Syrian President Bashar Assad's strategy for dealing with the Western occupation of Iraq is strikingly similar to how his father dealt with the entry of an American and European multinational force (MNF) into Beirut in 1982. The MNF's mission - to strengthen the Lebanese government and bring stability to the capital - was similar to that of coalition forces in Iraq today, and its strategic implications for Syria were almost the same - the (re)constitution of a liberal democratic political system in a neighboring state.

In 1982, the late President Hafez Assad began infiltrating operatives of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from Syria into Lebanon, where they organized "resistance" to the occupation. This led to an escalating string of shootings and car bombings that left hundreds of MNF servicemen dead and eventually persuaded the United States and its European allies to pull all peacekeeping troops out of Lebanon. As many Western observers have noted, Syria is using the exact same methods today (though the infiltrators are now Sunni, not Shiite, Islamists) to bring about the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq.

But the parallel runs much deeper than this. In Lebanon, Syrian-backed attacks against Western forces were part of a broader political strategy. The aim of the attacks was not so much to convince the MNF to abandon Lebanon, but to convince the United States and Europe that their interests in Lebanon could best be served by accommodating Syrian interests in Lebanon. Attacking the MNF was simply the easiest way to make the costs of failing to do so as high as possible - after its withdrawal, Syrian-backed groups switched to kidnapping Western civilians in Lebanon as a means of raising these costs.

The Syrians eventually got what they wanted in Lebanon - the United States endorsed Syria's invasion of Beirut in 1990 and has tacitly supported its occupation of Lebanon ever since. But there was more to this victory than efficiency in killing and kidnapping Westerners. At least as important was Syria's success in isolating the central government of Lebanese President Amine Gemayel (and his successor, Michel Aoun) by skillfully turning political factions against it, and in persuading the Arab Gulf states to abandon Lebanon's government in favor of a new Second Republic whose founding document (the Taif Accord) legalized the presence of Syrian troops in the country.

Syria is using a similar dual-track strategy to prevent Iraq from morphing into a pro-Western democracy. However, while its proxy war against coalition forces has been a resounding success so far, the political track of this strategy is floundering. After the establishment of Iraq's Governing Council in July, Syria launched an aggressive diplomatic campaign to deny it recognition in the Arab world, but these efforts have been a resounding failure. Although Egypt and most of the Arab Gulf states share some of Syria's concerns about the situation in Iraq, both believe that the best way to protect their interests in Iraq is by empowering, not weakening, the council. In September, the 22-member Arab League voted to allow the Governing Council to assume Iraq's seat for a provisional one-year period. A few weeks later, the council was given Iraq's seat at the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Some in the Arab Gulf states have loudly condemened Syria's position. The editor-in-chief of the Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa, Ahmad al-Jarallah, wrote an editorial criticizing "totalitarian and single-party regimes" in the Arab world that "are refusing to recognize the transitional Governing Council in Iraq" - an obvious reference to Syria. These so-called "revolutionaries" call the Iraqi Governing Council illegitimate because it was not elected, but they themselves "attained power by usurping it, not through legitimate elections," he wrote. These autocrats condemn the American intervention as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty even as "they themselves are robbing the freedoms of other countries . . . and raping their sovereignty" (an unmistakable reference to Syria's occupation of Lebanon).[1]

The Assad regime refused to invite a representative of the Iraqi Governing Council to a November 1-2 meeting in Damascus by the Turkish, Egyptian, Jordanian, Iranian, Kuwait and Saudi foreign ministers to discuss the situation in Iraq. On the eve of the meeting, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan indicated that they would boycott if a representative of Iraq's Governing Council were not invited to take part. "We don't see how such a meeting can take place without Iraq," one senior Arab official told Agence France Presse on condition of anonymity. "If this meeting take[s] place without Iraq it will mean isolating that country, while on the contrary the aim should be to bring them closer."[2]

