An essential element of Israel’s operation in Iran has been to weaken the forces Iran uses to suppress its people. Among such targets was Iran’s police commander, Ahmad-Reza Radan, though his fate remains unclear. Israel also attacked the Greater Tehran Police Command. Iranians learned of the attack via the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting on live television when a rocket interrupted the anchor. These are not targets that pose threats to Israel; they are obstacles to an Iranian uprising. During public unrest, the police force is first line of suppression, while national television intimidates would-be protestors. Still, the end of the Islamic Republic is likelier than ever, but a popular uprising that topples the regime could leave the world worse off.
The regime is near collapse because it has failed to fulfill the three promises at the heart of the 1979 Islamic Revolution: The regime has neither leveled the economy nor defeated corruption. It has not achieved a society defined by religion, and the broader Iranian public rejects anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism.
The end of the Islamic Republic is likelier than ever, but a popular uprising that topples the regime could leave the world worse off.
Only 10 to 20 percent of the population supports the state, of which many are the youthful thugs who populate the paramilitary Basij and put down protests. These basijis have seethed for decades. On the one hand, girls wearing hijab improperly, boyfriends and girlfriends holding hands, and people walking their pet dogs against Islamic practices anger them. On the other hand, they see the rich children of regime elite living lavish lifestyles. Since the 2000s, the Islamic Republic has been more aggressive with its foreign policy, in part as a compromise with its base. In exchange for losing heaven at home, the Islamic Republic would make life hell for Americans and Israelis.
Iran’s foreign policy setbacks since the killing of Qods Force commander Qassem Soleimani have voided this compact between the state and its supporters. Since 2020, the regime has lost its celebrity general; its proxies have been under open assault by U.S. forces; Israel has been waging a war in Gaza with Iran watching idly; Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, whose stature was second only to Soleimani, has been killed; and Hezbollah a shadow of its former self. The nuclear program has been the last bastion of legitimacy for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his regime. Its imminent loss will delegitimize them among the most hardline Iranians.
The most optimistic scenario for what comes after the Islamic Republic is a free and secular Iran. But the best-case scenarios rarely come about without the backing of a great power. Meanwhile, other powers such as Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have stakes in Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will remain the most powerful actor in shaping Iran’s future absent U.S. involvement simply because of its weaponry and resources.
Revolutions and civil wars are not democracies where the most populous group wins. Most Iranians want a free future, but they do not have a patron. The conservative youth who might turn against the state do, and they will follow their values. In other words, if they turn against Khamenei and his regime, it will be in favor of a new leader who can deliver the promises Khamenei made.
The other actors, all foreign states, are also illiberal regimes inimical to U.S. interests, and they will play their hands toward an undemocratic outcome in Iran. If the regime collapses, without U.S. action, the best-case scenario will be a Revolutionary Guard dictatorship. Likelier, Iran will devolve into a civil war more destructive and destabilizing than those in Syria and Libya.
The dream of a free Iran is realistic. It is one that most Iranians prefer. But it needs its backer. Among the diaspora, there are many candidates to pick up the mantle as a transitional authority. This has been a problem in itself. The Iranian diaspora is crowded with factions and infighting. The only way to overcome it is for the U.S. government to finally pick its favorite and stick with it.
[Regime] collapse without a succession plan is a recipe for disaster.
A successful policy of regime change also will require Khamenei’s surrender of authority to a U.S.-backed successor. To affect this, Khamenei must be kept alive to prevent anarchy and state collapse, but he must feel defenseless. There are reports that he suffers from panic attacks in a bunker and is partially kept in the dark. To convince him to forfeit power, he will have to be left defenseless, without his senior commanders and oppressive forces. His son Mojtaba has been the architect of suppressing protests since 2009 and is the likeliest candidate to succeed him. Eliminating him will be the most devastating blow to Khamenei’s hopes of survival.
The Iranian people have neither forgotten nor forgiven the Mojahedin-e Khalq for fighting against them during the Iran-Iraq War. Other than that group, picking any faction’s leader as the transitional authority would be better than choosing nobody.
A failure to do such a thing was a key reason for the failure of the Iraq War. In the prelude to the war, the Bush administration’s State Department sabotaged the efforts to form a government-in-waiting for Iraq. The result was the Coalition Provisional Authority, an experiment never to be repeated again. In Libya, too, the Obama administration failed to have a day-after plan, and the civil war there continues today. It is imperative not to repeat past mistakes.
There is a difference between the policies of regime change and regime collapse. Change is replacing the old with something new. Collapse without a succession plan is a recipe for disaster. Israel is doing its part to affect the end of the Islamic Republic, and Washington must ensure that its interests are protected in what comes next.
