Iran’s Nuclear Program Should Be Destroyed. America Should Help

On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a broad attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran to eliminate the Iranian nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had deferred to President Donald Trump’s reticence for more than four months after their Oval Office meeting in February 2025.

Trump demanded time for a good-faith diplomatic effort; Netanyahu acceded.

But when the Islamic Republic rejected a proposal for external supply of enriched uranium that would both fuel Iran’s reactors and obviate any autonomous path to nuclear weapons development, Netanyahu ordered the attack.

There were two reasons why Netanyahu acted when he did. First, the Islamic Republic had accelerated its enrichment and nuclear weapons work; the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) did not adequately address delivery systems and previous possible military dimensions such as Iranian work on warhead design. Second, as military analyst Eric Navarro showed during the April and October 2024 attacks, Israel had damaged or destroyed early warning and anti-aircraft systems. Iran had since worked to plug those holes and rebuild that capability, and so the window Israel had to run major airstrikes against Iranian strategic targets was rapidly closing.

U.S. reticence about any Israeli attack was based on four concerns.

First, Trump, like Biden and Obama before him, wanted to strike a diplomatic deal with Iran to resolve the impasse. Obama got a Nobel Peace Prize; Biden and Trump both want one.

Second, the United States worried that Israel could not finish the job. When faced with a hornet’s nest, there are two good strategies: Leave it alone or get rid of it. An intermediate choice—lightly tapping it with a stick is by far the worst option.

Third, the U.S. did not share Israel’s concerns about the threat Iranian nuclear weapons would pose. The Islamic Republic is not suicidal, the logic goes, and therefore the supreme leader would never order a nuclear strike on Israel that would cause Iran to suffer nuclear retaliation. The problem with this belief is that Israel never disputed whether the Islamic Republic was suicidal; rather, Jerusalem’s fear is that the regime could be terminally ill.

If the regime collapses and has only 24 hours left, what then is to stop the most ideologically pure units of the Revolutionary Guards who have command, control, and custody of nuclear weapons from launching them at Israel? There is no deterrence in such a situation.

Finally, Washington worries about Iranian retaliation. The United States has thousands of troops in the regime—in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, among other places—and embassies across the region. The Islamic Republic could also target Americans globally or in the home front—the State Department has not classified it the world’s greatest state sponsor of terror for nothing.

Now that Israel did attack, how should the United States react? Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rejection of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s proposal to allow external provision of enriched fuel meant talks were at a dead end. To allow Iran domestic enrichment was to allow it an autonomous path to a bomb. Iranian retaliation is a real concern, but a nuclear Iran might actually have made the regime’s terror threat worse, as Iranian leaders felt so secure behind their nuclear deterrent that they felt they could act with immunity. The Islamic Republic also had a long history of targeting Americans—including hundreds inside Iraq—and so the notion that they would otherwise restrain was fanciful.

It now appears, however, that Israel cannot finish the job against the regime absent U.S. support to destroy the underground Fordow complex, and perhaps with aerial refueling as Israeli fighter-jets need to refuel both on their way to Iran and as they return. Lastly, Israel seeks U.S. assistance shooting down Iranian missiles and drones.

Should the United States assist or involve itself in any way? Yes.

Helping an ally shoot down incoming rockets should be a no-brainer, a service the United States extends to any ally. To do otherwise is to show the United States is unworthy of partnership and a valueless society.

With regard to refueling and bunker busters to destroy Fordow, the Trump administration and even its MAGA fringe that opposes any action should make a cost-benefit analysis. If Iran retains its core nuclear program and rebuilds it, would that benefit U.S. interests or undermine them? A nuclear program is like a malignant tumor; it will keep growing unless completely excised.

But should the United States get otherwise involved militarily? Here, the answer is no with one big exception. If Iran targets any Americans directly or by proxy, it is essential the United States respond with overwhelming force against the units and political leaders responsible. Israel has re-established its deterrence since October 7, 2023; the United States has not.

While men like Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby remain wholly and exclusively focused on Asia and remain blind to the interrelation of the threats the United States faces and the interlinkages of U.S. enemies, they do not understand that failure to show the United States will react against attacks does not make America safe; rather, it only encourages China, Russia, North Korea and others to pivot toward asymmetric and proxy attacks.

The Ukraine-Russia war will soon past its three-and-a-half-year mark. The Sudanese civil war is the world’s bloodiest, and shows no sign of concluding. Hamas will likely survive in some shape or form if its patron Iran does fall. The question Trump should ask is if he believes the United States is better off with four ongoing conflicts, or whether peace and stability would be better served with a short-term and limited military investment.