ODESSA, UKRAINE—Too often, policymakers in the White House and Pentagon, or pundits on cable news shows, approach war fighting in far off lands with a 6,000-mile screwdriver.
They try dictate strategy and often criticize states for their failure either to follow U.S. practices. Many proponents of and participants in the Iraq and Afghanistan surge, for example, chide allies for not following that playbook without any sense of self-awareness that the surge appeared to sacrifice short-term quiet for long-term chaos in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
American officials remain unaware that they would have been better off listening and learning rather than trying to guide Israeli defense and security policy from afar.
Accompanying criticism about failure to follow U.S. diktats is the tendency to chide allies for their refusal to engage in diplomacy with sworn adversaries.
Hence, for decades U.S. diplomats and even many military officials, urged Israel to accept Hezbollah as a fact of life. A sitting U.S. ambassador once told me at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut that “Hezbollah is not a terrorist group” and that Washington would fail in its policy until it accepted that. During the Biden administration, U.S. policy—especially that of Special Energy Envoy—Amos Hochstein was to accommodate the terrorist group.
Hochstein was not alone. Both the Biden and also George W. Bush’s team criticized Israel for its tactics and efforts to fight Hezbollah. Quietly, officials in each administration urged diplomacy with the group, if not directly than through intermediaries like Germany.
Israel shocked the United States with its sabotage of Hezbollah beepers. After years of planning and with an imagination that the U.S. national security and intelligence bureaucracy lacks, it castrated Hezbollah, figuratively and in many cases literally.
The same boldness and creativity marked Israel’s July 31, 2024 assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh at an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps safe house in Tehran. While American officials—many of whom have no experience in the military—try to dictate to Israel how to address terrorism and often threaten consequences if Israel does not acquiesce, they remain unaware that they would have been better off listening and learning rather than trying to guide Israeli defense and security policy from afar.
The Soviet military operated on Ukrainian ingenuity. Many of the biggest military factories were in Ukraine and while Moscow exploited the Soviet Union’s constituent republics, it was the Ukrainians who innovated.
The same is true in Ukraine. I have spent the last several days in Odessa, Ukraine, attending the Black Sea Security Forum. It was a humbling experience to listen to the experiences of Ukrainian officials as they described how they had rallied and rebuffed Russian aggression. Still, from the very first signs that Russia was planning to invade Ukraine in a war of eradication, the White House and State Department counseled Kyiv about how to respond, never mind the U.S. decision-makers neither understood Russian nor Ukrainian nor had any sense of Ukraine’s national dynamism nor the deep corruption that had eroded Russian capabilities.
While many Americans treat the Soviet Union and Russia almost synonymously, they failed to appreciate the Cold War-era role of the Ukrainians. Simply put, the Soviet military operated on Ukrainian ingenuity. Many of the biggest military factories were in Ukraine and while Moscow exploited the Soviet Union’s constituent republics, it was the Ukrainians who innovated. The independence of Ukraine from the Soviet Union was a disaster for Russia because with Ukraine’s exit so left much of the brain trust upon which Russian power depended.
In hindsight, then, Ukraine’s ability to rally at a time of crisis and stop Russia’s attempt at annexation should not surprise. First Ukraine—with very little navy itself—delivered a bold and from the West’s perspective—unexpected defeat of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, sinking its flagship, the Moskva missile cruiser. Ukraine’s innovation with drones caught Russia by surprise several times, as did its incursion into Russia itself.
Ukraine’s Pearl Harbor Moment Has Arrived
The “Pearl Harbor moment”—Ukraine’s brilliant surprise attack on Russia’s air force, destroying planes based thousands of miles away—is a game-changer. Every night I was in Odessa, the “incoming” siren sounded. Not only does the attack on aircraft used to launch missiles into Ukraine blunt Russia’s ability to attack Ukraine effectively, it also undercuts the military structure with which Russia could strike at Europe or the United States.
While Americans famously always prepare for and fight the last war, Israel and Ukraine catch opponents off-guard with innovation. Lebanon, Gaza, and Ukraine are not Iraq and Afghanistan.
Once again, retired generals who counseled surrender or the civilians who repeated the mantra that Ukraine was losing and should cut its losses have egg on their face. Like Israel, what Ukraine may lack in personnel or equipment it compensates for with tactical brilliance.
While Americans famously always prepare for and fight the last war, Israel and Ukraine catch opponents off-guard with innovation. Lebanon, Gaza, and Ukraine are not Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military’s experience and model too often blinds U.S. pundits and politicians who seek to export it, never mind the lackluster results that followed.
Perhaps rather than lecture to democracies on the frontline of wars against terrorist and genocidal dictators, the United States should humbly start to listen to them, for Washington could use a dose of the brilliance that both Jerusalem and Kyiv now demonstrate.
Published originally on June 2, 2025.
