Defining Jihadism

Recently, the Daily Wire revealed that an internal newsletter from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence featured an article arguing for “changing terminology related to counterterrorism,” because “certain phrases to identify international terrorism... are hurtful to Muslim-Americans.” One of the supposedly “problematic phrases” is the term “jihadist.” An alternative suggestion given in the newsletter to denote jihadists is the word khawarij.¹

If one wanted to find stereotypical “woke” discourse and political correctness, one would be hard pressed to find a better example than this. Unfortunately, the suggested change in terminology only creates more obstacles to an accurate understanding of contemporary terrorism and insurgent activity associated with the Islamic State (ISIS) and al-Qa’ida.

For a start, the term khawarij (which can be translated in the broadest sense as “outsiders”) is not immediately understandable to broader audiences or those without knowledge of historical and present-day usage of the term in Arabic-language and Islamic discourse. In this regard, the use of the term recalls the British government’s official adoption of the derisive Arabic acronym “Da’esh’"(standing for “the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham”) to refer to the Islamic State -- an acronym that is by now familiar to Arabic-speakers but is meaningless to most English-speakers.

Within Islamic discourse today, the term khawarij is often thrown at those who are deemed too extreme in their beliefs. It may be as an insult, for example, against the Islamic State by al-Qa’ida, or from other Sunni Muslims against the Islamic State and al-Qa’ida. Even the Islamic State uses the term khawarij to describe groups it deems too extreme: most notably, the faction dubbed Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna lil-Da’wa wa al-Jihad, which broke off from the Islamic State in the West Africa region and continues to fight against the Islamic State.

The historical and present-day baggage of the term khawarij means that using the term in an attempt to delegitimise groups such as al-Qa’ida and Islamic State is unlikely to prove fruitful. Worse, it impedes proper understanding among the general public regarding the beliefs of these groups and makes it seem as though non-Muslim governments have the authority to arbitrate on what constitutes the proper “middle” path of Islam and who are the supposed deviants going too far in their beliefs.

However, this discussion does raise the issue of definitions of jihadism and its associated term jihadist.²

It is also not helpful to apply the terms jihadism and jihadist to any use of the term jihad by Muslims. Some Muslims do insist that “greater jihad” should be defined as some personal or spiritual struggle, far removed from the idea of taking up arms. Others speak of jihad (“lesser jihad”) in the sense of an armed struggle.

One of the most useful ways of looking at this issue might be through the lens of “extremism” as developed by JM Berger, utilising social identity theory. People often define themselves in terms of in-groups (such as a religious community) and corresponding out-groups (such as individuals and groups who do not share the religious identity of the in-group). In-groups and their corresponding out-groups may simply co-exist or perhaps compete to win adherents while not necessarily being hostile to each other. For Berger, “extremism” is when an in-group sees its survival and success as unable to be separated from hostility to an out-group — ranging from defamation to discrimination, to genocide at the worst.

For groups conventionally seen as jihadist, there is an eternal conflict between believers/Muslims (in-group) and disbelievers/non-Muslims (out-group). It is a conflict that is religious in nature. The Muslim ummah is portrayed as facing an immediate crisis: supposed degradation, humiliation and subjugation at the hands of the disbelievers. The solution to this immediate crisis is to wage jihad (violent hostile action) to expel the non-Muslim “invaders” or “apostate” entities, such as those that have supposedly abandoned Islam because they do not implement Islamic law in its totality and supposedly collaborate with the non-Muslims.

Ultimately, however, there is the broader “crisis” of the existence of disbelievers and their exercise of any sovereignty or power on any part of the Earth. Thus, the jihad continues against them until they convert to Islam, are subjugated as second-class dhimmis (an option for Jews, Christians and certain other non-Muslims) or are killed.

