Israel’s 12-day air campaign against the core institutions of Iran’s Islamic regime appears to have triggered a serious political power vacuum—the first of its kind since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has remained in an underground bunker for over two weeks, and Israeli strikes have eliminated much of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ senior leadership.
Amid the uncertainty, many in the Iranian opposition fear that the regime may either genuinely sideline Khamenei or do so as a pretense—unveiling new faces to appease the West, avert further attacks, and buy time.
Inside Iran and across the diaspora, debate is underway over how this existential crisis might unfold—and whether it marks the beginning of the end for Khamenei and the regime. The prospect of a renewed Israeli offensive looms large, discussed even in Tehran’s media outlets.
Inside Iran and across the diaspora, debate is underway over how this existential crisis might unfold—and whether it marks the beginning of the end for Khamenei and the regime.
In an editorial for Shargh newspaper in Tehran on June 29, 2025, political analyst Kiumars Ashtarian warned of the potential for a “second war,” calling for comprehensive national preparedness, reform of political structures, mobilization of social and intellectual capital, and the strengthening of preventive diplomacy.
Praising the fallen commanders of the 12-day war, he wrote: “[President Donald] Trump’s psychological warfare and the large-scale transfer of military equipment to Israel—supported by some European countries including Germany—should make us more alert to the possibility of a second phase of the war.”
At this point, Iranian analysts and journalists are uncertain whether Khamenei remains in control of the situation. In his most recent video message from the bunker, released on June 26, the 86-year-old cleric appeared fatigued and somewhat disoriented, struggling to deliver his usual rhetoric. His speech was marked by broken sentences and uncharacteristic pauses, a stark contrast to his typically forceful oratory.
A political figure said to be close to Khamenei’s son Mojtaba even dared to post on X: “The final whistle on Mr. #Khamenei’s political life was blown some time ago. Whatever he does now, he no longer has the strength to rise again. Perhaps he himself senses it—he didn’t even attend the funeral prayers for his slain commanders. His physical life may go on, and for his supporters he may remain a sanctified figure. But his end marks the end of lifelong, unaccountable absolute power in #Iran.”
Some so-called “reformist” circles in Iran have begun to float the idea that former President Hassan Rouhani could succeed Khamenei—either as supreme leader or in a transitional role. Rouhani, a relatively centrist politician, long has been embedded in the regime’s security establishment, dating to the earliest days of the Islamic Republic.
Proponents of his leadership argue that he could restore relations with the West and improve the country’s overall situation—implicitly suggesting that public revolt against the regime no longer would be necessary.
Regime opponents have reacted to these suggestions by extensively posting on social media about Rouhani’s past behavior and actions, especially the killing of 1,500 protesters in 2019 during his presidency, calling him the “pink fox.”
It is widely assumed within the Islamic Republic’s power structure that the supreme leader must be a Seyyed—a descendant of the Prophet.
However, London-based Iranian analyst Behruz Turani told Middle East Forum that Rouhani faces two significant obstacles within the regime that are not easily overcome. First, he is not a black-turbaned cleric, meaning he does not claim lineage from the Prophet Muhammad. While this is not a constitutional requirement, it is widely assumed within the Islamic Republic’s power structure that the supreme leader must be a Seyyed—a descendant of the Prophet. Second, conservatives and hardliners have spent over a decade casting doubt on Rouhani’s revolutionary credentials, making it difficult for them to accept his leadership, even in a transitional capacity.
Reuters, citing a supposed insider, reported that in the event of Khamenei’s death, a three-member standing committee responsible for choosing his successor will select a new leader “for his devotion to the revolutionary precepts of the Islamic Republic’s late founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.”
The other name being floated by “reformists” is Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini. However, he is not taken very seriously in Iran as a potential leader. The younger Khomeini has never held any prominent government post, except overseeing a mausoleum and foundation dedicated to his grandfather.
An anonymous opposition social media account tweeted, “Let’s stay vigilant—so that after the collapse of the mullahs’ communist-Islamist republic, the regime’s own oligarchs, whether in chocolate-colored cloaks or another Hassan (Rouhani-Khomeini type), aren’t forced upon the nation the way it was done to the Russian people after the fall of the Soviet Union.”
Iranians are on guard. It remains an open question whether Western diplomats who are either prone to wishful thinking or project their own values on Iranian regime officials will be as astute.
