On May 25, 2025, Elaheh Hossein-Nezhad, a 24-year-old Tehran resident, disappeared. Her family used social media to help find her, and the campaign became viral. On June 5, her body was found with stab wounds outside of Tehran. Unlike with the Mahsa Amini case that sparked the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, the government of Iran is not the culprit—but it is the subject of popular scorn and has the potential to spark unrest.
Investigations suggest that Hossein-Nezhad entered a cab to return home from work. The driver was a homeless man, going through a divorce, new to Tehran, and spent nights in his brother’s car. He intended to steal her phone, but she resisted, and he murdered her.
In Iran, a simple cell phone is valuable enough to murder someone.
In Iran, a simple cell phone is valuable enough to murder someone. It is also a valuable that people cannot forfeit, even in the face of violence. Cell phone robberies have rapidly increased. Phones are not the only target. In February 2025, a University of Tehran student was murdered during an attempted laptop theft.
Iranians fed up with such crime direct their anger toward the Islamic Republic. Poverty has elevated crime to an unprecedented level and, with resources limited, the government chooses foreign adventurism over hiring police to maintain order. During the first week of Hossein-Nezhad’s disappearance, suspicion was rife that the police were indifferent, especially because law enforcement announced the formation of a special unit to investigate her case eight days after she had gone missing.
Similarities between the Amini and Hossein-Nezhad murders carry possible political ramifications. The Amini protests happened because the saga dragged on for days while her beating at police hands led to a coma prior to her death. Even before her death, Iranians used social media to raise awareness about her beating. When the state confirmed her death, the built-up pressure exploded into street protests.
Similarly, the period between Hossein-Nezhad’s disappearance and the discovery of the body allowed Iranians to learn about the story, anxiously awaiting a conclusion, while becoming emotionally attached to her plight.
The three major protests in Iran over the last ten years happened unexpectedly.
Some Iranians believe that Hossein-Nezhad’s case has the potential for another uprising, and over the coming days and weeks, things might spiral out of control—especially as Iran experiences a nationwide truckers’ strike. Perhaps the reason why Iran has not already erupted is that the security forces, having learned from the 2022 protests sparked by Amini’s death, are more competently managing the crisis. They likely have pressured the victim’s family not to make public pronouncements. The regime also has embraced Hossein-Nezhad’s case to appear sympathetic and is prosecuting her alleged killer—unlike with the Amini case, when the regime protected the murderer(s).
The three major protests in Iran over the last ten years happened unexpectedly. In 2017, the people co-opted the hardliners’ own protests against the moderate Hassan Rouhani administration. In 2019, a routine increase in gas prices triggered demonstrations and, in 2022, Amini’s altercation with the morality police sparked unrest.
Even if Hossein-Nezhad’s murder does not lead to protests, it has revived public anxiety and turned Iranians’ focus away from international events to domestic injustice once again. Whether sparked by Hossein-Nezhad’s death or not, the potential for mass unrest is growing. The Hossein-Nezhad’s case may not ignite it, but it will accelerate the inevitable.
