Australian elections historically are decided on economic issues—interest rates, unemployment, and the cost of living.
Despite the deep social and political divides exposed in Australia after Hamas’s invasion of southern Israel on October 7, 2023, for most voters, the Middle East will be a peripheral concern on election day, May 3, 2025.
Yet, over the course of the last parliament, ideological and electoral factors have widened the divide between the Middle East policy positions of the ruling Australian Labor Party and the opposition Coalition composed of the Liberal and National parties.
The second-order effects triggered by Hamas’s aggression significantly weakened it, Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria’s Assad regime, all members of Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance.” This, in turn, compelled both Labor and the Coalition to recalibrate their foreign policy positions. The election campaign has sharpened these differences.
[M]any analysts might expect Australia to back the U.S.-led “maximum pressure” campaign to compel Iran to dismantle its nuclear program and end its sponsorship of regional proxies.
At a time of Iranian vulnerability, many analysts might expect Australia to back the U.S.-led “maximum pressure” campaign to compel Iran to dismantle its nuclear program and end its sponsorship of regional proxies that destabilize the world’s energy breadbasket and have cut by half shipping through the Suez Canal, a crucial route for Australia-Europe trade. After all, Australia for decades has aligned itself with U.S. foreign and defense policy, regardless of which party is in power in Canberra or, for that matter, Washington.
Yet, during the campaign, Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s only public statement on Iran was to defend the Australian government’s record: “[Labor] has taken stronger action in relation to Iran than any previous Australian government, both in terms of sanctions and our declarations with others on human rights.” Wong’s comment leaves unanswered whether a re-elected Labor Government would bite the bullet and designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist entity, something it resisted in the last parliament.
In contrast, the Coalition has pledged to join international efforts to pressure Tehran regarding the Islamic Republic’s advancing nuclear program and change Australian law to allow state entities to be designated, paving the way for the Revolutionary Guard’s listing as a terrorist organization.
Labor continues to stand by its major policy shift from May 2024 that Australia may recognize a Palestinian state during the peace process, rather than after a negotiated settlement.
Elsewhere, Labor continues to stand by its major policy shift from May 2024 that Australia may recognize a Palestinian state during the peace process, rather than after a negotiated settlement. Labor has failed to explain how Palestinians or other groups and terror sponsors would not perceive premature recognition as rewarding terrorism, nor how it would not further disincentivize the Palestinian Authority to make the necessary reforms and compromises for peace. In contrast, the Coalition promises to restore Australia’s longstanding position that it will recognize a Palestinian state only at the end of negotiations.
Some of the two major parties’ Middle East policy differences have been harder to spot. For example, the Coalition has pledged to back Israel at the United Nations; Labor says it will support resolutions that promote a two-state solution. While the language may seem similar, over the past 19 months, Labor has backed hostile anti-Israel U.N. resolutions that pay lip service to a two-state solution.
From every indication during the campaign, Labor is largely carrying over its current policies that tilt heavily toward the views of European powers, though with minor adjustments; the Coalition has pledged to align Australia more closely with the United States.
[T]he minor players ... could leverage their power to pressure the next government to adopt their own Middle East policies.
Presuming that neither party secures a majority, the minor players—the Greens and a group of loosely affiliated center-left independents called the Teals—could leverage their power to pressure the next government to adopt their own Middle East policies. For its part, the Greens party has grown increasingly hostile to the Jewish state. In 2023, the party officially abandoned support for a two-state Israeli-Palestinian peace paradigm and, since October 7, repeatedly accuses Israel of committing “genocide” in Gaza. If forced to rely on the Greens, Labor’s calculations likely will hinge on results in several seats with large Arab and Muslim populations.
According to a report in The Australian newspaper, in a recent letter to a sectarian political action committee known as “The Muslim Vote,” Greens leader Adam Bandt outlined the party’s terms for its support. Bandt “pledged in the first six months of the next government to push for sanctions on Israeli officials, an end to arms exports, and the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state. He also committed to backing the ‘redlines’ legislative package, a suite of proposals that centre on blocking exports to Israel.” Meanwhile, the Teals’ positions on Israel range from supportive to hostile.
Many analysts believe that subcontracting Australia’s Middle East policy to the radical left would be counterproductive to Australia’s national security interests. Such a foolhardy move undoubtedly would lead to a host of unintended consequences that impact upon the Australia-United States relationship that have not been witnessed since the early 1970s when the Gough Whitlam Labor Government adopted a pronounced anti-Israel stance.
