While Iran is under pressure following Israeli airstrikes, its retreat from Syria, and the decimation of Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq remain on the offensive. For days they have targeted Kurdish oilfields with drones, shutting down half of the region’s output. Their bluster is a bluff, though, as their Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps patrons continue to reel from recent defeats.
Popular Mobilization Forces wrested control of disputed areas, oil fields, and infrastructure from the Kurds.
On September 25, 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq held an independence referendum. Over 92 percent of voters across the Kurdistan Regional Government and territories whose control Kurds disputed with the Iraqi government in Baghdad voted in favor of independence. The Iraqi government rejected the referendum and responded with military force. Popular Mobilization Forces wrested control of disputed areas, oil fields, and infrastructure from the Kurds. Within days, the Kurdistan Regional Government lost nearly 40 percent of the territory that the peshmerga had controlled since Iraqi forces fled in the face of the Islamic State.
The strategic equation has now shifted. With Iran’s focus diverted and its proxies in disarray, Baghdad lacks the strategic depth and likely the political will to respond to any Kurdish push to restore its control. Turkey, meanwhile, remains preoccupied with its conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the mountainous regions of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Kurds should look at this not just as a tactical window, but also as a constitutional mandate. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution outlines a framework to resolve the status of disputed territories. It requires a census concluding “with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens, by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.” Iraq never held that referendum. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s 2017 independence vote was, in part, an attempt to break that deadlock. The lands lost in October 2017—Kirkuk chief among them—are those whose status the constitutional process was meant to resolve.
The international environment toward the Kurds is less hostile than at any time since 2017.
Despite the shifting geopolitical landscape and strategic opportunity, the Kurdistan Regional Government has refrained from any military or political move to reclaim its lost territories. The division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan continues to paralyze broader decision-making. Compounding this paralysis is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s alignment with Iran and the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s ties with Turkey. The Kurdish leadership is also risk-averse, fearful of retaliation and hesitant to lose what little fiscal leverage they have. Adding to this complexity, reports suggest that on July 17, 2025, the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government reached an agreement on Kurdish oil exports, aimed at easing tensions over budget allocations. But Baghdad’s attitude toward the Kurdistan Regional Government suggests this is a temporary fix.
The Kurdish leadership and peshmerga commanders should act. With American support focused on its bases across the region, Israeli strikes across Syria, and Iran exposed as a paper tiger, the international environment toward the Kurds is less hostile than at any time since 2017.
The peshmerga should prepare a swift, coordinated move to retake Kirkuk and other key areas. This should be done with a strategic communications campaign that frames the move as a step toward fulfilling constitutional obligations and protecting Kurdish populations. Moving toward such a target would also strengthen the Kurdistan Regional Government’s position in negotiations with Baghdad and serve as a clear message of deterrence against future drone attacks targeting its cities and oil infrastructure.
The peshmerga must act before the opportunity is lost again.
