Starlink in Yemen Can Undermine the Houthis

Cell Phone Towers and All Major Internet Service Providers in the Country Are Under Houthi Control

Internet Starlink satellite in space near Earth.

Internet Starlink satellite in space near Earth.

Shutterstock

On September 21, 2026, the Houthis will mark the 12th year since they seized Sanaa, Yemen’s capital. Prime Minister Mohammed Basindawa resigned, and the Houthis took over government and military facilities. They quickly instituted a reign of terror reminiscent of the first years of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s rule.

The remaining members of the Internationally Recognized Government fled to Aden, where they regrouped. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 affirmed recognition for the displayed government by unanimous vote, with only Russia abstaining. On April 7, 2022, Yemen’s partners formed a Presidential Leadership Council to assume theoretical control after Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi resigned; he spent the remainder of his life in Saudi Arabian exile until suffering a fatal heart attack on May 28, 2026.

Prior to the Houthi capture of Sanaa, Yemeni leaders deliberately centralized their country.

The Presidential Leadership Council is not presidential; nor does it exhibit leadership. Within Yemen it is a fiction, meant to give a legitimate face to a disparate group of political factions that have little in common other than they are not Houthis. The only constituent members who controlled territory and governed were Aidarus al-Zubaidi’s Southern Transitional Council and Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance, but Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman staged a coup against Zubaidi because the Southern Transitional Council refused to bend local interests to those of Bin Salman and his Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood proxies.

The other factional leaders both prefer lives of luxurious exile, so much so that Yemenis refer to the Presidential Leadership Council as the “Hotel Government,” and paralyze governance with their own infighting as they focus more on undermining each other than defeating the Houthis.

Prior to the Houthi capture of Sanaa, Yemeni leaders deliberately centralized their country. Late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh sought to undermine southern Yemen’s development, deliberately undermining Aden’s commercial prospects in favor of Hudaydah, for example. Rather than engage the former South Yemen’s different political culture, a succession of northern politicians sought to crush it as they centralized Yemen’s prospects in Sanaa.

This has been especially true with the communications portfolio. The Yemeni government had centralized Yemen’s cell phone network in Sanaa, leading major infrastructure such as cell phone towers and systems to fall under Houthi control. All major internet service providers in the country are likewise under Houthi control. The logical response to this would be for the Presidential Leadership Council to sign off on a new system for southern Yemen, so that the Houthis, quite literally, cannot easily monitor every call made and text message sent.

The problem is that northern politicians within the Leadership Council, as well as perhaps Saudi Arabia, fear the establishment of new infrastructure based in the south; the chief screening criteria from Saudi Arabia for appointments to the Internationally Recognized Government appears to be a willingness to prioritize opposition to southern political expression and independent infrastructure over defeat of the Houthis.

Ending the Houthi ability to control and infiltrate Yemeni communications should be the prerogative.

Against this backdrop, the best move for the Trump administration would be to bypass both the “Hotel Government’s” and Saudi Arabia’s questionable priorities and instead double down on Starlink.

Technically, Starlink launched in Yemen two years ago when SpaceX and the Aden-based Internationally Recognized Government signed an agreement. Infrastructure did not readily follow, however, and the cost of systems is out of range for most Yemenis. That cost, however, is a fraction of what would be necessary to oust the Houthis by military means alone.

Some Yemenis may wring their hands and complain about “digital sovereignty,” but ending the Houthi ability to control and infiltrate Yemeni communications should be the prerogative. Neither rhetoric nor money alone will defeat the Houthis. Instead, the United States needs to address the Yemeni problem with precision, identify specific problems and rectify them. Supporting Starlink’s Yemeni file would be a good start, and perhaps the only place to start.

Michael Rubin specializes in Iran, Turkey and the Horn of Africa. His career includes time as a Pentagon official, with field experiences in Iran, Yemen, and Iraq, as well as engagements with the Taliban prior to 9/11. Mr. Rubin has also contributed to military education, teaching U.S. Navy and Marine units about regional conflicts and terrorism. His scholarly work includes several key publications, such as “Dancing with the Devil” and “Eternal Iran.” Rubin earned his Ph.D. and M.A. in history and a B.S. in biology from Yale University.
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