For decades, Washington has based its strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the Middle East on its relationship with Ankara. Thanks to its geography, control of the Turkish Straits, and military capabilities, Turkey long has been a cornerstone for NATO. These advantages still matter. What differs today is whether Turkey’s foreign policy choices continue to support American interests.
The July 7–8, 2026, NATO summit in Ankara highlights this challenge. President Donald Trump has tried to strengthen ties with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while other alliance leaders still stress Turkey’s military significance. Ankara continues to present itself as a vital ally, insisting that NATO needs Turkish cooperation to keep its southeastern flank secure.
But having strategic value is not the same as being strategically reliable. A dependable ally offers more than military assets; it supports shared goals, works closely with allies, and avoids actions that could strain the alliance. By those measures, Turkey’s track record has become harder to overlook.
A dependable ally offers more than military assets; it supports shared goals, works closely with allies, and avoids actions that could strain the alliance.
The clearest example is Ankara’s decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system, showing that Turkey was willing to set aside core NATO security concerns to pursue its own defense priorities.
Turkey’s relationship with Russia raises similar questions. On one hand, Ankara has supplied drones to Ukraine and supported parts of NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion. On the other, Turkey has kept close economic, financial, and energy ties with Moscow.
Ankara’s relationship with Iran adds another layer to this reliability puzzle, as it has often worked with Tehran when their interests align.
The Eastern Mediterranean is yet another area of tension. Turkey continues to dispute the maritime claims of Greece and Cyprus, objects to Cyprus’s offshore energy projects, and pushes the “Blue Homeland” doctrine to expand its regional influence. These moves make it harder for the United States to build regional energy partnerships, improve maritime security, and foster stability in the area.
The debate over Turkey’s possible return to the F-35 program now raises concerns beyond Washington. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has urged the United States not to sell F-35 fighter jets or advanced fighter jet engines to Turkey, warning that such a decision would alter the regional balance of power.
This intervention matters because it shows that Turkey’s reliability is not just a problem between Washington and Ankara; it also affects America’s other partners in the region. If Israel, Greece, and Cyprus all have doubts about granting Turkey access to America’s most advanced military technology, Washington should ask whether boosting Turkey’s military forces would really strengthen the alliance or just undermine trust among partners who share U.S. interests more closely.
Washington’s response has been gradual but clear. It has expanded cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt. Defense cooperation with Greece has deepened. The United States has lifted restrictions on security cooperation with Cyprus. American companies such as Chevron and ExxonMobil have expanded their presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, while the proposed Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act and the Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center point to a broader strategy built around trusted regional partners. Together, these initiatives suggest that Washington is diversifying its regional partnerships, rather than keeping all its eggs in the Turkish basket.
Alliances depend on trust, shared goals, and predictable actions. By those standards, Turkey has become a less certain ally than before.
None of this means the United States should seek to isolate Turkey. The question is whether Turkey should continue to occupy the central place it once held in American strategy. Recent efforts by the Trump administration to improve relations with Ankara, including discussions on Turkey’s possible return to the F-35 program, do not answer that question.
The takeaway for U.S. policymakers is simple: Turkey remains important because of its geography and military strength, but that does not make it a reliable partner. Alliances depend on trust, shared goals, and predictable actions. By those standards, Turkey has become a less certain ally than before.
The concern extends beyond the F-35 program itself. Restoring Turkey’s access to the program without first addressing the strategic differences that led to its suspension would have consequences beyond alliance politics, risking exposure of sensitive U.S. military technology to a state that maintains close ties with Washington’s adversaries while signaling that strategic divergence carries few lasting costs. Such a decision would also undermine confidence among partners such as Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.
At a time when the United States is working to contain Russian influence, deter Iran, secure key energy and shipping routes, and compete with China, reliability is more valuable than ever. U.S. policy should reward allies who genuinely back American interests, not just assume that geography equals loyalty. The real question is whether Washington can keep treating a more independent Turkey as if its priorities still align with America’s.
