The United Kingdom’s $10.7 billion sale of 20 Eurofighter Typhoons to Turkey, announced during Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit to Ankara, is being celebrated in London as a “win for NATO security.” In reality, it empowers a belligerent regime that threatens NATO allies Greece and Cyprus and even dreams about waging a war on Israel. What Downing Street calls renewal is instead a revival of Ankara’s regional ambitions.
Since Greece fielded Rafale DG/EG fighters at Tanagra, the Hellenic Air Force has held a decisive edge over Turkey. Rafale radars, Spectra EW suites, and Meteor missiles curtailed Turkish airspace violations across the Aegean. The response by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not moderation but preparation: Turkish and Qatari pilots began joint training to analyze Rafale performance and rehearse counter-tactics. The new Typhoons—first deliveries expected in 2030—will restore Turkey’s lost advantage and could reignite the daily intrusions that had largely ceased.
Equipping such a state with Europe’s premier fighter rewards defiance, not deterrence.
London argues that Turkey is a “vital NATO ally” securing the Black Sea, yet Ankara’s record of buying Russia’s S-400 system, undermining sanctions, and threatening to seize Greek islands shows the opposite. Equipping such a state with Europe’s premier fighter rewards defiance, not deterrence. The United Kingdom repeats France’s earlier mistake of prioritizing export revenue and employment over end-use control and alliance security.
For the United States, the consequences are direct. The Typhoon’s full combat capability depends on several U.S.-made subsystems—Link-16 MIDS terminals, Mode 5 IFF crypto gear, and integration of AIM-120 AMRAAM and Paveway IV weapons. Each requires U.S. export licenses. Congress can condition or delay these approvals, restricting Turkey’s ability to field networked or precision-armed Typhoons. Without American data-linkage, GPS, and munitions support, Ankara’s aircraft will remain downgraded. Washington has previously used similar leverage to freeze F-16 sales and block Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program; it can do so again.
Lawmakers have firm legal grounds. The Arms Export Control Act authorizes denial of re-export licenses when transfers risk destabilizing allies. Empowering Erdoğan with multirole fighters of this class clearly meets that threshold. Turkish pilots already trained alongside Qatari Typhoons and Rafales will transition smoothly to the Typhoon cockpit, entering future confrontations with tactical insight into Greece’s air tactics. In any Aegean or Cyprus scenario, that knowledge—combined with new Typhoon sensors—directly threatens U.S. partners.
London defends the deal as industrial policy. It sustains production lines at Warton, Samlesbury, Bristol, and Edinburgh, supporting 20,000 jobs across BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce, and Leonardo UK. Yet economic gain cannot justify enabling an aggressor within NATO. A “Plan for Change” that enriches British factories while endangering European allies exposes the moral emptiness of such policy. Selling Typhoons to Turkey is not deterrence; it is subsidized escalation.
Congress should demand a full audit of U.S.-origin technology in the Typhoon and restrict any export licenses for components destined for Turkey.
Washington should act before the transfer becomes irreversible. Congress should demand a full audit of U.S.-origin technology in the Typhoon and restrict any export licenses for components destined for Turkey. The Pentagon should limit NATO data-linkage and support to Turkish aircraft until Ankara complies with alliance standards. Should BAE Systems bypass these restrictions, targeted financial measures—including denial of future U.S. contracts—must remain options.
The Eastern Mediterranean has become the test of whether NATO can prevent its members from arming their own destabilizers. The Rafale sale to Greece created a fleeting deterrent; the Typhoon sale to Turkey may erase it. By 2030, Turkey will again field a fleet able to challenge Hellenic, Cypriot, and even Israeli airspaces—this time built with British pride and U.S. technology. London may celebrate jobs saved in Lancashire, but Athens, Jerusalem, and Nicosia will count the cost in security lost.
Britain’s decision shows how alliance stability collapses when economic expediency eclipses strategic judgment. A deal sold as a boost for NATO instead empowers its most erratic member. The Typhoon sale may keep British assembly lines alive, but it risks igniting the Aegean—a price neither the United States nor Europe can afford to ignore.
