On November 7, 2025, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi delivered a video address to the 34th Arab National Conference in Beirut, speaking not as a rebel commander but as a self-proclaimed victor. He boasted of his movement’s “military achievements” over the past two years: more than 1,800 operations involving ballistic and cruise missiles, drones, and naval strikes. He claimed that 228 ships belonging to “enemy states” were targeted, forcing Israel, he claimed, to shut down the port of Eilat for two years. Al-Houthi further asserted that his forces had downed 22 U.S. MQ-9 drones and confronted five American aircraft carriers in the Red Sea, driving them away through what he termed “effective Yemeni tactics.”
While exaggerated, these assertions reveal a belief within the Houthi movement it has transcended the boundaries of Yemen’s civil war to become a regional, if not global, actor. Al-Houthi’s speech was not directed at Yemenis but at the international community, sending a defiant message that his movement now serves as the spearhead of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” capable of threatening global shipping lanes.
The hesitant and fragmented international response only reinforces the perception of an emerging Houthi ascendancy, at least politically if not militarily.
Al-Houthi’s speech was not directed at Yemenis but at the international community, sending a defiant message that his movement now serves as the spearhead of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance.”
Since the Gaza war subsided, the Houthi propaganda machine has regained momentum, issuing fresh threats toward regional states. Diplomatic leaks suggest back-channel bargaining between the group and regional actors, reportedly involving economic and logistical concessions—including the creation of a Houthi-run airline, the reactivation of Hudaydah’s three ports, and a relaxation of certain sanctions. Such gestures signal a dangerous shift from containment to accommodation, legitimizing the very leverage that Iran seeks to extend through its regional proxies.
An October 15, 2025, a United Nations Panel of Experts report confirmed that arms continue to flow to the Houthis through maritime and overland smuggling networks that bypass embargoes. The report identified Iranian manufacturing signatures on seized weapons and documented financial, technical, and training support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah. The experts concluded that the U.N. arms embargo on Yemen has become largely “symbolic,” as inspection measures weaken and international naval patrols withdraw.
Warnings are no longer confined to Yemen’s borders. Speaking at the Manama Dialogue on November 7, 2025, Cyprus’s Foreign Minister, Constantinos Kombos, described the Houthis as an emerging international threat to maritime security. He emphasized that Cyprus, set to assume the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2026, has a direct stake in safeguarding navigation for three key reasons: its possession of one of the world’s largest merchant fleets and the third largest in the European Union, its strategic location linking the Middle East and Europe, and the 12 Houthi-linked maritime incidents that have disrupted Cypriot shipping interests over the past two years.
Kombos noted that the Houthis have transformed maritime aggression into a strategic communications tool, branding themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause while employing low-cost, high-impact attacks that have reduced traffic through the Suez Canal and Red Sea by nearly 60 percent. He warned of two dangerous paradoxes: first, that the modest impact on supply chains has created a false sense of control; and second, that while the European Union continues to sanction Russia, it has left the Red Sea as a “blind spot” in its broader strategy.
While the Cypriot minister labeled Europe’s failure to classify the Houthis as a terrorist organization a “strategic contradiction” that it must correct, he did not address the contradictory perceptions within the European Union regarding the Houthi threat, which now endangers both European and global security.
Crucially, one unspoken European calculation driving this slow, defensive response is the expectation that the United States will ultimately deploy the necessary offensive naval power and resources, as demonstrated by Operation Rough Rider and subsequent strikes, to prevent a closure of global shipping chokepoints, allowing Europe to effectively free ride on American security spending and risk.
The only legitimate Yemeni factions that stand in the Houthis’ way are the Southern Transitional Council, the Southern Giants Brigades, and the National Resistance.
Meanwhile, Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, established in April 2022 to replace President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, faces its weakest and most divided phase yet. Competing factions pursue divergent agendas rather than pursue a unified strategy to reclaim Sana’a or restore state authority. Into this state of failure steps al-Houthi, emboldened by sustained Iranian backing, international complacency, and a region eager for quiet at any cost.
The only legitimate Yemeni factions that stand in the Houthis’ way are the Southern Transitional Council, the Southern Giants Brigades, and the National Resistance that occupies the territory surrounding Mocha, just south of Hudaydah. These forces have intercepted several shipments of missile and drone components bound for Houthi territory in recent months. Their isolated successes underscore the urgent need for coordinated international backing to prevent the further entrenchment of Houthi power.
The trajectory is unmistakable: a movement once besieged in the mountains of Saada has evolved into a cross-border force shaping the security of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and global energy routes. Should the international community continue its policy of appeasement and containment rather than confrontation, the Houthis will reap the dividends of the post-Gaza landscape—just as they exploited prior moments of global distraction.
The reality that must be understood about the Houthis is that their survival—and perhaps their growing influence—reflects a deeper shift: the re-emergence of Cold War-style geopolitics, where powers compete through regional conflicts and proxy wars.
Failure to dismantle the Houthis would signal a capitulation to Iranian expansionism across the Middle East. The pressing question, therefore, is no longer merely whether the Houthis can win, but rather: Can the world afford the cost of their victory?
