Although Israel must hold Knesset elections by October 2026, the contest is generating little excitement. Polls predict the most likely outcome will be a “hung Knesset,” in which neither incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s “full right” coalition nor any combination of opposition Zionist parties elects more than sixty-one members of the Knesset to form a government. The prospect of a series of Knesset elections, with Netanyahu’s coalition remaining in power, looms.
There are alternatives. As with the Naftali Bennett-Yair Lapid “change” government, the opposition could invite Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am party into a new coalition, or former Defense Minister Benny Gantz— should he cross the electoral threshold—might join with Netanyahu, enabling him to cobble together more than sixty-one votes. Both options would yield fragile governments constantly on the verge of collapse because of sectoral and individual demands. Most importantly, a revitalized Netanyahu coalition would never tackle two of the most serious internal problems facing Israel today: integrating the Haredi population into the Israeli Jewish mainstream and squelching Jewish violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.
Haredi refusal to serve in the military impedes the Israel Defense Forces from implementing its post-October 7, 2023, mission.
The Haredi challenge threatens Israel’s security and economic prosperity. Haredi refusal to serve in the military impedes the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from implementing its post-October 7, 2023, mission of border security and throttling foreign threats in the cradle. The lean, mean special operations and technologically superior IDF must now also become an army stationed on all of Israel’s borders. The IDF says it needs at least 12,000 more soldiers, including 7,000 combat troops, to fulfill this mission. Notwithstanding the increase in female war fighters, there is only one source for these bodies: Israel’s almost 1.5 million Haredim.
Drafting Haredim, however, will not resolve the community’s educational deficit. Eighty-four percent of Haredi male secondary-school students do not study any core curriculum subjects: English, math, and science. Most male graduates are qualified only for menial work, and many do not work at all. While there are exceptions, the Haredim are a net drain on Israel’s budget and contribute little to the start-up nation’s high-tech economy. The Haredi community’s 4.2 percent yearly growth rate assures that while the group now comprises 16 percent of Israel’s population, by 2050 it will constitute nearly a quarter and a much larger proportion of its Jewish population. Already, 26 percent of students in Jewish schools are Haredim. This spells potential disaster: Israel simply cannot maintain itself as a First World country with a high-tech economy and superior military if a growing percentage of the population neither serves in the IDF nor receives a twenty-first-century education.
Jewish violence in the West Bank is another problem that a new government must tackle. While even left-wing Zionists such as Yair Golan, a retired major-general and leader of The Democrats party, admit that a Palestinian state is not in the offing, this should not mean that extremist settlers can terrorize Palestinians. Expulsions of Palestinians from their villages and the burning of their houses invites reprisals in kind and shreds what remains of Israel’s good name in the international community. Israel cannot coherently claim that it remains “the only democracy in the Middle East” while casting a blind eye at its citizens’ rampages across the West Bank.
Jewish violence in the West Bank is another problem that a new government must tackle.
A Version 2.0 of Bennett’s “change” government might address these problems but it is doubtful that such a narrow coalition could stay on message and have the cohesion to successfully tackle them. The Haredi problem is particularly thorny: The group’s Torah Sages, who command obedience in the community, remain firmly against reform and have mobilized Haredi masses against the IDF draft. A few Haredi-friendly IDF units or the fact that a few Haredim are acquiring modern skills will not solve the problem. The Israeli leadership must confront the issue head-on by withholding state support for Haredi institutions that do not teach core curriculum and for individuals and their Yeshivas who dodge the draft. The opposition from both Haredi rabbis and the rank-and-file will be fierce; only a strong government with upwards of seventy members of the Knesset could stay the course.
Such a government is feasible, but only if elections break the current political mold of “full right” coalition vs. a motley opposition. A Zionist Unity government, including most Zionist parties, must replace the current model. This government would exclude Haredi parties, which will never consent to sacrificing privileges, and Miniter of Finance Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir’s Jewish Power, which endorse settler violence and resist channeling resources from settlements to Israel’s needs within the Green Line. Such a government would reach from the right (Likud and Bennett) to the center-left (Lapid and possibly Golan), with the prime minister probably coming from the largest party.
Netanyahu needs to abandon his current allies and the opposition must abandon its boycott of Netanyahu.
Two things must happen for this strategy to succeed. Netanyahu needs to abandon his current allies and the opposition must abandon its boycott of Netanyahu. The prime minister is probably not wedded to his current coalition, which has caused him headaches over judicial reform, the Haredi draft-evasion bill, and calls for Jewish settlements in Gaza (and now southern Lebanon). Netanyahu can be flexible. His second government included former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and both Bennett and Lapid served as ministers in his third government. The 2023 judicial reform push was initiated by a Likud faction that Netanyahu did not join, and his Haredi partners forced draft-dodging legislation on him. So long as Netanyahu keeps tight control of Likud, a party that has had only four leaders in almost eighty years, governing with elements from the current opposition actually may be less of a challenge for Netanyahu than juggling the demands of his current far-right and Haredi partners.
The current opposition also must play its part by accepting Netanyahu. Likud is likely to be the largest party after the elections and sidelining the far-right and the Haredim should be reason enough for the opposition to collaborate with their old nemesis. The opposition, however, will need to meet the Likud half-way; for example, some form of consensual judicial reform must be on the agenda. Netanyahu, for all his negligence prior to October 7, 2023, has deftly handled foreign and military affairs since that disaster. Netanyahu’s top goal is remaining in power, for which the Zionist Unity government is likely to be his best post-election option.
The glue to hold together such a broad-based government must come in the form of a pardon from President Isaac Herzog. Not before the elections, which would be construed as partisan interference, but afterwards. A pardon would make it easier for Netanyahu’s current opponents to accept him as prime minister, although it would short-circuit the judicial process. But the best is often the enemy of the good. In this case, the health of Israel’s economy, society, and security—all enhanced by integrating the Haredi community into the twenty-first century and quashing settler violence—must come first.
