 800,000 barrels per day in 2025. This means that Iran’s leverage will shrink further. Indeed, in its May 15, 2025, report, the International Energy Agency said that global oil inventories increased for the second consecutive month, reaching 7.7 billion barrels in March 2025. Reuters also reported that onshore crude oil inventories rose by over 100 million barrels between mid-April and mid-May, reaching 3.127 billion barrels. Iranian leaders can bluster, but there is little risk that Iran can cause a global oil shortage.
The biggest loser of any Iranian attempt to close the Strait would be Iran itself. According to data from the trade analysis firm Kpler, all of Iran’s oil exports are currently shipped from Persian Gulf ports, meaning tankers must pass through the Strait of Hormuz to load and transport crude.
According to Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, around 80 percent of Iran’s cargo trade goes through ports that rely on the Strait of Hormuz.
Vortexa data also show that the storage tanks at Jask—the only Iranian oil terminal located outside the Strait—are empty. In October 2024, amid speculation that Israel might retaliate against Iranian oil infrastructure following a missile attack, Iran used the Jask port to export oil for the first time, but it managed to load fewer than 200,000 barrels per day, and once the immediate threat passed, loading operations at Jask—located more than 600 miles from Iran’s main oil fields—halted.
More importantly, according to Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organization, around 80 percent of Iran’s cargo trade goes through ports that rely on the Strait of Hormuz. The only significant Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman is Chabahar, which handles just 4 percent of the country’s non-oil cargo trade. Moreover, the port is not yet connected to the national rail network.
For Iran, the issue is not only exports but also imports. Decades of mismanagement in Iran’s refinery network, even before Israel’s latest strikes, have forced Iran to rely on imports of refined gasoline both to supplant its own production and to inject into oil fields to aid extraction.
Iran might make boasts, but closing the Strait now would be a mosquito bite to the Western economy, a deep cut to the Asian economy, but a sucking chest wound to Iran itself. Even making the threat hemorrhages what little credibility the Islamic Republic has left.
