On September 11, 2012, U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens was at the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. His final meeting of the day was with Turkish Consul General Ali Sait Akın. The meeting was routine, but as Akın departed around 8:30 pm, he passed groups of militants—many Turkish-supported—that were converging on the U.S. Consulate not only with AK-47s, but also with rocket-propelled grenades and even some heavier weaponry. Akın apparently chose not to alert Smith and, just over an hour later, the militants attacked the Consulate, ultimately killing Stevens. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan subsequently promoted Akin to ambassador and posted him in Afghanistan, where he worked to engage, normalize, and empower the Taliban.
With the guns silent in Gaza, there is talk of a 200-man American contingent in Israel to support Gaza’s reconstruction.
In 2012, many in Washington, D.C., continued to embrace the fiction that Erdoğan was a democrat first, and his Islamism was more a relic of his past. Daniel Fried, the State Department’s top diplomat for Europe, described Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party as little more than the Turkish version of a Christian Democratic Party—that is, religious in name only.
Today, there should be no such naivete. With the guns silent in Gaza, there is talk of a 200-man American contingent in Israel to support Gaza’s reconstruction. While initial reports suggest the Americans will not be based in Gaza itself, there likely will be considerable transit, especially given President Donald Trump’s desire to make Gaza a cornerstone of his legacy, if not the centerpiece of his campaign for the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize.
At the same time, Trump makes little secret of his admiration of and friendship with Erdoğan. Erdoğan, in turn, openly seeks a Turkish role in Gaza, not only because the construction contracts would be lucrative, but also because he sees himself as Hamas’s new patron. Erdoğan openly sympathizes with Hamas, not only over Israel, which he considers a terror state, but over the Palestinian Authority as well.
If Trump gives Erdoğan a foothold in Gaza, it will mean a lifeline for Hamas and other Islamist extremist groups. Well outside U.S. bases in Afghanistan, Turkish billboards promoted Islamist solidarity rather than NATO peacekeeping, Afghan reconstruction, or democracy. In Libya, Turkey continues to support the most Islamist factions and to seek defeat of the more secular Libyan groups that look more toward Egypt as a model.
If Trump gives Erdoğan a foothold in Gaza, it will mean a lifeline for Hamas and other Islamist extremist groups.
Any Turkish contingent in Gaza will arm Hamas or its Islamist successors for three reasons: First, to ensure Hamas lives to fight another day and retains the paramount position as Palestinians near transition after 89-year-old Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas dies; second, as a beachhead against Israel; and, third, as a pincher to harass Egypt from the east as well as from its West, where its Libyan factions operate.
Embarrassing the Americans by enabling Hamas to kidnap or kill American personnel would be icing on the cake for Erdoğan, who looks at Trump as a man to use, rather than a friend to respect. If, thirteen years ago, Turkey could encourage Islamist extremism, have foreknowledge of an attack, and then look away as extremists murdered a U.S. ambassador, then what they might do in Gaza could be even more extreme. Indeed, the only difference between Turkey now and Turkey in 2012 is that Erdoğan is more willing to support terrorism and more confidant in his ability to get away with it.
