‘The people of Sweida feel betrayed and abandoned by the majority of Syrians at the worst time in our history,” a Syrian Druze friend, who prefers to remain anonymous out of concern for his family, told me recently.
“If Syrians want to preserve the history, safety, and unity of their country, they need to stop the sectarian incitement and end their support for the terrorist government,” he continued. “The people of Sweida have decided – they will never accept Ahmed al-Sharaa or Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as their leader. Syrians must rise up against this rogue gang in order to achieve peace.”
This statement reflects sentiments I have heard and read expressed in Arabic and English by tens of Syrian Druze, in Syria and outside, in the month that has passed since the large-scale targeting of the community by forces aligned with the current government in Damascus.
According to figures released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 1,635 people were killed in the province between July 13 and July 20, when the violence was at its height.
The violence may have subsided in recent weeks, but nothing has been resolved. It is almost certainly a matter of time until the next round.
The scale of what took place in Sweida governorate in mid-July is only now beginning to be acknowledged by international bodies. According to figures released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 1,635 people were killed in the province between July 13 and July 20, when the violence was at its height.
These included the summary execution of 20 medical staff members at the Sweida National Hospital. Among the dead were US and French citizens. Around 160,000 people remain displaced. Abductions of Druze women took place, with 80 women still unaccounted for, according to UN figures.
Sweida remains cut off from the rest of Syria, with forces aligned with the government controlling all exit and entry points. The Damascus authorities are now permitting some supplies to reach the area. Reliable sources indicate that Israel has also established its own means of bringing supplies into the province and is making use of it.
Syrian Druze are clear in who they hold responsible for the violence: forces associated with the current governing authorities in Damascus. According to a statement by Druze Nexus, a US-based Syrian Druze organization, “Army divisions operating under the Syrian Defense Ministry, along with units of the General Security Force (Interior Ministry), are directly implicated in facilitating, endorsing, and participating in acts of violence, mass killings, and large-scale destruction.
“While official state media has sought to characterize the events as a localized conflict between Druze and Bedouin communities and to frame government actions as efforts to restore order, independent documentation, witness testimony, and video evidence confirm the active involvement of government authorities in carrying out and supporting the atrocities, including actions consistent with ethnic cleansing.”
The Druze call for self-determination
THE VIOLENCE in July was followed by large-scale Druze protests beginning on August 18, when protesters, for the first time, raised slogans calling for Druze self-determination and independence. Then, on August 23, a number of significant armed groups in Sweida announced the formation of a Sweida “national guard force,” to be led by Sheikh Abu Salman Hikmat al-Hijri, the most significant spiritual leader of the Druze in the province.
The violence in July was followed by large-scale Druze protests beginning on August 18, when protesters, for the first time, raised slogans calling for Druze self-determination and independence.
The new force does not bring together all armed Druze groups active in Sweida. According to a recent report by Ahmed Sharawi at Long War Journal, the militia of the prominent rival leader Layth al-Balous remains outside the new framework. Balous is known for taking a more accommodating attitude toward the Damascus authorities than al-Hijri. A second leader, Suleiman Abdul Baqi, meanwhile, has spoken out strongly against the new initiative.
Baqi, commander of the Ahrar Jabal al-Arab group, criticized al-Hijri’s “subservience to foreign projects” (a coded reference to Hijri’s positive remarks regarding Israel).
In a statement on social media, Baqi also offered measured praise to the Damascus government and its leader, saying: “The people of Idlib lived in security and dignity thanks to President Ahmed al-Sharaa after the fall of the regime, and we are capable of living in security if we move beyond sectarian rhetoric.”
Baqi’s stance notwithstanding, the new Sweida National Guard brings together the most powerful armed Druze groups into the province, under a banner of separatism.
On September 4, in a statement published on his social media pages, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri expressed his support for Druze self-determination, stressing that this was a “sacred right guaranteed by all international conventions,” and that the Sweida Druze would “not retreat from it regardless of the sacrifices.” Al-Hijri, in his statement, also thanked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump.
Demonstrations in Sweida expressing similar sentiments have taken place in recent weeks. In the city’s Karama Square, protesters raised Druze and Israeli flags on August 16, calling for “full independence” and the “right to self-determination” and explicitly rejecting “federalism.”
Sweida has no border with Israel. Rather, the Sunni Arab majority of Deraa and Quneitra provinces are located in the area between the two.
The Sweida Druze call for self-determination raises several immediate practical issues. A de facto sovereign enclave under Israeli protection would need a more solid link than the nebulous corridor between Sweida and the Golan Heights currently maintained.
Sweida has no border with Israel. Rather, the Sunni Arab majority of Deraa and Quneitra provinces are located in the area between the two. Although Sweida borders Jordan, the Jordanian monarchy, fearing the response of its own Islamist opposition, opposes any humanitarian corridor with the province.
The US administration remains resolutely committed to something less than federalism (and certainly far short of minority secession) in Syria. Israel, too, is reported to be maintaining contacts with the Sharaa government in Damascus, in the hope of reaching a security arrangement with it.
How realistic are the current calls emerging from Sweida?As is usually the case, this will depend on the balance of power. As of now, the Sharaa government’s power rests on a conglomeration of Sunni Arab Islamist militias.
These do not enjoy the monopoly of force throughout the country. In July, swift Israeli air intervention on behalf of the Druze was sufficient to force the government militias to cease their slaughter of the Druze population and retreat northward.
Similarly, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces east of the Euphrates remain at least the equal of the forces currently available to the authorities in Damascus. For this reason, they too are standing firm, refusing to accept the diktat of the capital. This can hold for as long as the central authorities remain weak.
This has led to the rarely paralleled sight of an Arabic-speaking population in a neighboring country raising the Israeli flag and thanking the Jewish state for its intervention in their defense.
Turkey is currently engaged in an energetic effort to transform Damascus into a modern state. If they succeed, and if no one helps increase the capacities of the Druze, Kurds, and other minorities, then a time may come when the Sunni Islamists will succeed in imposing their will over the entire country. If they do, the scenes witnessed in Sweida in July are likely to be repeated on a massively larger scale. The scenes witnessed in Sweida in July are likely to be repeated on a massively larger scale.
Sweida’s Druze are currently organizing to avoid this fate. This has led to the rarely paralleled sight of an Arabic-speaking population in a neighboring country raising the Israeli flag and thanking the Jewish state for its intervention in their defense. It remains to be seen if this proves to be merely a historical curiosity on the road to a new, centralized Syrian regime, or conversely, a sign of things to come.
Published originally on September 13, 2025.
