David Daoud, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, spoke to a June 15 Middle East Forum Podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
The Islamic regime’s deterrents, namely Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias, were meant to serve as Iran’s “axis of resistance” against Israel. After Israel launched its attack against the mullahs, the “resistance,” by and large, remained sidelined. “This isn’t to say the resistance axis is over and done with, but it really is for now an Iran-Israel war.”
Turkish president Erdoğan has instructed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to stay out of the fight.
As Israel’s targeted strikes against Iran’s top military commanders degrade the regime’s assets, Hezbollah, “Iran’s first line of defense,” contends with daily strikes from Israel. The Iraqi militias, an “extension of Iran,” are reportedly interested in de-escalation. Moreover, with Hamas and the Houthis in a weakened state, Iran may be “holding its proxies in reserve” to avoid an escalation that triggers U.S. involvement. Such an expansion of the conflict would not only risk Tehran losing regional assets and the “Shiite crescent that Iran had worked so hard to build,” but it would also put the regime itself at risk.
Since October 7, the possibility of normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel has receded as the former also considers its role as patron of not only its own kingdom, but also of Muslims worldwide for whom the Palestinian Arab cause is central.
Jordan shoots down Iranian drones flying overhead on their way to Tel Aviv, but quietly. The Hashemite kingdom, with its large number of Palestinian Arabs, has to walk a tightrope between a restive population and the realization that “they need a strong Israel next to them, so they’ll remain strong, so that they’ll survive.”
Turkish president Erdoğan has instructed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to stay out of the fight. An official close to the Damascus government was quoted as saying “that there’s a general security cooperation between the two countries [Syria and Israel].” For now, it seems that the regional powers are taking Israel’s advantage into account as the Iran-Israel war unfolds.
Israel’s objectives are to “destroy the nuclear weapons program and the ballistic missiles program,” both of which are existential threats to its survival.
The possibility that Israel would assassinate Tehran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is “not on the table now,” nor is Israel’s focus on the unknown outcome of regime change, which could well be a consequence of events. Despite the majority of the Iranian people’s opposition to the ayatollahs, there is a pervasive “mentality of fear” among the populace. Massive street protests that erupted “with the 2009’s Green Revolution going up to the Mahsa Amini protests, the Woman, Life, Freedom protests” were met with a brutal crackdown by a regime increasingly “more proficient at suppressing dissent.” Although the prospect of freedom has increased from the intensive battering of Israeli strikes, 40 years “of living in this prison called the Islamic Republic of Iran” may not be enough to break the mullahs’ grip on the national psyche.
Israel’s objectives are to “destroy the nuclear weapons program and the ballistic missiles program,” both of which are existential threats to its survival.
Israel’s citizens have endured the Iranian missile attacks by relying on bomb shelters, acknowledging that the Israeli military must “make judicious choices” to prioritize its interceptors and protect its “long-range strike capabilities, refueling capabilities, weapons depots” until Iran’s capabilities have been sufficiently degraded. The Israeli people understand that “if you lose your Air Force because you’re protecting civilian population centers, you’re not going to be able to stop the continuing ballistic missile attacks.” The overriding national mentality is that “either we do the job, or we don’t exist.”