Islamic State, for instance, in Issue 15 of its English-language magazine, Dabiq, (published in 2016) carried an article addressed to the West, “Why We Hate You and Fight You.” The foremost reason, in the words of the article, is “because you are disbelievers,” and then elaborating:

The article then mentions grievances of “crimes against Muslims” such as bombing raids that “kill, and maim our people around the world,” the West’s “puppets in the usurped lands of the Muslims [that] oppress, torture, and wage war against anyone who calls to the truth,” and the invasion of Muslim lands. Expelling the Western presence from Muslim lands and deposing their “puppets” may be the more immediate objectives, but they are derivative of the broader crisis of the existence of disbelievers and the impediment they present to the ability of Islamic State to exercise its sovereignty anywhere on Earth.

The same basic worldview is articulated by al-Qa’ida. An interview, entitled “Questions and Answers Regarding al-Aqsa Flood and its Repercussions,” from October 2023, shows differences between al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State. Most notably, whereas al-Qa’ida was effusive in its praise for the Hamas-led “al-Aqsa Flood” attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Islamic State could not bring itself to praise the operation because, unlike al-Qa’ida, it considers Hamas in all its forms to be an “apostate” movement for reasons such as its alliance with Iran and failure to implement Islamic law in its entirety.

Nonetheless, the same basic jihadist worldview came through when the late leader of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Khaled Batarfi, was asked about how he viewed the reactions of rulers of Muslim lands to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, as well as his message to the broader Muslim masses. For Batarfi, those rulers’ policies apparently indicated the hollowness of their words of condemnation against Israel’s actions: he asked for God to grant Muslims a “caliphate” to replace these rulers. Batarfi subsequently explained that the conflict with “the Jews and Crusaders” is a “religious battle.”

No one, he continued, should be deceived “that we fight the Jews only because they are occupying the Muslims’ land or [we fight the Americans] only because the Americans occupy the Muslims’ land and wield power over us.” Rather, the other crucial reason is that “they have disbelieved in God Almighty.” He elaborated:

Thus, while serious disagreements arise between jihadist groups to the point that they often fight each other in interminable, internecine warfare, the basic worldview remains the same.

It is possible to define jihadism concisely as follows: “Jihadism is a worldview in which the survival and success of Muslims can never be separated from waging armed jihad against disbelievers of various kinds. The solution to the broader crisis posed by disbelief entails continuous jihad that should first reunite Muslim lands under one caliphate and then seek to conquer the entire world for Islam.”

The definition does not purport to say whether this worldview constitutes the correct interpretation of Islam. Rather, it only notes the necessary centrality of armed jihad to that worldview.

Additionally, defining jihadism in this way also leads to a better appreciation of distinctions between Islamic groups. One corollary of the definition is jihadism’s hostility to the current global system of nation-states.

There is no need, therefore, to abandon the terms jihadism and jihadist out of political correctness or fear of offending Muslims. When appropriately defined, those terms are helpful in grasping the terrorist and insurgent threats and challenges posed by al-Qa’ida, the Islamic State and similar groups -- far more so than khawarij, a term that does not have immediately clear meaning for wider audiences, is historically inaccurate, and sounds like a sneaky effort to cloud a very real threat.

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[1] Those described as the first khawarij in Islamic sources are recorded as having opposed the rule of Ali bin Abi Talib, who served as the fourth successor (caliph) to rule over the Muslim community after the death of Islam’s founder, Muhammad. In fact, like other Sunni Muslims, al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State accept Ali as one of the “rightly-guided” caliphs who represented the ideal system of governance they seek to create: that is, the theocratic polity of the caliphate that unites the global Muslim community.

Also, a number of specific beliefs are ascribed to historical groups deemed Khawarij such as declaring other Muslims to be non-Muslims on the mere basis of committing grave sins like fornication and drinking alcohol. These beliefs are rejected by al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State.

[2] On the broadest level, while the term jihad is most readily associated with Islam, it also occurs in Arabic-language Christian discourse in a positive sense to denote a spiritual struggle and willingness to suffer persecution and die for one’s faith.

For example, a liturgy book of the Melkite Greek Catholic Church (an autonomous church within the Catholic Church, based mainly in the Levant region and using Greek and Arabic as its liturgical languages) uses the term jihad to describe the death of Isidore of Chios, commemorated by the church as a martyr who died during the Roman persecution of Christians in the third century. As recorded in the liturgy book:

This sort of language is similar to the imagery that can be found in Latin Christian writings about martyrdom.