The 2026 Sinjar Agreement risks repeating the failure of its 2020 predecessor, which failed to integrate armed groups into the state. The agreement to integrate 4,165 Sinjar Resistance Units fighters into federal Iraqi security structures, and to remove Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) cadres to the Qandil Mountains, does not resolve who controls Sinjar. Instead, it formalizes a compromise between government institutions and non-state armed networks, potentially preserving the structures Baghdad claims to subordinate.
[The agreement] formalizes a compromise between government institutions and non-state armed networks, potentially preserving the structures Baghdad claims to subordinate.
Founded in 2007 to protect the Yazidi community, the Sinjar Resistance Units developed close ties to the PKK and became a target of Turkish opposition. The group’s position changed following the Peshmerga withdrawal during the 2014 Islamic State invasion. After helping liberate Sinjar from the Islamic State in 2015, the Sinjar Resistance Units emerged as a significant local armed force. Subsequently, the Sinjar Resistance Units maintained their militarized presence despite the resumption of federal Iraqi forces’ presence in 2017, culminating in clashes with the Iraqi army in 2022.
Unlike the 2020 Sinjar Agreement between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government, in which Kurdistan Democratic Party parliamentarians represented Yezidis and excluded Sinjar Resistance Units, the 2026 agreement incorporates the Sinjar Resistance Units and representatives of the Yazidi Cause Alliance and excludes the Kurdistan Regional Government and Kurdistan Democratic Party. Erbil considers it a violation of Article 140 of Iraq’s constitutional framework, which designates Sinjar as a disputed territory, pitting the Kurdistan Democratic Party against Baghdad.
Baghdad’s attempt to exercise authority by appointing a third mayor for Sinjar led to administrative paralysis when Nineveh’s governor, influenced by Kurdistan Democratic Party pressure, refused to ratify the appointment. The result: Sinjar now sits trapped under three competing mayoral claims, illustrating that executive decrees from Baghdad cannot override regional vetoes. Meanwhile, the resulting paralysis creates a power vacuum that enables non-state networks to preserve their leverage over security and local governance.
The failure of the Sinjar 2020 Agreement was not simply a disagreement between Baghdad and Erbil; it reflected an overlap of competing armed organizations, political interests, and economic arrangements that the Iraqi government could not dismantle.
For years, the Sinjar Resistance Units’ network of border crossings and tunnels served as a logistical route for Iran’s militias funneling weaponry into Syria and onward to Lebanon. Regional shifts—namely the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces following the Assad regime’s collapse—altered the strategic landscape by restricting Iran’s Syrian corridor; the ground-level smuggling networks remain intact. The 2026 deal leaves these illicit revenue sources untouched, without provision for transferring control to Baghdad.
This omission reflects Baghdad’s implicit admission that demanding the Sinjar Resistance Units relinquish their economic interests could derail the negotiations. By incorporating Sinjar Resistance Units personnel into local police, army, and Popular Mobilization Forces units, Baghdad merely transfers militia members onto federal payrolls without dismantling the commercial networks that sustain their influence. The result is not necessarily disarmament, but subsidizing their existing autonomy through state salaries, allowing fighters to maintain parallel command structures and relationships with external patrons and to resist federal authority when political circumstances shift.
For Washington, treating the 2026 Sinjar Agreement as a blueprint for militia integration misinterprets the mechanics of Iraqi state power.
If Prime Ministerial Adviser Ala Talabani’s statement is accurate that the U.S. envoy compelled the Sinjar Agreement, such commitments will collapse under shifting U.S. strategic priorities. For Washington, treating the 2026 Sinjar Agreement as a blueprint for militia integration misinterprets the mechanics of Iraqi state power. Integration that fails to establish operational command, dismantle illicit financial networks, or secure national consensus does not expand state capacity. Instead, it grants legal cover and federal revenue to non-state actors while leaving strategic corridors open to exploitation. While this does not establish Iranian operational command over integrated forces, it raises a question: whether Baghdad will control the loyalties, resources, and operational decisions of forces it has formally incorporated into its security institutions.
The true measure of the 2026 agreement depends on whether Baghdad can publish the legal terms of the Sinjar Resistance Units’ integration, enforce direct command-and-control with operational accountability, and prevent external actors—including Iran-aligned militias, Turkish forces, and PKK remnants—from exploiting local infrastructure. Without such enforcement, the accord merely codifies warlordism with state uniforms. Armed actors will exploit formal integration to cover their informal autonomy, Iranian proxies will deepen relationships within state-sanctioned units, and the contest over Sinjar’s strategic corridors will persist beneath the facade of compliance.
