An Iranian woman living in Arizona reportedly was arrested after another Iranian used an online platform to identify her to the Islamic Republic’s authorities after she took part in anti-regime demonstrations abroad.
Iranian news websites reported the arrest of Mehrangiz Rastin in Iran, but initial reports offered little information about where Rastin had demonstrated. They circulated a videoshowing her dancing and singing at a protest somewhere outside Iran and said where in Iran she had been arrested. But the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-affiliated Fars News Agency subsequently published screenshots that appeared to reveal how information about her had reached the Iranian authorities.
Elaj has published personal information about several Iranians living overseas who have taken part in protests. The regime urged people to identify and report others.
According to the screenshots, someone living in Arizona used an online platform called Elaj [Cure] to report Rastin. The informant described her as an Uber driver who had lived in the United States for 18 years and held a green card. The submission included details about her husband, who reportedly owned a car showroom; their travels; that they had a Bahá’í family member; and the family’s participation in anti-regime demonstrations in Arizona.
If reports of Rastin’s arrest prove accurate, this is a clear case of transnational repression: the Islamic Republic using physical or digital means to threaten, harass, silence, or coerce people living beyond its borders.
Elaj has published personal information about several Iranians living overseas who have taken part in protests. The regime urged people to identify and report others through its platform. Some profiles include real names, photographs, national identification numbers, birthdates, and fathers’ names.
Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has actively promoted the project, yet it is unclear which security or government entity is managing it.
The regime has used informants and digital reporting systems to identify protesters inside Iran before. Elaj appears to extend that practice to the Iranian diaspora, encouraging people to report fellow Iranians who demonstrate abroad.
This culture of surveillance and denunciation did not begin with Elaj or with the arrival of digital technology. It has deep roots in the Islamic Republic.
In 1982, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, sent a message to Iranian students at the beginning of the academic year, urging them to spy on their teachers, classmates, and even family members. More than four decades later, that directive remains part of the regime’s governing mentality. The methods have changed, but the underlying principle has not: Everyone should watch everyone else, and anyone who steps outside the regime’s ideological boundaries should face scrutiny.
In 2019, Iran’s judiciary introduceda text-messaging system that allowed people to report others for a wide range of supposed offenses, including removing their Islamic headscarves, holding parties, drinking alcohol, publishing social media posts deemed inappropriate, or engaging in any activity the authorities consider contrary to the regime’s rules.
Following the worldwide demonstrations against the regime after the January 2026 massacre of protesters, Iranian authorities apparently have expanded this model beyond Iran’s borders with Elaj. The implications are grim. A system that encourages people to report fellow members of the Iranian diaspora risks turning entire communities into targets of suspicion. It also creates opportunities for intimidation, harassment, and the collection of personal information about people who have committed no offense in the countries where they live.
The United Kingdom Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights recognized the wider threat in its July 2025 report on transnational repression. The committee concluded that the United Kingdom inadequately monitors and controls foreign repression. It urged the government to adopt a formal legal definition of transnational repression, require systematic police data collection and training, establish a dedicated hotline for victims, reform the abuse of Interpol Red Notices, and tackle Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.
These recommendations matter because transnational repression does not always take the form of an assassination plot, a physical attack, or a direct threat from a foreign intelligence officer. It can also involve surveillance, intimidation, harassment, the collection of personal information, and the mobilization of individuals to target members of their communities.
Khomeini’s 1982 appeal to students to spy on their teachers, classmates, and families captured the mentality of a surveillance state built on suspicion.
We do not know why Rastin decided to travel to Iran, but if reports of her arrest are accurate, the circumstances demand strong international condemnation. No government should use information gathered abroad to punish people for exercising freedom of expression and assembly.
There is also a contradiction in the Islamic Republic’s attempts to defend its conduct during the January massacre. Iranian officials have told foreign media that those killed, arrested, and executed were not peaceful demonstrators but participants in an armed and violent uprising. These officials have insisted that the authorities respect peaceful protest.
But that argument falls apart when the regime targets Iranians who protest peacefully outside Iran. What threat do people dancing, singing, and holding demonstrations in Arizona pose to the Islamic Republic? Why should the regime concern itself with their political activities in countries where they have every right to express their opposition?
Khomeini’s 1982 appeal to students to spy on their teachers, classmates, and families captured the mentality of a surveillance state built on suspicion and denunciation of citizens against each other. Four decades later, Elaj appears to have given that same logic a digital platform and an international reach.
