BENGHAZI, LIBYA—Following Ambassador Chris Stevens’s murder, Benghazi rebelled, not against Americans and the West but against the Turkey-backed militias that had attacked the consulate. For Libyans, Ansar al-Sharia was analogous to Antifa in America: a national embarrassment that received a lot of press coverage, but which always remained unpopular in society.
It is not just spin. Under the command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a former Qadhafi-era general who lived briefly in Virginia, Libyans fought to reclaim Benghazi, Tabrouk, Derna, and Sirte. Haftar and the Libyan Arab Armed Forces sought to defeat the Islamists and militias completely, but President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shipped drones and advisors to Tripoli to stop Haftar’s advance and protect Turkey’s militia and Muslim Brotherhood clients.
Benghazi authorities are investing what little money they receive from their own private oil company into universities and education.
Today, Benghazi is safe. The Turks, Italians, and Greeks have set up consulates. At Tanmia360, a partnership modeled after the Aspen Institute and with a Silicon Valley vibe, a young student activist told me how she created a one-stop shop to hook Libyan students up with scholarship and grant opportunities. Benghazi University has soared in regional rankings and now produces everything from aerospace engineers to software designers to surgeons and entrepreneurs.
While Prime Minister Abd al-Hamid Dbeibeh’s government diverts and embezzles state funding, and so, has little to show for it, even after five years in power, the Benghazi authorities are investing what little money they receive from their own private oil company into universities and education.
What many Libyans lament, however, is the short-sightedness of President Donald Trump’s continuing visa ban. The logic behind military sales is not simply to sell weaponry for profit, but rather, to cement relationships. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program might bring billions of dollars to Lockheed Martin and its partners, but it requires training and maintenance that tie the United States to its customers for decades.
The same holds true with education. While Ivy League universities continue to embarrass themselves, Libyans and other Africans seek the opportunities that more serious U.S. colleges and university programs provide. The professors and universities I spoke with pointed out that while U.S. authorities have accused nationals of countries not subject to the visa ban of terrorism—the Saudi and Egyptian perpetrators of the September 11, 2001, attacks being the most prominent—they have never accused a Libyan student of terror. Increasingly, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces is a U.S. counter-terror ally. In April 2026, U.S. Africa Command conducted its annual Flintlock exercises in Sirte. The local mayor set up a bazaar where Americans and Libyans could interact; there were no incidents or hostility.
While the State Department continues to reject recognition of Somaliland, it remains a counter-terror partner that the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence community regularly engages.
Nor are Libyans the only nationality for which the visa ban is counterproductive. While the State Department continues to reject recognition of Somaliland, it remains a counter-terror partner that the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence community regularly engages. Its Abaarso School network has produced PhDs from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Caltech, among others. The resulting research scientists contribute to the American economy and pay far more in taxes than any seed grants USAID once provided. The Somalilanders do not overstay visas, they do not engage in terrorism, and unlike the Somali community in Minnesota, they do not seek to defraud the U.S. taxpayer.
While there is logic to the visa ban for certain countries, its lack of precision increasingly does American diplomacy, partnerships, and the U.S. economy harm. Just as the State Department should differentiate in travel warnings between the disaster of western Libya with the success of eastern Libya and between the terror- and corruption-addled Mogadishu regime in Somalia and democratic, secure, and pro-Western Somaliland, so too should it refine its visa bans to differentiate between regions of countries.
Not only would it further American partnerships, but such a policy also could bring greater stability by showing Libyans, Somalis, and others the benefits of reform and success. If Libyans and Somalis understand that the antics of Dbeibeh and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud hold them back, whereas Haftar and Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro pursue policies that opens the doors to scholarships and the world, those whom Trump arbitrarily punishes may understand that political accountability matters more than accidents of birth.
