Turkey’s Policy in Syria at Crossroads after HTS Group Takes over Afrin

This is an abridged version of an article published originally under the title "Turkey's Policy in Syria at Crossroads after HTS Terror Group Takes over Afrin."

Winfield Myers

A former Kurdish area of Syria that was ethnically cleansed in 2018 by Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups is now partly in the hands of an even more extreme group called Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

This group, known as HTS, is an outgrowth of what was once Al Qaeda in Syria, and which was rebranded as “Nusra” and then HTS over the last decade. The infighting between HTS and Syrian rebel groups illustrates how Turkey has created a nightmare for civilians in Syria, and also how what was once the Syrian rebellion has been transformed into proxy groups.

The fighting leaves locals with little hope that their lives will improve. The area of Afrin is made up of rolling hills and olive orchards. It was once a peaceful area and, during the horrors of the Syrian Civil War, it was saved from the destruction of other areas by Kurdish self-defense groups. Those groups eventually coalesced around the YPG or People’s Defense Units.

The areas around Afrin were often contested between elements of the Syrian regime and a plethora of Syrian rebel and jihadist groups. Over time, Turkey began to take control of this area of Syria. It co-opted Syrian rebel groups and turned them into proxies. Turkey accused the YPG of being “terrorists” even though there were never any “terror” attacks on Turkey.

In the neighboring area of Idlib, the HTS group became dominant. Meanwhile, many hundreds of thousands of Syrians who had been displaced by the Syrian regime fled to these areas near the Turkish border. Turkey infiltrated there and then ordered Syrian rebel groups to attack Afrin in 2018. During the fighting, the Kurds of Afrin were forcibly expelled from their homes, and minority groups, such as Yazidis, were persecuted.

Religious jihadist extremists took over the area. These groups kidnapped women and murdered civilians. In many ways, they behaved like ISIS, targeting minorities. Meanwhile, ISIS commanders fled from Raqqa, some of them via Turkey, and came to Idlib and Afrin. HTS began to escort Turkish forces in the area.

How an influx of activity from HTS and ISIS has increased global intervention

THE RISE of HTS control and the presence of ISIS members led to several US raids between 2019 and 2022. Many ISIS members moved into homes in Idlib and Afrin next to border crossings to Turkey – which, as a member of NATO, didn’t carry out any strikes on extremists in these areas. Instead, Turkish drones continue to target Kurds in eastern Syria, including killing Kurdish commanders who work closely with US anti-ISIS forces.

Now HTS has taken over Afrin, and Turkey appears to have coordinated between HTS and Syrian rebel groups. The takeover comes as Turkey’s leader was in Kazakhstan for talks with Russia’s Putin on the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) confab.

“Earlier this week, amid administrative conflicts and infighting in the northwest Syrian region, the HTS dispatched its fighters from Idlib eastward into the district of Afrin,” Ahval media reported. “HTS fighters were able to quickly expand northeast on Wednesday and Thursday of this week, taking full control of Afrin and some 26 towns and villages to its southwest, most without a fight, the Middle East Institute reported.”

Is Turkey taking a clear stance?

NOW TURKEY has pivoted again. Having used groups like Ahrar Al-Shariyq, giving them safe haven and supporting them to fight Kurds, Yazidis and Christian minorities in Syria, Ankara appears to want to let HTS take over areas run by these former rebel groups. But why would it prefer HTS to groups it had co-opted and wasted time and resources supporting for the last four years?

Turkey believed for some time that it could move Syrian refugees into areas it had ethnically cleansed of Kurds between 2018 and 2019. Some 250,000 or more people had been ethnically cleansed in Afrin and Sere Kaniya. Ankara thought it could move between one to three million Syrians, mostly Arabs, from Turkey into those areas.

But the presence of the rebel groups left much to be desired. The groups often fought each other and kidnapped locals for ransom, sexually assaulting women and business people.

Ankara’s dreams of turning Afrin and other areas in northern and northwestern Syria into a small Syrian proxy mini-state have not gone well. Turkey even threatened more operations and wars against Kurdish groups in 2021 and 2022 but received push-back from the Biden administration.

Now Turkey apparently thinks the Syrian groups it mobilized in 2018 to fight Kurds can be pushed aside. It uses drones to assassinate Kurds in Syria and may think that its rebel groups are not up to the task of doing much besides bombarding civilians and kidnapping people. HTS, by contrast, has proven itself a more disciplined force. Turkey has worked with HTS for years, and now it may gamble that the empowering of HTS could lead to a shift in policy.

Ankara has long sought a way to work with the Syrian regime, via close contacts with Damascus and the so-called Astana process where Russia, Turkey and Iran work on Syrian issues. On October 6, Turkey hinted it could meet with the Assad regime “when the time comes.” If the Syrian rebel groups can be pushed aside and HTS empowered, then Turkey could sell this to Damascus, Moscow and Washington as a fait accompli.

The Assad regime wants the rebels sidelined and has been happy to see Ankara’s efforts to co-opt them to fight the Kurds. The regime has in the past worked with extremist groups, releasing extremists in 2011 and also funneling them to fight the US in Iraq from 2003 to 2011.

This means that having HTS run areas in northern Syria may appeal to many of those involved. Russia, involved in a war in Ukraine, wants peace and quiet in Syria; it doesn’t want HTS threatening its forces in Latakia, or problems from the rebel groups. Ankara could sell this to Moscow as a way to let Russia attack HTS, or come to an agreement with the extremist group. If the Assad regime attacks Afrin now, for instance, it will be attacking HTS, not Turkish-backed proxies.

Turkish Kurds look towards the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani from the top of a hill close to the border line between Turkey and Syria near Mursitpinar bordergate (credit: REUTERS)

This may also enable Turkey to concentrate on fighting the SDF. Recent drone strikes by Ankara on key SDF commanders who work with the US could be a prelude to that shift.

IN SHORT, the HTS moves in Afrin open up many opportunities. For some in Washington who have advocated quietly for the US to work with the group, or have attempted to re-brand it, this is wind in their sails. For Moscow and Ankara, in talks about making Turkey a Russian gas hub for Europe, this could help matters in Syria and reduce friction between Turkey-Russian forces, enabling Ankara to shift focus to areas in eastern Syria.

VOA news notes that experts think the advances by HTS show divisions within the Turkish-backed rebel groups; some of whom sided with HTS. This couldn’t happen without the approval of Ankara, which has never opposed the group. The areas Ankara controls in Syria have become home to extremists, including ISIS members and Al Qaeda types.

Ankara wants to manage these groups – and it apparently thinks HTS should now cement control of Afrin. For women and minorities, this means there is no chance for the former diversity of this region to return. In a strange irony; while women are protesting in Iran, there are no chances for them to protest in Afrin or Idlib, areas where NATO-member Turkey operates.

Seth Frantzman is a Ginsburg-Milstein Writing Fellow at the Middle East Forum and senior Middle East correspondent at The Jerusalem Post.

A journalist and analyst concentrating on the Middle East, Seth J. Frantzman has a PhD from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was an assistant professor at Al-Quds University. He is the Oped Editor and an analyst on Middle East Affairs at The Jerusalem Post and his work has appeared at The National Interest, The Spectator, The Hill, National Review, The Moscow Times, and Rudaw. He is a frequent guest on radio and TV programs in the region and internationally, speaking on current developments in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere. As a correspondent and researcher has covered the war on ISIS in Iraq and security in Turkey, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, the UAE and eastern Europe.
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