President Donald Trump’s twenty-one-point plan to end the war in Gaza offers a permanent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, demands the release of forty-eight Israeli hostages—twenty of whom may still be alive—within seventy-two hours, demilitarizes Gaza, establishes a temporary governing authority, and requires real reform for the Palestinian Authority to strengthen governance. If the Palestinians meet these conditions, the plan offers a path to statehood.
The viability of this pathway to independence lies in adherence to legal principles—the same ones that guided successful statehood efforts in East Timor (now known as Timor-Leste) in 2002 and Kosovo in 2008.
The viability of this pathway to independence lies in adherence to legal principles.
East Timor’s path to statehood was a difficult one. After both brutal occupation and suppression by Indonesia and a guerilla campaign following the end of Portuguese administration in 1975, the United Nations supervised a referendum in 1999 in which East Timorese voted for independence. International peacekeepers intervened after violence interrupted. A transitional United Nations administration helped rebuild institutions, train civil servants, and organize elections. In 2002, much of the international community recognized East Timor after it had developed capacity and could function as a state.
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008 after years of violence, NATO intervention, and a United Nations-led transitional period. More than 100 countries recognize Kosovo, and in 2010 the International Court of Justice affirmed the legality of its declaration of independence. But the international community accepted Kosovo’s case only after its government committed to democratic norms, built functioning institutions, and cooperated with international forces.
Both East Timor and Kosovo achieved statehood because they met the requirements outlined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), which sets out four criteria for statehood: a permanent population; defined territory; functioning government; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The United Nations recognized both states because they fulfilled all four conditions. They did not rely only on narratives of victimhood, but instead engaged in state-building, governance reform, and international diplomacy. They fulfilled legal obligations often under difficult conditions and earned recognition accordingly.
[The Palestinians] have no unified, effective government; the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, an armed terrorist organization, divide their territory.
They also achieved statehood because they adhered to other important international standards set by the United Nations itself in the United Nations Charter—the requirement that an aspiring state demonstrate that it is “peace-loving” and willing to abide by “the obligations contained in the … Charter,” such as not threatening or using force “against the territorial integrity or political independence” of any U.N. member states. East Timor and Kosovo’s adherence to these principles demonstrated that they were states that the community of nations could trust.
The Palestinians, by contrast, fall short. They have no unified, effective government; the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, an armed terrorist organization, divide their territory. There is no reliable security apparatus under centralized command, nor do they pursue a unified diplomatic strategy. They have failed to demonstrate that they are peace-loving and will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, most especially Israel, but also Egypt and Jordan.
Until the Palestinians and the international community address these problems, Palestinian statehood will remain a political illusion, not a legal reality.
Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who played an active role during both crises in East Timor and Kosovo, supported those independence movements because the people and leadership of both countries demonstrated commitment to rule of law, institutional development, and peaceful governance. Blair’s experience explains his proposed role to lead the Gaza International Transitional Authority that would serve as Gaza’s “supreme political and legal authority” for as long as five years.
Palestinian rhetoric must end its insistence on victimhood as a political identity.
Trump’s plan offers a structured path forward, but it is conditional. Palestinians must meet the standards that every successful new state has met: demonstrate effective governance, disarm militias, control territory, and show they are capable of peaceful coexistence with neighbors.
Palestinian rhetoric must end its insistence on victimhood as a political identity, as it will only undermine the people’s confidence. Statehood is not compensation for grievance; it comes by meeting legal and institutional benchmarks.
If Palestinians want a state, they must build one—with institutions, disarmament, and the rule of law. If they want international recognition by the United States—the most important vote they need at the United Nations—then they must meet international standards; there are no short-cuts.
New states can certainly emerge from conflict, as seen in East Timor and Kosovo, but only when committed to the legal and moral obligations of statehood. Palestinians must now do the same.
