Low-cost drones now shape recent conflicts, from Ukraine to the Middle East. They deliver impact at scale and at low cost, forcing changes in air defense and operational planning. In this context, Turkey’s defense company Baykar has expanded into the European market. This move raises a question for Western defense policy: Who shapes military capability today, alliances or those who control production and supply chains?
Baykar entered the European defense ecosystem through the acquisition of Italy’s Piaggio Aerospace in 2024 and a partnership with Leonardo in 2025. These steps give the company a production and development presence inside the European Union, including plans to relaunch manufacturing and produce unmanned systems in Italy.
This model reflects a shift in how defense influence operates. Companies shape outcomes through supply chains, joint production, and access to industrial infrastructure. By embedding itself in European production networks, Baykar gains access to certification processes, markets, and potential defense initiatives. It also allows the company to operate within European regulatory frameworks and reduce exposure to export restrictions that have affected Turkish defense firms in the past.
By embedding itself in European production networks, Baykar gains access to certification processes, markets, and potential defense initiatives.
The Italian dimension remains central. The acquisition of Piaggio preserved industrial capacity and employment while preventing the liquidation of a long-standing aerospace company. The partnership with Leonardo expands this position by combining Turkish unmanned systems with European manufacturing and integration. The result links Turkish technology with European industrial assets, combining industrial recovery with strategic entry into the European defense sector.
This cooperation also reflects a broader alignment between Italy and Turkey within NATO. While the alliance provides a shared framework, member states increasingly pursue bilateral industrial and defense partnerships based on national priorities. The Italy-Turkey link shows how cooperation can deepen at the industrial level, adding another layer to alliance dynamics, where coordination depends not only on political alignment, but also on shared production and technological integration.
Turkey has secured access to the European aerospace market and now seeks to enter the European Union’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, which supports joint defense production and industrial cooperation. Participation in such initiatives would extend Turkey’s role from market access to involvement in European Union-supported defense frameworks.
At the same time, this shift raises new strategic questions. Turkey, excluded from the F-35 program in 2019, now re-enters Western defense structures through industrial channels rather than formal programs. This allows Ankara to influence European production networks while maintaining strategic autonomy.
This industrial position gains importance when combined with the operational performance of Turkish systems. Baykar’s drones have already shown impact in multiple theaters, including Ukraine and the Middle East. New systems, including low-cost, one-way attack drones, follow a model designed to saturate air defenses at minimal cost. This approach lowers the barrier for states that seek deterrence without investing in high-cost platforms.
For European defense planning, this development creates risks. The integration of non-European actors into core industrial structures complicates efforts to build strategic autonomy, particularly when those actors maintain ties with competing powers such as Russia.
The issue is no longer only about burden-sharing, but about who shapes the production base that underpins allied capabilities.
At the same time, this dynamic exposes a gap at the European level. The European Union has launched initiatives such as SAFE to strengthen defense production and fund joint projects, yet it has not fully defined the limits of participation in its industrial base. As a result, companies linked to non-member states can enter production networks that benefit from European funding and integration. This creates a tension between the goal of strengthening internal capacity and the reality of an open industrial system. The issue shifts from how Europe funds defense production to who ultimately benefits from that investment.
The implications are also significant for Greece. Turkish capabilities no longer remain confined to bilateral competition, as they may become embedded within the same European frameworks that support Greek security, shifting the strategic environment in the Eastern Mediterranean and challenging assumptions about alliance boundaries.
For the United States, the issue creates a direct strategic concern. Washington has encouraged European allies to expand defense production and reduce dependence on external suppliers. However, the integration of Turkish defense firms into European industrial structures moves in a different direction. It raises questions about technology control, interoperability, and alignment within allied systems, while complicating efforts to maintain a coherent defense framework across NATO. The issue is no longer only about burden-sharing, but about who shapes the production base that underpins allied capabilities.
Baykar’s expansion does not determine outcomes on its own. It does, however, show that control over production now shapes strategic influence alongside military alliances, and in doing so blurs the boundary between internal and external actors in Western defense systems.
