Hezbollah dominates attention among discussions of Lebanon abroad. It has the missiles, Iranian patronage, the myth of “resistance,” and the ability to drag the country into war. Yet behind Hezbollah stands another Shi’i force without which Lebanon’s present crisis cannot be understood: the Amal Movement.
Amal is older than Hezbollah. Its name comes from Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, the Lebanese Resistance Detachments, but the amalgam Amal also means “hope” in Arabic. Its founder, Imam Musa al-Sadr, was an Iranian-born cleric who transformed Shi’i political consciousness in Lebanon. His “Movement of the Deprived,” founded in 1974, presented Shi’a as a neglected social class inside a state that had failed them.
But the 1975–1990 Lebanese civil war militarized Amal. After al-Sadr disappeared in 1978, Nabih Berri, then a 40-year-old secular lawyer and power broker, became Amal’s leader and turned it into a pragmatic, Syria-aligned machine. He continues to lead the party today.
Its name comes from Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya, the Lebanese Resistance Detachments, but the amalgam Amal also means “hope” in Arabic.
In southern Lebanon, the collapse of state authority and the growing power of Palestinian armed factions helped shape Amal’s rise. Parts of the region had become bases for attacks on Israel, drawing Israeli raids and bombardments. When Israel invaded in 1982 to drive the Palestine Liberation Organization out, some Shi’a initially viewed the Israeli army as a liberator that had removed Palestinian domination from their villages. That attitude was short-lived, as prolonged Israeli presence and Jerusalem’s alliance with Christian militias soon transformed Shi’i attitudes.
In 1982, Amal’s greatest rival emerged: Hezbollah. In Beirut’s southern suburbs and in the Bekaa Valley, Iran helped build a new Shi’i organization. Hezbollah was Islamist, revolutionary, anti-American, committed to armed struggle against Israel, and loyal to Tehran. It tied its identity to Iran’s revolutionary project.
The contrast was clear. Amal sought communal power inside Lebanon’s existing order. Hezbollah sought to change the balance of power in Lebanon and the wider region. For radical Shi’i militants, Amal was too pragmatic; Hezbollah was the revolutionary alternative.
The relationship between Amal and Hezbollah has never been simple. In the late 1980s, the two movements fought a bloody intra-Shi’a war known as the “War of the Brothers.” Syria backed Amal and Iran supported Hezbollah. Mediation ended the conflict and produced the division of labor that still shapes Shi’i politics in Lebanon: Hezbollah dominates the armed “resistance,” while Amal dominates Shi’i representation inside the state. Berri has been speaker of parliament since 1992.
That arrangement made Berri indispensable. Hezbollah needed Amal as a bridge to the Lebanese political system. Amal needed Hezbollah because Hezbollah’s military power protected the broader Shi’i order from which Amal benefited. This division, however, was never absolute. Hezbollah entered parliament in 1992 and has held cabinet positions since 2005. Yet political integration never meant disarmament. The arrangement deepened after the 2008 Doha Agreement. Hezbollah’s show of force in Beirut helped produce a formula in which Hezbollah and its allies gained veto power over major government decisions. Post-Doha Lebanon became an “undeclared Islamic Republic,” a system in which Hezbollah and its coalition could control decision-making without abolishing the existing confessional order. Even after Hezbollah and its allies lost their parliamentary majority in 2022, the Shi’i duo preserved leverage. In February 2025, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam formed a government in which Amal controlled finance, environment, and administrative development.
After October 7, 2023, Amal assisted Hezbollah’s war effort on the home front, including logistics, medical aid, local security, and support for displaced families.
At the same time, Amal has shown signs of renewed militancy. From 2021 onward, Berri increasingly has used the language of jihad, calling on Amal to mobilize for the liberation of Palestine and confront Israel at the border alongside Hezbollah’s struggle to “protect” Lebanon. After October 7, 2023, Amal assisted Hezbollah’s war effort on the home front, including logistics, medical aid, local security, and support for displaced families. In May 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Amal officials, accusing them of coordinating security activities with Hezbollah and undermining peace efforts.
Unlike Hezbollah, Amal is not designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, making Berri a useful channel for governments that cannot speak directly to Hezbollah. After the 2024 ceasefire with Israel, he passed messages and tested formulas. But he could mediate around Hezbollah’s weapons, not command them. That weakness became clear in March 2026. As the regional war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States escalated, Berri urged Hezbollah not to enter the conflict on Tehran’s behalf. Hezbollah launched rockets toward Israel, Lebanon was pulled back into war, and Berri felt fooled by Hezbollah’s move.
The rift became visible inside the Lebanese government, which adopted a decision declaring Hezbollah’s military and security activity illegal. Amal’s ministers neither blocked the move nor walked out of the session. Tensions have surfaced locally. Reports of friction between Amal and Hezbollah supporters in southern Lebanon suggest that, beneath the rhetoric of unity, old rivalries and local resentments remain alive, especially where communities fear being drawn into Hezbollah’s war strategy.
Still, Berri is Tehran’s man. He reportedly receives more than $500,000 a month from Iran to support Tehran’s interests and preserve Shi’i unity behind Hezbollah. The report sharpened the suspicion surrounding Amal—that it plays a double game. It presents itself as a Lebanese institutional force, more pragmatic and less ideological than Hezbollah, while remaining too entangled with Hezbollah’s power to serve as a real counterweight. The question for Washington is how long the United States will fall for the “good cop, bad cop” delusion the Amal-Hezbollah dynamic represents.
