As the conflict between the United States and Iran turns hot again with renewed attacks this week, the Gulf Cooperation Council states realize that beyond diplomatic effort, their survival depends on geostrategy, military capacity, and economic resilience. Among the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, Bahrain arguably is the most structurally vulnerable, being the smallest in size, with one of the Council’s most limited indigenous military capacities, constrained resources, and a complex sectarian political landscape.
Moreover, it hosts the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The security architecture that makes Bahrain important to the United States and its regional allies also makes it a target for Iran. Bahrain, therefore, presents a fundamental paradox: The assets that serve to protect it render it exposed.
The security architecture that makes Bahrain important to the United States and its regional allies also makes it a target for Iran.
Bahrain is a small island kingdom consisting of 300 square miles of land. It has a population of just over 1.5 million, of whom only 46.8 percent are citizens. Unlike its bigger neighbors Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain has little strategic depth to absorb a military shock. Bahrain’s defense depends heavily on allied military capabilities, particularly air and missile defense, intelligence, and surveillance. Since 1995, the U.S. Fifth Fleet has headquartered itself there. While this has provided Bahrain with a security umbrella, the presence of U.S. forces also has made U.S. assets front-line targets. The scale of the disruption caused by recent Iranian attacks on the U.S. Naval Support Activity, as the U.S. and Bahrain call the de facto American base, became evident when Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle stated that the U.S. Navy was “not getting back in there anytime soon,” signaling that the Naval Support Activity’s evacuation from Bahrain is likely to be more than temporary.
Bahrain’s domestic political environment presents another complexity. It is the only Gulf Cooperation Council state with a majority Shi‘a population. Bahrain has a deep-rooted indigenous Shi‘i tradition, with a long history of religious scholarship and leadership who have played a key role in community mobilization. This is critical in distinguishing Bahrain’s Shiite identity from wider regional geopolitical rivalries. This demographic structure also has political significance since Bahrain’s ruling Khalifa family are Sunnis, like the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council state rulers.
In 2011, Shi‘a-led opposition and protesters led an uprising demanding political reform, greater representation, and an end to perceived discrimination by the Sunni establishment. The ruling regime suppressed the revolt with the help of Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council forces. However, the uprising exposed a structural vulnerability at the heart of the Bahraini state: the intersection of sectarian division, regime security, and regional competition, particularly within wider Saudi-Iranian rivalry.
The current conflict makes Bahrain vulnerable to the possibility that unresolved domestic political and sectarian fault lines could reactivate. The killing of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, considered a spiritual guide by many Shi‘a, sparked anger among Bahraini Shi‘a. Fearing backlash, the Bahraini government arrested hundreds of mostly Shi‘i Bahrainis over alleged sympathies with Iran. It also limited major Shi‘a commemorations such as ‘Ashura, reflecting the underlying fears of sectarian tension. The Bahraini regime, therefore, confronts a dual security challenge: defending its frontiers against external attack and ensuring that old internal divisions do not reignite.
Bahrain’s economy is dependent on finance, logistics, tourism, aviation, and service sectors that are acutely sensitive to regional instability.
Economic fragility further compounds Bahrain’s vulnerability. Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Petroleum Company jointly own Bahrain’s offshore oil field Abu Safah, and Bahrain markets its 50 percent share with Saudi Aramco. Bahrain’s proven oil reserves amount to approximately 125 million barrels, several orders of magnitude smaller than its neighbors’ reserves. Bahrain’s fiscal position is equally troubling. According to an International Monetary Fund 2025 Article IV assessment, Bahrain’s government debt had reached 134 percent of gross domestic product in 2024, with the fiscal deficit at 11 percent of gross domestic product.
The significance of these figures during wartime goes beyond fiscal weakness, as Bahrain’s economy is dependent on finance, logistics, tourism, aviation, and service sectors that are acutely sensitive to regional instability. In a prolonged conflict, Bahrain has less financial maneuverability than its Gulf Arab neighbors to subsidize its economy, rebuild infrastructure, or sustain extraordinary defense expenditure.
This is the central paradox of Bahraini foreign policy. Through close alignment with Saudi Arabia and the United States, and by joining the Abraham Accords with Israel, Bahrain sought to increase its strategic value. But greater strategic integration has increased its exposure. Bahrain, therefore, may be the Gulf Cooperation Council’s weakest link, mainly from the concentration of strategic assets within a small territory, its dependence on external military protection, its proximity to Iran, limited strategic depth, constrained fiscal space, and unresolved domestic political sensitivities.
On its own, Bahrain lacks indigenous military capacity to independently withstand a sustained confrontation with Iran, but the bigger question is whether its existing security architecture can protect it without further exposing the island to Iranian retaliation.
