Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi promised President Donald Trump during their July 14, 2026, White House meeting that his government would bring all weapons under state control, insisting that Baghdad would not tolerate any armed entity outside state institutions after September 30, 2026. But the challenge Zaidi now faces may be different from the one he pledged to solve. Iran appears to be building a network that no longer depends on the large militias that have defined its influence in Iraq for the past decade.
Three commanders from Iran-aligned Iraqi factions say Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Colonel Hamed Abdollahi, known in Iraqi circles as Haj Hamed, oversees cells made up of fighters drawn from major militias. They operate without the approval of their original commanders but report directly to him.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Colonel Hamed Abdollahi, known in Iraqi circles as Haj Hamed, oversees cells made up of fighters drawn from major militias.
The U.S. Treasury designated Abdollahi in 2011 as a senior Qods Force officer and said he coordinated aspects of the plot to assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir in Washington, DC, while supervising officials involved in planning it. After Qassem Soleimani’s death, security studies linked an aide known as “Haj Hamed” to smaller Iraqi groups, including al-Warithuun, whose members went to Iran for training.
A U.S. strike on a house in Baghdad’s Jadriyah district in March 2026 brought the name back into focus. Iraqi sources later said Abdollahi was present, survived, and then stopped attending public meetings, while orders continued through his deputies. Other reports suggested another Qods Force official, Hamed Naseri, may have been among the targets, leaving some details disputed.
The Islamic Republic also created three or four cells in southern Iraq, each with roughly ten fighters. Iraqi sources attributed at least seven attacks on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates between April 20 and May 17, 2026, to those cells. Some members came from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, but the cells bypassed militia leadership and communicated directly with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Iraqi security sources also reported the reactivation of the “Iran Room,” or “Sharaa Room,” formed in 2025 as part of a plan aimed at toppling Syria’s new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa. The mission later shifted toward the Persian Gulf, according to those sources, bringing together Iran-aligned Iraqi operatives and Houthis as tensions rose around the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.
The September 10–11, 2026, attack on Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline pushed the issue into a new category. Saudi officials said the drones were launched from Iraq. An Iraqi investigation confirmed this, prompting dismissals of security officials in Maysan and operations to locate launch platforms.
The reported use of Shahed-136 long-range drones is important. Security studies indicate that the system was not common in traditional Iraqi militia arsenals and that newer Iranian systems entered Iraq only during the 2026 war. Tehran may now be losing confidence in the traditional militias themselves. The Jadriyah strike demonstrated that Iran’s opponents could penetrate networks surrounding senior advisers and meetings inside Baghdad, raising the possibility that Tehran increasingly views established militia structures as compromised. If its most sensitive systems are now being kept inside smaller cells tied directly to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran may be reducing its dependence on partners whose internal security it no longer fully trusts.
More revealing is where much of the information about Haj Hamed’s network comes from: sources inside Iraq’s own security institutions.
Baghdad’s response has largely remained reactive, with investigations, arrests, dismissals, border closures, and seizures after attacks. None has prevented repeated operations from Iraqi territory.
More revealing is where much of the information about Haj Hamed’s network comes from: sources inside Iraq’s own security institutions. Baghdad may not have an intelligence problem. Its services appear to know much about the network and its leadership. The harder question is whether Zaidi is willing and able to move from negotiating with Iraqi militia chiefs to confronting a structure tied directly to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and designed to bypass them.
Zaidi is in New York for the United Nations General Assembly, where efforts are underway to arrange another meeting with Trump. Their first meeting produced a promise to bring weapons under state control. This time, Zaidi arrives after new attacks on Saudi Arabia and the emergence of a network more elusive than the militias he promised to disarm. The questions will be whether Baghdad has an executable plan for the model now replacing the old one, and whether Trump will accept new promises after Zaidi’s refusal or inability to keep his first.
