How to understand the fighting in Syria between the central government in Damascus and its many foes, including Alawites, Kurds, Druze, and the Israel Defense Forces?
During its first quarter-century of independence, 1946-70, a weak Syrian state served as the battlefield for its many stronger neighbors to project their ambitions, a predicament summed up in the title of a well-known book, The Struggle for Syria. That struggle disappeared through the four decades of rule by Hafez and his son, Bashar al-Assad, only to reemerge during the civil war of 2011-24 and then reach new heights after the overthrow of Bashar in December 2024.
His overthrow nearly eliminated Iran as a factor in Syria, leaving Turkey [Türkiye] and Israel as the primary external combatants. While Syrians are the main protagonists, they effectively serve as proxies for the governments of those two most powerful neighbors.
Both Turkey and Israel face three major risks in Syria.
Continued fighting in Syria almost certainly will cause more Syrians to cross into Turkey and more problems for Ankara.
Start with Ankara and its strongman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has dominated the country since 2002. The outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 led to some 3.1 million Syrians registering as refugees in Turkey, along with an estimated one million more living there unregistered. Their presence has led to increased resentment and tension. Accordingly, Erdoğan oversaw the walling off by 2017 of nearly the entire 566-mile border to discourage more refugees. Continued fighting in Syria almost certainly will cause more Syrians to cross into Turkey and more problems for Ankara.
Second, Turkish officialdom worries that the fracturing of Syria into autonomous ethnic polities will serve as a prototype for their country. This fear mainly concerns the Kurds, who already control autonomous regions in Iraq and Syria, but it could spill beyond them to others, such as Alevis and Arabic speakers.
Third, and unfortunately for Erdoğan, the Republic of Turkey’s century-long existence, with its legacies of institutions and treaties, constrains his freedom of action. Therefore, he sees his agent Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham as an instrument to wage aggressive jihad, especially against Israel. For this, however, he needs a strong central government in Damascus; a weak one undercuts his jihadist ambitions.
Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister on and off since 1996, also has three key interests in Syria. The first involves countering Turkish goals and the construct of a Syrian jihadi state. So long as Damascus is distracted by fighting its own population, it cannot initiate trouble abroad.
Netanyahu has a moral and political obligation to the 140,000 Druze citizens of Israel.
Second, Netanyahu has a moral and political obligation to the 140,000 Druze citizens of Israel. When a retired brigadier general of the Israel Defense Forces, a Druze, accuses Syria’s leader of wanting to “eliminate the Druze,” Jerusalem cannot snub him, much less ignore the thousand or so Israeli Druze who breached the border with Syria to protect their brethren. Plus, Israel’s Druze vote not as a community but individually, so a prime minister instinctively seeks to win its members’ electoral support.
Finally, the joint Israel-U.S. attack in June 2025 heavily damaged Iran’s nuclear program but did not destroy it, so Jerusalem may again wish to send Israeli jets streaking through Syrian skies. Israel will then prefer the Syrian government down below to remain weak and unable to control its airspace.
Also in parallel, Turkey’s Russian patron (yes, NATO membership notwithstanding) and Israel’s American patron each disapproves of its client’s actions. Vladimir Putin prioritizes retention of Russian air and naval bases in Syria, so a weak central government in Damascus serves his interests. Donald Trump met with and endorsed Erdoğan’s proxy president in Damascus; the U.S. envoy to Syria made urgent pleas for the fighting to end; and a White House official described Netanyahu as acting “like a madman.” So far, however, these patrons have had limited influence.
Two conclusions: What appeared to be a Turkish opportunity in Syria a half-year ago now looks like an Israeli one, and what comes next for Syria will be determined largely by decisions made in Ankara and Jerusalem.
