Wokeism Is Increasingly a Survival Strategy for the Islamic Republic of Iran

How do progressive values and identity politics exist within a regime like Iran’s Islamic Republic that leaves no space for non-Islamists or individuals with different sexual orientations? The answer is they do not, but some regime loyalists, especially within the reformist camp, find preserving the illusion can be a useful tactic.

Whereas wokeism fades in the United States, it gains popularity in the Iranian political sphere. In Iran’s 2024 election, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Islamic Republic’s former foreign minister, campaigned for Masoud Pezeshkian on the state-run broadcaster Seda va Sima [Voice and Vision] in part on the idea that he would bring a new emphasis on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion. “If you are under 50 or are a woman, you will get points. If you are a man, you get no points,” Zarif said, describing the selection process for Pezeshkian’s cabinet. He also said that Pezeshkian would not prioritize Shi’a and would welcome ethnic minorities into leadership roles. While rhetoric changed, religious minorities such as Jews, meanwhile, remain excluded from any executive branch roles and Baha’is remain excluded from all political life.

This use of identity-based language extended beyond Zarif. During the 2024 presidential debates, Pezeshkian himself invoked identity politics to highlight the lack of ethnic representation in government. “How many Kurdish governors do you have right now? Name one. We currently do not allow them to become governor,” he stated.

As a candidate, Pezeshkian often emphasized justice-oriented issues in his statements. “I believe that the development and realization of gender justice will not only improve the situation of women but also bring life back to our beloved Iran,” he declared in a statement on women’s rights. In another statement, he advocated for “positive discrimination” as a policy solution to address social inequalities. After taking office, Pezeshkian sought to implement these ideas by appointing a woman as government spokesperson and by extending its policies towards separatism. As the first president of the Islamic Republic to visit Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, he addressed the media in Kurdish rather than Persian, drawing criticism back in Iran.

“We are at their service,” Pezeshkian responded in Kurdish when asked by a reporter in Persian about his message to Iraqis and Iraqi Kurds.

Khamenei’s openness to wokeism can reflect multiple motivations. Allowing newspapers to cover progressive trends such as gender issues or climate change shifts pressure onto people rather than issues that could strike at the heart of regime legitimacy. Many climate movements put the responsibility on citizen’s shoulders and culture. In a recent trending environmental issue in Iran, some elites blamed Iranian tourists traveling during Nowruz for taking so much of Hormoz Island’s iconic red sand home as souvenirs that they changed the color of the island’s beaches. Hormozgan province’s Department of Environment subsequently campaigned for the return of Hormoz Island’s red soil, something that will do nothing to solve environmental issues like pollution or water shortages caused by unnecessary dams. Discussion of women’s rights or racial discrimination enables the regime to try to blame people’s culture and shift discussion away from politics and the regime’s religious policies.

The second benefit of adapting progressivism is ironically to promote separatism, a phenomenon many Iranians despise more than the regime itself. The Islamic Republic’s leaders calculate that if the separatist voices gain prominence among the Kurds, Azeris, Arabs, or Baluch, the public will scale back their opposition to the regime, fearing the disunity that might follow regime’s collapse. Nowruz Rallies against Kurdish Iranians in Urmia organized by cleric Mohammad Khalilpour and attended by former parliamentarian Nader Ghazipour are an example of regime efforts to provoke tensions between different ethnicities.

Finally, the regime hopes to substitute identity politics to counter growing patriotic discourse that promotes nationalism above religion. A fragmented Iran will not threaten the Islamic Republic’s foundations. Hence, Khamenei seeks to channel any repeat of the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement into a discussion about different regime policies rather than a movement in opposition to the regime itself.

More than 46 years after the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Islamic Republic has a legitimacy problem. As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other regime officials grow desperate, they embrace wokeism not out of sincere commitment to progressive values, but rather to kill two birds with one stone: They seek to distract and divide Iranians who increasingly question the Islamic Republic’s value, while also blinding many Western progressives who mirror image their own values onto other cultures and cannot conceive that a regime that uses the rhetoric of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion could seek their antithesis.

Faezeh Alavi is an Iranian artist, analyst, and researcher focusing on foreign and development policy. She is currently pursuing her Ph.D. at the University of St Andrews.