Turkey’s decision to begin offshore oil and gas drilling in Somali waters in February 2026 is not only a commercial undertaking; it is also a strategic intervention unfolding alongside accelerating military deployments and great-power competition across the Horn of Africa.
If commercially viable reserves materialize—with estimates reaching as high as 30 billion barrels of oil equivalent—Somalia would gain its first credible pathway toward economic sovereignty since the collapse of the central state in 1991. But oil rarely arrives quietly in fragile states. More often, it brings elite capture, militarization, and geopolitical rivalry. Oil does not automatically create prosperity. In weak states, it often exposes institutional fault lines.
Energy provides Ankara leverage that humanitarian aid and training missions alone could never secure.
Turkey’s move into Somalia’s offshore energy sector completes a decade-long strategic arc. What began as humanitarian engagement after the 2011 famine evolved into infrastructure construction, military training bases, security cooperation, and growing political influence in Mogadishu. Energy now anchors Ankara’s long-term positioning. In late January 2026, Ankara escalated its involvement by deploying Turkish F-16 fighter jets to Mogadishu, marking one of the most visible demonstrations of Turkish hard-power projection in East Africa. The deployment coincided with preparations for offshore drilling and the expansion of Turkish military infrastructure around Aden Adde International Airport.
This is not opportunism. It is strategic statecraft. By embedding itself simultaneously in Somalia’s hydrocarbons sector and security architecture, Turkey positions itself as a gatekeeper over revenue flows, maritime access routes, and sovereign infrastructure. Energy provides Ankara leverage that humanitarian aid and training missions alone could never secure. For Somalia, the partnership offers technical capacity and diplomatic backing. For Turkey, it establishes a permanent strategic foothold along one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors linking the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Indian Ocean trade routes.
Somalia’s leadership views hydrocarbons as the exit ramp from donor dependency—a way to finance state rebuilding without reliance on international assistance. The ambition is understandable. The institutional reality is far less forgiving. Somalia’s governance architecture remains embryonic. Petroleum revenue management frameworks are incomplete. Federal-state revenue-sharing arrangements are contested. Parliamentary oversight is weak. Anti-corruption enforcement capacity is limited. Fiscal transparency remains inconsistent.
Somalia’s leadership views hydrocarbons as ... a way to finance state rebuilding without reliance on international assistance.
Injecting sudden hydrocarbon wealth into such an environment risks strengthening patronage networks rather than building national institutions. Oil revenues flow first to actors already embedded in political and security power structures—not to public services or national development priorities. Weak institutions do not become stronger by accident. Oil often accelerates the wrong incentives. Without institutional sequencing—governance first, extraction second—Somalia risks repeating a familiar fragile-state pattern: monetizing resources before building regulatory capacity, then struggling to regain control once money begins flowing. Weak states often struggle to survive oil.
Unlike emerging African producers operating in relatively stable environments, Somalia is attempting hydrocarbon development while still engaged in active counter-insurgency operations. Offshore platforms, port facilities, logistics corridors, and energy support infrastructure will become high-value strategic targets. Energy assets concentrate economic value, political symbolism, and operational importance into fixed locations—precisely the type of infrastructure militant actors seek to disrupt.
Protecting drilling operations will require expanded naval patrols, maritime surveillance, air-defense coverage, and onshore force deployment. The arrival of Turkish fighter aircraft underscores a reality: Somalia’s energy sector is being born inside a security theater. This creates a dangerous feedback loop: oil infrastructure demands security expansion; security expansion attracts militant targeting; escalating attacks justify further militarization. Oil platforms do not sit in neutral waters—they sit on political fault lines. If Somalia cannot establish credible security dominance around energy corridors, hydrocarbons risk becoming not a stabilizing asset, but a permanent vulnerability embedded into national infrastructure.
Turkey’s expanding footprint is not limited to bases and air assets. Last week, Somalia formally appointed a Turkish-trained senior officer as chief of the Somali National Army—a major institutional milestone reflecting Ankara’s penetration into Somalia’s defense architecture. The appointment signals Mogadishu’s increasing reliance on Turkish military training pipelines and command doctrines as it attempts to professionalize the armed forces and consolidate territorial control. It also embeds Ankara’s strategic influence directly into Somalia’s command structure at a time when counter-insurgency operations remain ongoing. Security partnerships are no longer peripheral to Somalia’s political system. They are shaping its core leadership architecture.
As Ankara embeds itself militarily and economically in Somalia, Washington is reaffirming its own regional security infrastructure.
While Turkey expands its footprint, Washington has simultaneously reinforced its Horn posture. Last Saturday, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State conducted a high-level regional visit to Djibouti and Kenya, underscoring American priorities around Red Sea security, counterterrorism coordination, and strategic access corridors. In Kenya, the visit included engagement at Manda Bay, a key operational hub supporting U.S. and partner counterterrorism missions focused on threats emanating from Somali territory. The timing is notable. As Ankara embeds itself militarily and economically in Somalia, Washington is reaffirming its own regional security infrastructure. Somalia’s offshore energy frontier is therefore emerging inside an increasingly competitive strategic environment.
The Horn’s geopolitical landscape shifted sharply on December 26, 2025, when Israel formally recognized Somaliland as an independent state. This move challenges Somalia’s territorial claims at the same moment Mogadishu is asserting maritime sovereignty through offshore energy development. It elevates Somaliland’s strategic relevance along the Gulf of Aden corridor and complicates negotiations over offshore jurisdiction and resource control. For Israel, the calculus is linked to Red Sea maritime security and regional alignment dynamics. For Somalia, the consequences are destabilizing: weakened diplomatic leverage, emboldened separatist claims, and intensified competition among external actors seeking footholds in the Horn.
Somalia’s offshore discovery will not automatically deliver prosperity. Oil is a governance stress test. The decisive factor will not be reserve size, drilling technology, or foreign partnerships, but institutional sequencing. Transparent revenue frameworks, binding federal-state agreements, independent audits, professionalized security management, and credible anti-corruption enforcement must precede production, not follow it. If Somalia extracts first and governs later, hydrocarbons will entrench elite capture, deepen fragmentation, and intensify regional rivalries. If institutional reform comes first, oil could provide rare fiscal leverage to stabilize a post-conflict state.
