Despite having the second-largest natural gas reserves in the world, sanctions, deteriorating infrastructure, and years of poor management have caused Iran to experience shortages. While limited imports from Turkmenistan and Russia offer short-term respite, frequent blackouts and industrial shutdowns reveal the severity of the situation. To rectify this, Tehran is seeking an agreement with Moscow on gas imports. The deal, which would begin with the import of 1.8 billion cubic meters per year and could grow to 55 billion cubic meters, would be less expensive than what Russia charges China or Europe. Additionally, Moscow would finance important infrastructure through Azerbaijan.
Pricing is the final issue awaiting resolution in the negotiations that Russian energy officials are scheduled to conclude in Tehran.
The gas contract was a major topic of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s discussions with President Vladimir Putin on September 1, 2025, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Tianjin, China, according to Kazem Jalali, Iran’s ambassador to Russia. Pricing is the final issue awaiting resolution in the negotiations that Russian energy officials are scheduled to conclude in Tehran. The first phase should start in a few months, and subsequent phases will rely on the construction of significant infrastructure projects that Russia has promised to fund. This phased rollout highlights the infrastructure deficiencies brought on by sanctions and decades of underinvestment, while also reflecting Iran’s pressing need for alternate gas supply, particularly for northern provinces during the winter.
But the agreement is more than a temporary solution. Moscow desires lasting influence on Iran’s energy industry by funding the construction of its pipeline network. Tehran, meanwhile, presents the alliance as a means of overcoming isolation and Western sanctions. The disparity is evident: Russia obtains long-term leverage while Iran receives quick relief.
This conundrum calls into question Iran’s long-term energy sovereignty. Iran is one of the biggest producers in the world, but its reserves have not been fully developed because of sanctions and mismanagement. Tehran now risks increasing its reliance on Moscow by linking infrastructure funding and gas imports to larger collaboration on nuclear and oil projects. The fact that pricing is the only outstanding issue illustrates the negotiation strength Russia wields.
Additionally, the pact makes Iran’s goal of becoming a regional gas hub more difficult to achieve. Russian funding might make possible the infrastructure needed for upcoming exports, including possible connections to Persian Gulf neighbors, but a dependence on imports could reduce incentives for domestic investment in processing and exploration. This trade-off raises a larger conundrum: weighing the short-term advantage of reducing shortages against the long-term costs of dependency.
Tehran risks being locked into an asymmetric arrangement that restricts its capacity to diversify relationships or develop an independent energy policy.
Entanglement poses serious dangers. Tehran risks being locked into an asymmetric arrangement that restricts its capacity to diversify relationships or develop an independent energy policy by relying too much on discounted Russian gas. Russia has economic clout when it comes to financing infrastructure through Moscow, which could influence Iran’s political stance. Ordinary Iranians will be particularly sensitive to this arrangement due to Russia’s history of imposing unequal commercial arrangements on Iran in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. Swap arrangements, in which Tehran satisfies southern demand while Russia supplies northern Iran, further solidify dependency and provide intricate dynamics that leave Iran’s energy security vulnerable to Russian manipulation. Iran’s goal of becoming a self-sufficient energy hub under the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union free trade agreement is in jeopardy due to this implied transfer of power.
Iran needs to invest significantly in its own gas infrastructure, broaden its alliances beyond Russia, and ensure that import and swap agreements do not impede its ability to export or advance technologically. Tehran must weigh the immediate benefit of Russian imports against the possibility of undermining energy sovereignty. The persistent pricing disagreements highlight the danger: Moscow’s leverage can be strengthened by the easy conversion of economic terms into political influence.
In the end, the Iran-Russia gas deal encapsulates how necessity and geopolitics intersect in a broken world order. Although the deal would give Tehran short-term stability under sanctions, it also risks preventing fulfillment of its goal to be an independent energy power.