On October 31, Syria finally agreed to allow an Iraqi delegation to attend, but refused to proffer the invitation itself, fearing that this would be construed as de facto recognition of the Governing Council. An invitation was sent by the Kuwaitis late that evening, but Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari turned it down because it did not follow proper protocol and travel arrangements could not be made in time for him to participate on both days of the summit. "If someone tells you at nearly one in the morning that he invites you to Damascus where the meeting starts the next day at ten in the morning, it means that this is not an invitation," he said bitterly.[3] "The absence of a clear, frank and direct invitation from the Syrian government . . . to attend the entire ministerial conference makes our participation impossible in practice."[4]

Jalal Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in northern Iraq, called Syria's handling of the conference "an insult to Iraq and interference in its internal affairs."[5] Anti-Syrian sentiments among Iraqi Shiites also rose as a result of the dispute. On the eve of the Damascus summit, a radio station operated by the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) complained that "some neighboring Arab countries are still uncomfortable with the changes taking place in Iraq, especially with regard to the balance achieved between responsibilities [i.e. the distribution of power in the provisional government] and the sectarian and national reality in Iraq." The station added that "some internal and regional forces, harmed by this achieved balance, work towards the continuation of the cycle of violence in Iraq."[6]

Indeed, the only Iraqis that appear to be enthusiastic about Syrian "interference" are Sunni groups. In late October, Syria hosted a delegation of tribal leaders loyal to Saddam who call themselves the Central Council of the Sheikhs of Iraqi and Arab Clans. After meeting with Assad and senior Syrian officials, the leader of the delegation, Ali Khalifah Muhammad al-Dulaymi, condemned what he called Iraq's "occupation by the Americans and the Jews." Speaking to the London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat, Al-Dulaymi praised "the resistance" in Iraq. Dulaymi defended the October 27 bombing of the International Committee of the Red Cross headquarters in Iraq, saying that it had been directed at a "Jewish" hospital in the Iraqi capital. Asked what he would do if Saddam Hussein asked him for refuge, Dulaymi replied, "If he should seek refuge with our clan, then the law on protecting a stranger makes it definitely incumbent on us to protect him by all means."[7]

Another recent guest of the Syrians is Izz al-Din Muhammad Hassan al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein who headed a delegation of the newly-formed, Arab nationalist National Unity Movement for Reform (harakat al-wahdah al-wataniyah lil-islah) in early November. "The interim Governing Council is a creation of the occupation authorities and we reject the occupation, its products and its personalities," Majid said in an interview during his visit, though he was careful to avoid endorsing violence against coalition forces.[8]

Although Syria has helped give rise to an insurgency in Iraq that is claiming the lives of more and more coalition troops and Iraqi civilians, it has failed to isolate Iraq's Governing Council either domestically or internationally. In Lebanon, Syria cultivated a multiconfessional network of allies who later assumed power and could pretend to represent all major sectarian groups. In Iraq, Syria has only managed to mobilize tribal and nationalist factions within one ethnic minority. Although this may be enough to sustain an armed insurgency in the short term, Iraqi Sunnis will eventually find that Syria cannot offer them an alternative political model, only chaos.

Notes

  [1] Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), 30 September 2003. Translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).
  [2] "Saudi, Kuwait, Jordan could boycott Damascus meeting on Iraq," Agence France Presse, 31 October 2003.
  [3] "Iraq has not been invited to Damascus meeting: Iraq FM," Agence France Presse, 1 November 2003.
  [4] Al-Jazeera satellite TV (Qatar), 1 November 2003, translation by BBC.
  [5] Al-Jazeera satellite TV (Qatar), 5 November 2003, translation by BBC.
  [6] The Voice of the Mujahidin, 31 October 2003, translation by the BBC.
  [7] Al-Hayat (London), 30 October 2003.
  [8] Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 29 October 2003. Izz al-Din al-Majid should not be confused with another cousin of Saddam, Ali Hassan al-Majid ("Chemical Ali").