Middle East Forum Executive Director Gregg Roman spoke with The Ed Morrissey Show about Iran’s intensifying nationwide protests, the growing role of the merchant (bazaar) class in challenging the Islamic Republic, and the historical significance of the unrest. They discussed how the current demonstrations combine elements of past protest movements from 2009, 2019, and 2022, why the participation of bazaar merchants and Kurdish political groups marks a potential turning point, and how the regime’s economic collapse and looming succession crisis are accelerating instability. Roman also outlined what meaningful U.S. support for Iran’s opposition could look like short of military intervention, and why Washington should avoid legitimizing the regime while allowing Iranians to determine their own political future.
MORRISSEY: Welcome back to The Ed Morrissey Show podcast. Joining us again is Gregg Roman from the Middle East Forum. You can find their work at meforum.org, which has a lot of excellent material. In fact, one of the top items today asks an intriguing question: Is Mohammed bin Salman an ally or an adversary? That’s not what we’re focusing on today, but it’s a good example of the analysis you’ll find there.
Gregg joins us today to talk about Iran, which has been an adversary of both Saudi Arabia and the United States. You might have to turn to the foreign press to learn that Iran is now racked with protests across nearly the entire country. Those protests are intensifying. At least one human rights group says 36 people have been killed and roughly 2,000 arrested. Gregg, what are you hearing, and how significant is this moment?
ROMAN: To understand the significance, you have to look beyond late December. We’re now on the eleventh day of protests, with demonstrations active in 29 of Iran’s 31 provinces. We’re even seeing social media footage showing police officers who were supposed to suppress protesters instead joining them against the regime.
What makes this moment unique is that it represents a convergence of multiple protest waves: the 2009 Green Movement, the 2019 economic protests, the 2022 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising, and recent labor unrest, including truck drivers halting their rigs across the country earlier this year. Add to that Iran’s staggering inflation, the collapse of its currency, widespread anger at social repression, and frustration with corruption, and you have a perfect storm.
Most importantly, these protests did not begin with students, ethnic minorities, or women targeted by morality policing. They began with the bazaar merchants—the same social class that helped launch the 1979 revolution. That matters enormously, because historically in Iran, when the bazaar moves, the country moves. This didn’t erupt overnight. It metastasized gradually, gaining momentum day by day.
Yesterday brought a particularly significant development: seven Kurdish political parties representing Iranian Kurds in the diaspora and coordinating opposition activity in northwest Iran announced they were joining the strike. That signals a major expansion of the movement and points to the largest protest Iran has experienced since 1979.
MORRISSEY: That’s especially striking because the 1979 revolution is often remembered primarily as a theocratic uprising. In reality, it was much broader—economic, political, and social. The fact that the merchant class is now pushing back this forcefully suggests something very different from previous protest cycles.
ROMAN: Exactly. What we’re seeing mirrors more than a century of Iranian history. When Iran enters deep economic crisis, it’s often the informal or merchant economy that leads resistance against a stagnant political class. That was true during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1906, during the Mossadegh era in the early 1950s, during the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and now again today.
The bazaar functions as Iran’s safety valve. In Turkey, the military once played that role as the guardian of secularism until Erdoğan neutralized it. In Iran, democracy has never been firmly established, so political change doesn’t come through elections. Instead, the merchant class historically forces course corrections. That safety valve now looks like it’s about to blow again.
MORRISSEY: That raises the question of outside involvement. In 2009, the Obama administration chose to endorse the results of a clearly rigged election because it wanted to pursue a nuclear deal with Tehran. That decision arguably helped the regime survive.
ROMAN: That’s a critical lesson. The worst thing the United States can do is legitimize the regime. Protesters aren’t asking for American fighter jets, but they don’t want Washington shoring up the credibility of the Islamic Republic either. That’s a delicate line to walk.
Rather than talking about “regime change,” which implies choosing Iran’s next leaders, Washington should focus on the downfall of the regime and allow Iranians to decide what comes next—even if that path is messy. The goal should be to make clear that figures like Mojtaba Khamenei will not be accepted by the West as legitimate successors.
MORRISSEY: That’s a tricky balance, especially given Venezuela. The removal of Nicolás Maduro was a significant blow to Iran and Hezbollah, both of which were deeply embedded there.
ROMAN: It was a major strategic setback for Iran. But Iran is different. Maduro was a kleptocrat, Assad an autocrat, but Khamenei is an ideologue. If he falls, Iran risks becoming a zombie regime, where the system continues without him. The Islamic Republic isn’t tied to one man—it’s an entire ideological structure.
That means the uprising has to be systemic. The IRGC, the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts—these institutions are deeply entrenched. A successful transition will take months or even years. It may involve chaos, anarchy, or even civil conflict. But for the West, removing Iran’s proxy networks, nuclear ambitions, and missile programs would be a strategic gain.
MORRISSEY: You’ve mentioned opposition groups like NUF and the NCRI before. Are they cooperating more effectively now?
ROMAN: There are signs of progress. After the Iran–Israel conflict in June, nine Kurdish factions—despite deep internal disagreements—began coordinating. Yesterday’s joint strike announcement in solidarity with Tehran’s bazaar merchants shows a rare moment of unity between Kurds and Persians. It may be tactical, but it’s still meaningful.
That kind of solidarity is essential if the Islamic Republic is to be dismantled. This may be the most promising opportunity for fundamental change since 1979, and people should be paying close attention.
MORRISSEY: Gregg Roman, thanks so much for joining us. Always great to talk with you.
ROMAN: Thanks, Ed.
