The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 ended the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, which consistently had threatened Kuwait’s territorial integrity. Since then, Baghdad has recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty, normalized diplomatic relations, and reestablished economic and political ties. But the fall of Saddam did not eliminate the political sensitivities surrounding Kuwait in Iraq. Instead, the nature of the threat has changed from territorial revisionism to a combination of nationalist grievances, unresolved maritime disputes, concerns about Iranian influence, and Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq. As recent escalations indicate, security threats to Kuwait from Iraq’s southern borders persist.
Disputes over maritime boundaries and the Khor Abdullah waterway have revived economic and nationalist sensitivities surrounding Iraq’s restricted access to the Persian Gulf.
In recent years, disputes over maritime boundaries and the Khor Abdullah waterway have revived economic and nationalist sensitivities surrounding Iraq’s restricted access to the Persian Gulf. Iraq laid the foundation for the Grand Faw port in Basra in 2010, and Kuwait launched the Mubarak Al Kabeer port project on Bubiyan Island in 2011. Iraqi critics view Kuwait’s port development as a threat to Iraq’s access to navigation routes serving Umm Qasr port and as an attempt to constrain Iraq’s economic connectivity. Iraq’s limited 36-mile coastline makes access to the Persian Gulf strategically important, as Baghdad develops Grand Faw into a regional transportation hub. Kuwait is equally vulnerable due to its narrow coastline and dependence on maritime access. These competing interests create friction, even as Baghdad and Kuwait continue to cooperate on trade, investment, border management, and security.
In 2012, Iraq and Kuwait signed an agreement regulating navigation in Khor Abdullah; however, a 2023 ruling by Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court declared the agreement unconstitutional, reopening a contentious issue. In 2026, Iraq submitted a new list of maritime coordinates and illustrative charts with the United Nations, to which both Kuwait and other Gulf Arab states objected, moving the dispute from rhetoric into international diplomatic confrontation. Meanwhile, street protests in Basra denounce the agreement as conceding Iraq’s sovereign rights. Recent encounters in Al Faw involving Kuwaiti coast guards and Iraqi fishing vessels have heightened tensions over maritime resources in the Shatt-Al-Arab waterway.
Iraq-Kuwait relations, therefore, operate on dual tracks. On the one hand, Baghdad and Kuwait pursue systematic cooperation through the process of transfer of Kuwaiti remains, security coordination, economic engagement, and Kuwaiti investment in Iraq. On the other hand, court rulings, parliamentary campaigns, maritime incidents, and social media revive claims of sovereignty violations and alleged Iraqi territorial losses.
The more immediate security concern for Kuwait, however, stems from armed actors operating in Iraq. During the 2026 U.S.-Iran war, Kuwait faced attacks launched from southern Iraq. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reportedly established covert cells in southern Iraq to conduct drone attacks against Gulf Arab states hosting U.S. forces. Iran-backed armed factions in Iraq are reportedly shifting toward smaller, compartmentalized cells of five to ten members operating directly under Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command. Such restructuring makes the networks harder to detect, complicates efforts to pinpoint accountability, and raises concerns that Iran’s armed infrastructure could persist, even if Iraqi pressure forces larger factions to disarm. Iraq’s fractured internal security continues to provide Iran with operational space to threaten Kuwait and other U.S. allies.
The April 7, 2026, attack on Kuwait’s consulate-general in Basra illustrates how nationalist grievances, militia politics, and regional conflict can converge. After a rocket attack reportedly fired from the direction of Kuwait near Khor Al-Zubair killed at least three people, protesters in Basra stormed the Kuwaiti consulate in revenge. While Iraqi authorities investigated the incident and promised legal action against those involved, the episode demonstrated how a single spark could fuel public anger and retaliation against a former adversary.
The central question, therefore, is whether the Iraqi state exercises sufficient authority to prevent its sovereign space from becoming a platform for attacks against Kuwait.
The security challenge for Kuwait today is different from what it faced under Saddam. That earlier threat was centralized, attributable, and tied to the ambitions of the Iraqi state. Kuwait could respond through conventional deterrence backed by U.S. military power and security guarantees. Today, the threat is fragmented. Drone attacks, covert cells, militia networks, and nationalist mobilization create asymmetric pathways through which Kuwait can be targeted while responsibility remains contested or deniable. The central question, therefore, is whether the Iraqi state exercises sufficient authority to prevent its sovereign space from becoming a platform for attacks against Kuwait.
Kuwait is no longer confronting an expansionist Iraqi state, even if the narrative of Kuwait’s historical legitimacy finds popular ground in Iraq. Its vulnerability now lies in the convergence of unresolved grievances, narratives, maritime disputes, Iraqi nationalism, militia autonomy, and Iranian power projection. These are potentially harder to deter because they operate through multiple actors and channels. As the U.S. military footprint in Iraq diminishes, Washington will need to strengthen its engagement with Iraqi institutions, deepen intelligence cooperation, apply diplomatic pressure, and sustain its security partnership with Kuwait to prevent Iraq from becoming a recurring launchpad for threats against a key U.S. partner.
